

# Виктор Суворов



Главная книга  
о Второй Мировой

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**ПРАВДА**  
**Виктора Суворова**

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# **Виктор Суворов:** **Главная книга** **о Второй Мировой**

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TO THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE "ICEBREAKER" OF VICTOR SUVOROV! Few people know that this legendary book was completed back in 1981, but then 68 publishing houses from 9 countries refused to print it, some chapters were published only four years later in the Russian Thought newspaper, the entire circulation of the first English edition was bought unknown and destroyed, and the first publisher of the Icebreaker in Russia was killed. The book itself was also tried more than once to "soak in the toilet", but, although

cedent harassment by the Kremlin agitprop does not stop for the second decade now, all the attempts of the ideological "killers" turned out to be in vain - Viktor Suvorov to this day remains not only the most cursed, but also the most read military historian, and in his under more and more professional researchers from all over the world are speaking out.

The NEW SERIES of Viktor Suvorov not only provides irrefutable proof of his correctness, but also restores the true story of one of the main books of the late 20th century, which forever changed the idea of the causes and perpetrators of the Second World War, and in terms of its impact on the mass consciousness is comparable only to The Gulag Archipelago ". (FROM THE COMPILER)

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With Viktor Suvorov  
Dmitry Khmel'nitsky is talking  
MEMORIES AND REFLECTIONS

- *"Icebreaker" is the most famous book of Victor Suvorov. She provided him with worldwide fame, but also provoked the most protests. "Icebreaker" split into two camps of not only Russian, but also world historical science, completely turned over the usual ideas of millions of people about Soviet history and the history of World War II. When you have the first ideas for the book "Icebreaker" appeared?*

- I think it is difficult for every author to determine the first moment when this or that idea arose. First there was understanding. And then the desire to present all this somewhere and somehow. I had a few of these kind of insights.

There is a lecture at the Kiev School. Frunze. And in the process of presenting historical material by the lecturer, it turns out that when studying the defeat of the Red Army on June 22, 1941, we should focus our attention on what kind of backward equipment we had at the initial stage of the war, how stupid we were, what stupid Stalin was, and so on. Further.

But the fact that in September 1941 there was a terrible defeat of the Red Army near Kiev - it's already impossible to talk about this, this is already anti-Soviet. The encirclement near Kharkov in May 1942 was not mentioned in any of our textbooks, it was not reflected anywhere, it was closed, and any mention of it was anti-Soviet, and if anything, it was sorted out by the KGB. Here I had one of the first insights, although, perhaps, not the first.

This is what is surprising and strange - why there is only one such date, one such event, the only one in our history, in the study of which we focus on the bad. After all, everything we have is the best: crops, and athletes, and science, and education, crime is drastically reduced, going to zero.

And then there was Chernobyl. The first reaction to him was that nothing happened, something happened, but not much. At the end of April it broke out, and in Kyiv there was a May Day demonstration. Specially should have been shown to everyone

ru that nothing is scary to us, nothing happened here.

Suicide statistics were classified. Everything negative is under the rug!

But there is only one date - June 22, 1941 - when all the negativity is suddenly put on display for the whole world! We, they say, should focus our attention on this, study in more detail how stupid we were, and

all that.

For example: 73% of our tanks needed repairs by June 22nd. This is a scandal for the whole world! How many tanks in general - never and nowhere was it said, only about cents. From an unknown number. If we had not mentioned this, no one would have known about the unrepaired tanks. But for some reason we said.

Or our other "stories" - a six-volume or twelve-volume history of the Great Patriotic War. The section on the beginning of the Second World War - how bad Hitler was, what and where he captured ... And then the next section - the peaceful work of the Soviet people, in which our "liberation campaigns" are inscribed. The latter had nothing to do with the Second World War!

And so I'm preparing for the seminars and studying the dates. I write all the dates from different sections, seemingly unrelated to each other, on one sheet to make it easier to remember. And it turns out: on September 1, Hitler attacked Poland. And on September 17, we began a "liberation campaign" in the same Poland. I write out

easy to remember...

Or - our "liberation campaign" in Finland. It ended in March 1940, and in April Hitler entered Denmark and Norway. In May-June 1940, Hitler attacks France, Belgium, Holland, and so on. And in June we have a "liberation campaign" in Rumania. And in July Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia "voluntarily" join the Soviet Union.

When you put it together, it becomes somehow uncomfortable. "Liberation Campaign" is the same thing, just a different name. And we did the same thing at the same time!

- *Materials about the preparation of the attack you already where, in cadet times, did you collect?*

— Yes, but as a collection of our stupidity. Here we are creating airborne troops, never used in the war. Or rather, they used it a couple of times and always unsuccessfully. An airborne assault was landed near Moscow in the winter of 1941/42. Where the hell is the landing - in the snow, in the frost ... The Dnieper landing of 1943 is unsuccessful. De Santa only works when we have air supremacy. It is necessary to bring the troops to the place, land them, provide them with air support, and then drop everything on them - potatoes, and dumplings, and ammunition, and blood, and medicines. And this requires our absolute dominance in the air. So, how stupid we are, we were preparing airborne troops, which were never used.

I am reading the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan. In 1940, we suddenly began to reorganize our rifle divisions in the Carpathians into mountain rifle divisions. Then it was in the Kiev military district. And the marshal writes, they say, that "I catch myself thinking why did we form these mountain rifle divisions, we have to fight on the plains." And we lightened the mountain rifle divisions, that is, we removed all heavy weapons from them. They gave them ropes, spiked shoes, and so on. And the divisions were not capable of the war that began later. Another seemingly stupidity.

And then there's this lecture. When we get ready to the offensive, we are pulling airfields to the border. Here is an example: Zhukov in 1939 was preparing for a strike on the 6th Japanese Army and pulled up airfields as close as possible to the eastern state border of Mongolia so that the planes, as soon as we advance, would fly at full radius, ammunition depots, supplies, hospital base and so on - all as close as possible. We must go ahead. This means that all this should be pulled up to the front edge.

Further, in the next lecture (after some time) it is said that Hitler, before attacking us, pulled up airfields, warehouses, headquarters, communications centers to the border  
And so on.

Further. The Soviet Union, they say, was not preparing for war. And he brought airfields to the very border, and warehouses, and so on. All this was bombed by the Germans. We are so stupid...

The same examples... A certain time passes, and they tell me about the most brilliant operation of the Red Army. August 1945, Manchurian offensive operation. And all the mistakes of 1941 for this case are described to me as a model of correct action: you need to move airfields to the very border, command posts, headquarters, warehouses, and so on. That the officers were released on vacation so that the enemy would not guess anything, the border guards were mowing hay at the very border, songs were played, movies were played. And then - r-r-time, and hit the enemy. This is how you should act!

It turns out that the same "mistakes" of 1941 are superimposed here on the brilliant operation of 1945! And all the same mistakes are literally repeated!

In 1941, many of our airfields had a double set of aircraft. Let's say there are 60 pilots, and 120 planes. Like, if the enemy attacks, 60 pilots will fly away on 60 planes, but what to do with the rest? Well, that's complete nonsense! This is what they tell me, but six months pass, and they tell me that in 1945 we did something very cunning. To prevent the enemy from guessing that we are preparing a blow against him, we do not

we carry out the relocation of aviation equipment, and we are gradually replacing old aircraft in an already concentrated military units with new ones, rearmament - and that's all. And the old planes remain right there. The enemy receives reassuring information from his reconnaissance: as there was a fighter regiment, so it stands there, as there was a bomber regiment, so it stands, and the regiment commander

same...

As soon as we struck, the regiment got up and went forward and relocated to new airfields in front, at this time a new regiment was relocated from the depths of the country, where there were only officers-pilots and technicians. As soon as they landed, a new regiment immediately turned out on the equipment left in advance. It does not need to be formed, it was formed long ago, but was located five thousand kilometers from the place of events, now the personnel were put into several transport aircraft and transferred to everything ready.

Exactly the same situation arose when I served in the Carpathian military district and at one time received my platoon. Each regiment of our 66th Guards Division had a second set of weapons. I am the leader of the first platoon. There were not enough officers, and sergeants commanded the second third platoons.

- *Conscripts?* ..

— Yes, yes, conscripts. This was the period of the Soviet-Chinese conflict, the war for Damansky Island, etc. In the companies, the commander and commander of the first platoon were often among the officers. And that's it.

I had to replace the company commander in all cases: vacation, call to headquarters, drinking or other important absences.

And in terms of deployment, I am a company commander in the division of the second formation.

I explain.

Here they announce the alarm, the division rises and leaves somewhere. And in the division, as I said, there are two sets of weapons. Tanks - we had T-55 and T-54, and

the old kit was kept - T-34. We had self-propelled guns Su-122-54. It was a powerful weapon, I have never seen them anywhere, not in any pictures. And the old kit is Su-100. The old ones stood, and the new ones were used. By the way, the film "In War as in War" was filmed in our division, military consultants were the commander and chief of staff of the division. We get new assault rifles, AKM, we hand over the old assault rifles, AK, to the warehouse. The division received new anti-tank guns - "Rapier", we hand over the old guns to the warehouse, to the storage. They are then either sold to our "class brothers" - the Vietnamese, for example, or somewhere else, handed over to some state arsenals. But there was always a second, previous, former ammunition load in the division before it was replaced by a new one.

So, the division left on combat alert. Our 145th Guards Regiment, the deputy commander of the regiment, the deputy chief of staff, deputy battalion commanders, officers replacing commanders, and from each company and battery, the commander of the first platoon, remain in the town. The same is true in another regiment, and in the division as a whole. And there was a complete set of weapons.

What is it? This is the skeleton of the regiment of the second fore peace.

Why is it good? There is no need to form a new division. All commanders are there, all of us are not reservists, we all know each other. We get soldiers - fat reservists, they sit on the old weapons that we have - and the second division is ready.

All this is a good system. But here is the shortcoming. We were at the very border, in Chernivtsi. If the division left, and in the military camps there were only deputies without personnel (for now!) And we were attacked, then this second formation would immediately die. As long as we recruit fat reservists (it will take a day or two!), we will all be caught. When I looked at this system in 1968, I suddenly remembered this so-called "stupidity" of ours that there were two sets of aircraft at each of our airfields in 1941. This

the system worked only in an offensive war, when the first train went forward, and a set of old aircraft remained on an empty airfield. We get pilots and we have a second regiment.

*- This system was promoted in 1941?*

"The same system as I saw it in 1968. And then I remembered what I said above. All this is necessary only in case of preparation for an attack! This system only works in offensive warfare. So everything that was talked about until 1941 was not stupidity, but preparation for an attack! If you deploy everything at once and completely, then you can scare the enemy.

In the book "Day M" I described such a situation. In 1968, before entering Czechoslovakia (M-day), suddenly all the soldiers with whom I served in Zakarpattya were changed into leather boots. All at once! Usually they went to tarpaulins! It was a signal. All

it became clear: preparation for an attack.

Soldiers on the territory of the GDR, in Poland walked in cowhide boots, in the capital's garrisons - in Moscow, Kyiv - also walked in cowhide boots, and the rest of the soldier mass - in tarpaulin. We are standing at the border, we got lice, we want to go to the bathhouse, everyone is wondering: let's go - we won't go ... And suddenly - they change everyone's shoes into cowhide boots! All clear, we'll go.

We didn't know what happened, whether it was a world war or something like that, but it's clear: let's go.

And one old man, with whom we once had a drink, said: everything is exactly the same as in 1941. And then the soldiers also dressed in cowhide boots. Damn yourself! It was a signal!

And I have accumulated a lot of material about these boots. They just don't give new shoes to a soldier.

He lectured us at the academy - this was already later - Lieutenant General Moshe Milshtein, an old scout, a wolf, was an illegal immigrant, worked in the Main Directorate of Strategic Camouflage.

By the way, when I had already run away, this general came

to the west. Just then, cruise missiles were deployed, including in England, there were protests and all that. Powerful was then the campaign of struggle for peace. And here he was, in an American dialect, very pure, speaking for peace, against cruise missiles. Imagine a Soviet general comes and says that this is simply not good from an ethical point of view! You expose Britain to nuclear strikes and all that... And all the press here admired: what kind of generals are there in the Soviet Union, how cultured they are, how educated they are, how fluently they speak English and not just like that, but with American accent...

Once I spoke, and I was asked a question about this general. I asked them if they could find a lieutenant general who spoke Russian fluently and was ready to go to the Soviet Union and in Moscow to agitate for disarmament there. Since when did generals start advocating disarmament? Let him agitate in his own country, why did he come to the enemies with agitation? By the way, Milstein is the author of the book "Honorary Service" with the stamp "Owl. secret." We studied it at the academy.

- *Is he not one of Sudoplatov's guys?*

— No, no, Milstein was from the GRU. So, he gives us a lecture and talks about the stupidity of Stalin after the Second World War. It was just at a time when relations with China were deteriorating. China's teeth erupted, and he began to bite us little by little. And Milstein says: "What stupidity was allowed! Manchuria was an independent state, Tibet was an independent state, Inner Mongolia could be made an independent state. When in 1945 Stalin kicked the Japanese out of China, it was necessary to preserve independent Manchuria, independent Tibet, set up some more buffer states, we would now live in clover, not having a common border with China. And everyone says: oh, they say, what a truth!

And the devils pulled my tongue, and here I am saying: "That



comrade general, this is all great, but in 1939 we did not have a common border with Germany, but we took it and established it. That is, he recalled the situation when we deliberately established a common border with Hitler. He clapped his jaw and found nothing to answer. I put him in a rut. Here is the call. He read the second lecture without remembering my question. And I bit my own tongue. There were no consequences, however.

I then thought that it would really be good if they did this with China. But we acted differently, we thought that China was in our pocket... And in 1939, if we had not made a common border with Germany, we would have kept Poland, well, at least cut down, there would have been no common border with Hitler, there would have been no and a surprise attack.

So there were several such insights, until

there was an understanding.

*- Many times I heard a reproach against Suvorov that, they say he does not use the archives. On what material was written "Icebreaker"?*

"Intentionally did not use the archives, quite deliberately. "Icebreaker" is written on open sources, on material published in the public press.

I wanted to say: ladies and gentlemen, here it all lies on the surface! And why do you need archives - everything, I repeat, is already open! Here Marx said, here Lenin said, here Trotsky said. Here Stalin said, and here are his actions. But the actions of the Red Army.

Let's assume that all the memoirs written since 1945, which we were fed all the time, that all this is a lie! But then I'm a winner again! Let's admit that Zhukov lied. Who am I quoting: Zhukov, Vasilevsky, in principle, all the marshals that we had in the USSR, and left any written materials ... Marshal Timoshenko did not leave memoirs, but there are his speeches, there are transcripts of his speeches, which I also quote. And even Marshal of the Soviet Union for Brezhnev Leonid Ilyich, what a regiment

kid ... - too. If they lie, then you have to openly admit that all this is a lie, that all this waste paper should be burned!

Then I reasoned: if all this is a lie, then tell me what really happened. So, price

The beauty of my sources lies in the fact that the the apostates themselves speak of their crimes. These are their words. I didn't invent this.

And when we talk about archives, I hit their scientific heads with the same club. Okay, I say, guys, then show me the plan for the defense of the Soviet Union. You have access to all archives. Show me where to see it. Colonel General Gorkov spoke with a series of devastating articles "The End of the Global Lie" and cited the text of a plan to cover the state border during deployment. That is, while the Red Army is being deployed, it gradually comes to support the border guards in the border zone. "Comrade General," I say, "is this all that our strategic plans, all the strategic plans of the state, exhausted, to send battalions and hold the borders together with the border guards until the Red Army unfolds? And when it turns around, what will happen?

They are silent. So, when they reproach me for not using archives, I answer them the same way. Now I am writing a new book, The Last Republic, Part Two, and I show that neither Zhukov nor our other outstanding commanders had any knowledge of the Red Army. They are admitted to all archives, but their knowledge, to put it mildly, is negligible.

*- State military historians had access to the archives, and I think that they still have it. But practically none of the archives is used. That their documentary base is absolutely no different from yours!*

- Yes. This is first. And, secondly, at one time I calculated the document dated March 11, 1941. General ar

Mii Gareev, former deputy. The chief of the General Staff for scientific work, and now the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, says that access to a certain part of the archive will not be open soon. This is 60 years after the war! After that, the same general reproaches me why I do not use the archives. On the one hand, it's closed, on the other hand, why don't you refer. I tell him that I have calculated this document and can show it.

I turned to Russian journalists, gave them a fund, an inventory of the case and sheets - a list of documents. About the forces to find specific documents in the archives. They came to the archives and asked to see these documents. No, they answer, we cannot issue such a document. For all the documents about the Second World War are declassified, but there is a "Special Folder" label, there are more than 200 thousand items of documents with such a classification. They don't let anyone in. And declassified documents have a different, previously unknown stamp: "not subject to extradition." It is declassified, but not issued. The archive of the General Staff is completely closed. The GRU archive is closed. It was opened only for the Israeli researcher Gorodetsky, who, by the way, reads Russian in syllables, and Russians are not allowed there. By the way, because he has such good relations with our top military and political leadership, the Israeli government once decided to appoint him as ambassador to Russia.

- How - the ambassador?

- Well, yes. But the Israeli researcher Zeev Bar-Sella came forward and crushed this Gorodetsky in the Israeli newspapers so much that he was never appointed ambassador.

*By the way, about the archives. In a very serious book by Mikhail Meltyukhov "Stalin's Missed Chance" this the situation is actually confirmed. There is a chapter on Soviet pre-war planning. In it, out of 75 links, only 7 are to archives, and not to the archive of the General Staff*

*ba. And this is the most capital study of the pre-war Soviet history.*

- From Zhukov we find the number of aircraft in the Red Army on June 21, 1941, and there he refers to the 12-volume history of the Second World War, volume 4. And there they are sent to the Institute of Military History. I sent a messenger there, they answered that on April 13, 1990, by order of the head of the Institute of Military History, Colonel General Volkogonov, all these documents were destroyed. Seven tons! After that, Volkogonov was appointed adviser to the President of the Russian Federation on military affairs. In other words, sensing, as the song says, the hour of death, they destroyed the documents. And for this Herostratus case, a doctor of historical, military and other sciences was appointed an adviser to the president!

— *You mentioned that you used about 400 memoirs.*

- Probably more. My father was a great lover of this memoir literature. And he was very interested in what happened on June 22, 1941.

Did he figure it out on *his own*?

- No. He collected these books and marveled at our stupidity. But he knew a lot. When I came home for the holidays from the Suvorov Military School, where we took exams every year, unlike ordinary schools, a real exam began for me.

Sometimes it even started with random numbers. For example, the number 5. Fifth mechanized corps. Who commanded them? Alekseenko. He commanded the right flank at Khalkhin Gol at Zhukov. Yep, understandable. And where was this corps? in Transbaikalia. And which army? Sixteenth. In a word, I should have known all this! And who is the commander of the army? Lukin Mikhail Fedorovich. And what happened to him? He was captured, his leg was cut off. Where did it hurt him? At the Soloviev crossing, on the Dnieper. So, having asked one question, he could examine me without asking other questions from five in the evening until five in the morning.

Developing the same question. And I was 13-14 years old. And all these armies, divisions, I should have known.

Let's start: Ivan Stepanovich Konev. Yeah. He commanded the North Caucasian Military District. Entered the war in what position - commander

19th army. Where was the 19th Army based? In Cherkassy, the second strategic echelon.

I could go through all the memoirs. In Moscow, I had a large military library. Already after I ran away, after the Icebreaker, the head of the GRU, speaking in Komsomolskaya Pravda, wrote that I had a large military library. Many years later, the head of the GRU remembered this! Is this not praise?

When I ran away, I had to collect these books again. But where can you get them in the UK at that time, military books? It is almost impossible to get these books in England. So I made a lot of photocopies. On microfilms I have copies of the newspapers Krasnaya Zvezda and Pravda for 1939-1941. There were no computers then, but there were microfilms. I read all these newspapers and after that I wear glasses, I lost my eyesight. In general, the book was ready in 1981, but work on the Icebreaker continued. Improved it all the time. In 1985, I decided to put an end to it.

In 1985 it was the 40th anniversary of the Victory. And I decided to publish Le Docol as I have to, even in pieces. The first publication (chapters) was in Russian Thought in May 1985. But no one reacted. There were many anti-Soviet publishing houses, but no one took this book from me. This book has never been published in Russian abroad. In 1989 it was published in Germany in German. At the same time, I really wanted

release it in Russian.

In Brighton, in New York, the book was going to be published, but some dark forces intervened. It was the Liberty publishing house, Levkov. Something is dragging on, dragging on. They reworked the text, decided something among themselves. They didn't tell me anything. I call there. They say that, they say, everything is fine, we are working. There is not much left, in three days we will complete work on the text. I

I ask: "What?" They say that almost everything is already done. I say: "Hey, send the text back to me!" They send me a text - it was something beyond the limit ... If it came out in Russian, it would be the end ... You see, my style is not like that. They decided to rewrite the book so that the style was good. All my terminology has been changed. I write "general's rank" - they write "general's rank". And "chiny" was canceled in 1917. Some kind of fluff.

*What is this, just stupidity?*

"I still don't understand what it is. Instead of my words "Supreme Commander" they wrote "Commander in Chief". We had at least a dime a dozen commanders-in-chief, but there was only one Supreme Commander. I am writing: 123rd Fighter Aviation Regiment. But they know better. They believed that there were no regiments in aviation. And they ruled without my permission: the 123rd squadron. And they did not consider it necessary to inform me about the work done. At school there are 10 "A" class, 10 "B", but if you say that there was also 123 "Sch", then the people will not believe this. There may be three squadrons in a regiment, sometimes four or five. There are large numbers for squadrons, but then the name contains a very important word - "separate". It was a total joke. I demanded that my text be published. They answered: if you disagree with something, correct it. But if I fix everything, then my original text will turn out. Why should I rewrite my book when you have a clean copy of my manuscript. It needs to be published. EU

whether the editor disagrees with something, if there is any doubt vaetsya, let him ask, together we will agree. But they did not agree to work in this way.

— *Who did it?*

- Some aunt, her name was Asya, conscientiously rewrote the whole book in two months, assuring me that my style was no good. She put it all in her own words. Pi

shu "major general" or "colonel general", and they reduced it all to "general". I write that "I was a major general, became a colonel general", and they get "was a general - became a general." I am writing: "On the Kursk Bulge in 1943, such a defense was created that the density of mining reached 17 thousand mines per kilometer. Mean running kilometers. She ferried it to "square kilometers". And so on. Further, I wrote that Stalin cleaned up the army, but at a critical moment no one put a bomb under his table, as they put it to Hitler. In the text in the margins, they write: "Ha ha, what is this? This is fascist propaganda! What, the Nazis themselves could have thrown a bomb under the table to Hitler? They could not imagine that the Nazis could slip the bomb on Hitler!"

I thought that a book would come there, they need to check commas and so on. If "cow" is written with an "e", then correct it. There are typos, then everything was printed on typewriters! And they rewrote the book! Then I say: "Stop, guys, let's text back!" Thank God it didn't work out then. In English, "Icebreaker" was released in 1990 in the UK. But someone bought up the circulation, and the book was destroyed. A copy of the book is currently on sale for \$999.99. I ask why such a strange price. Answer: the only copy, badly shabby.

- *And who bought the circulation? Who destroyed the book?*

- I don't know. Someone who needed to book

gi was not. Possibly the KGB. Who bought it, he destroyed it.

— *And further? Was the book already published in Russian in 1992?*

Yes, in 1992. The story was like this. Rebuilding is in full swing, everything has gone haywire. And the magazine "Neva" turned to me with a request to give something for publication. I gave them the Aquarium. Printed. "Aquarium" goes with a bang... We sent letters from readers. Come on, please, come on! Students from Moscow State University wrote that they were following

For the current year, everyone subscribed to the Neva in anticipation of new publications. "Neva" again turns to me: "Do you have something else?" I say yes. And I send "Ledo Call". I say: "You will not publish it, of course." "Let's!" - They say.

I send. There is a pause. I'm calling to find out what number and so on all this will be. They answer: you understand, some date is needed to coincide with the publication. I say that I understand everything: they don't have a date! The date is coming. I call: how are you? They say: you understand, man, what's the matter, because we can't offend our veterans on such a date!

And it drags on again. It drags on until Sergei Leonidovich Dubov appears on the horizon. One of the first Russian magnates, oligarchs. He bought the Novoye Vremya publishing house and a magazine on Pushkinskaya he bought a huge building on the square, came to me and said: "Come on." The first trial run is 320,000. A strange number: not 300, not 350... Here's the explanation. He decided to publish on wrapping paper without pictures, without maps. I say: let's be human. What kind of war book is this - without maps? You can't, you know? He thought and thought and decided: he will give 300 thousand on wrapping paper and in paperback.

- *I have it. Here lies.*

- What circulation?

- *320 thousand.*

- Exactly. He wanted 300,000 of these, and 20,000 in hardcover, with pictures, maps, and so on. He was then in London. He went to his place and released all 320 thousand on wrapping paper. This is the explanation for the circulation of 320,000. The second edition he shied away for a million copies. He said: glory to you, and money to me. And on February 1, 1994, he was killed. In front of his house.



- *And what was the reaction to the "Icebreaker"?*

— The most interesting reaction was in Ogonyok, under the heading Book of the Week. Here, they say, there was a book such and such, "Icebreaker". But she was late. Who does not know that the USSR was going to attack Germany! We knew it all. You're late, Suvorov! So the question is closed. We are so clear.

When they call me a fascist or anyone else, I understand this. But the fact that the book was late made me laugh.

*How did historians react ?*

- They immediately set to work on me: "Where are the archives?" And then I turned to Marshal Kulikov Viktor Georgievich with, approximately, a proposal. I believe that you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, have brought my country to complete ruin and disintegration under the slogan: "As long as there is no war." So, you did it in vain, because the war was unleashed by the Soviet Union, we are not so innocent. So your argument that we should arm ourselves lest someone else attack us is a false argument. So, on horseback or on foot, go chest to chest to the willow bush. Go out for an open conversation, we will fight under TV cameras. Marshall dodged.

There were attempts with Volkogonov and others. With all senior command personnel personally. Letters were personally sent to them, and personal "answers" were received - silence! Speaking on television, on the radio - on the BBC, on the Deutsche Welle, I constantly repeated that I was ready for an open discussion. Perhaps a hundred, expose me. I don't have archives, you do. Let's meet in front of the TV camera, let the people tell which one of us is the fool. But to this day, I have not been able to pull anyone out under the TV cameras.

- *Books and articles against Suvorov came out and comes out a lot. How can the main claims be summed up? The fact that Suvorov is a forger and everything lies, it is clear. What else?*

- The main claim: "a bad person." And it says how bad I am, my wife is bad, and my daughter is bad, and my son is bad.

Recently, one uncle, a Colonel of the State Security, announced that when I ran away, my grandfather hanged himself out of disgrace. And my grandfather Vasily Andreevich was a Makhnovist, he hid it all his life, he hated the Soviet government very, very passionately. If he had lived to the moment when I ran away, he would have drunk for joy ... He always reproached me for the fact that I serve the wrong authority.

So, the most important thing is not to expose my books, but to expose me. But even the ancient Romans knew that as soon as in a dispute in the Senate someone gets personal and claims that the opponent is a fool, then he is immediately counted as a defeat. And it is believed that all his arguments have been exhausted. And so, when they write all sorts of nasty things about me, how bad I am, that I seduce children and animals and what else I do there, I come home and say: "Tatyanochka, open the champagne!" This is always evidence of my victory, evidence that they have nothing to cover.

*Was that the bulk of the criticism ?*

- Yes. And then came the nit-picking completely wrong essentially, but sometimes surprising.

For example, I write that Zhukov writes in his memoirs that at Khalkhin Gol our tanks burned like candles, because we do not have diesel engines, but carburetor ones. Aha! And the whole world repeats: that, they say, what Russian fools: they had carburetor engines. I write in my book "The Last Republic" that the Soviet Union was the only country that created a fast tank diesel engine with a capacity of 500 hp. He was on the T-34 and self-propelled guns SU-85, SU-100 and SU-122. The same engine in a forced version was also used on heavy tanks and self-propelled guns KV-1, KV-2, IS-1, IS-2, ISU-122, etc. In addition, the same diesel engine was used on our heavy artillery tractor. Nobody in the world has anything like it

was. How they rushed at me! But in Japan they had a tank with a diesel engine. First of all, how many tanks were there in the Japanese army? During the entire war, fewer of them were produced than during the war, tanks were produced in the Soviet Union in one month! Second. In what battles did Japanese tanks excel? Where? Was there something similar on the Kursk Bulge or something like that? No one has ever seen such battles. Third. They had a tank with a diesel engine - an automobile, not a high-speed one, not a tank one, with a power of 90 hp. — and we have 500! High-speed, V-shaped, and the Japanese have a single row. Low power. And their tanks are riveted freaks! And the armament is a 37 mm cannon, and our most "obsolete" tanks have had 45 mm cannons for a long time! And then 76, then 122, and on self-propelled guns - even 152 mm! All Japanese tanks can simply be ignored at all, because they are nowhere to be distinguished

foxes.

This is such a small thing that I know about and deliberately neglect it. She has nothing to do with me at all.

they have no proof.

I say: take a bucket of diesel fuel and a bucket of gasoline, bring a torch to the gasoline. Might fizzle. You will not yet touch this bucket with a torch, if it is a hot day and gasoline evaporates, it will blaze. Now take a torch and put it in a bucket of diesel fuel. The torch goes out. That's what diesel is! One uncle speaks out, a certain Rodent, scoffs: gee-gee-gee, so the Germans did not fight with torches. And the armor-piercing projectile has one hell of a thing - both a carburetor and a diesel engine. Now I am writing an answer to him: dear man, why were you silent before, when Zhukov spat on our tanks to the whole world that they were fire hazardous, that they had carburetor engines, but they needed diesel ones. Why was he silent then? It was necessary to explain to comrade Zhukov that the projectile was one hell of a thing, which tank to hit. Why were you silent? And it's not about the projectile. The fact is that if the engine is gasoline, then any spark knocked out by an armor-piercing projectile can

call a fire. Especially if high-octane (aviation) gasoline is used. And this will not happen in diesel!

- *Well, it's all sorts of jokes. And as for the people who looked more serious - Gareev, Gorkov - what are their main claims?*

- Serious simply was not. I just don't want to argue with them. All this is not serious.

- For example?

- Well, for example. The same Gareev tells why we captured Northern Bukovina. Because there was a strategic road from south to north, a European road, narrower than ours, and there was a lot of rolling stock - locomotives, wagons. And it was very important for us for an offensive war. I quoted him, and he retracted his words. This is how we have a relationship with him.

Gorkov, on the other hand, exposes documents showing that we had a plan to cover the border. Not defense, but cover! And immediately says: "The end of the global lie." That is, mine. And brings cover plans! Then I say: if we had a plan for a defensive war, then where can you explain why this plan did not work? Because there was no plan? And if so, then explain, perhaps, a hundred, what did Zhukov and others in the General Staff do for six months? No, I don't even feel like arguing with them, because never, never do they do anything smart.

said.

- *I took the magazine "Visitors to Stalin's Cabinet" and simply calculated that from the beginning of January 1941, when Zhukov became chief of the General Staff, until June 22, Zhukov was in Stalin's office 33 times. Not the slightest hint of what they were doing there, Zhukov does not have it in his memoirs.*

- Zhukov writes that Stalin occasionally listened to the Chief of the General Staff and that he "had no

opportunity to talk to Stalin. While his meetings with Stalin in Stalin's office lasted for an hour and a half, and for six ... "Day M"

— *If the "Icebreaker" contains materials proving that the Soviet Union was preparing the Second World War, then "Day M" contains arguments in advantage of the fact that an attack on Europe in general and on Germany in particular was to be held exactly in July. How can you formulate the main book idea? Usually, in endless discussions, its content is discussed in fragments, in trifles and bits and pieces. And never in a complex.*

— The main idea of the book is that the decision to start World War II was made in the Kremlin on August 19, 1939. It was not a spontaneous, but a deliberate decision. What the Kremlin leadership was doing then was irreversible. All the decisions they made in August 1939 automatically brought the country into the war, and it was impossible to get off this track. The country was heading towards war. Just as one cannot say that a woman is a little pregnant, one cannot underestimate such an event as mobilization. Mobilization is the process that gives rise to war.

- *Why exactly on August 19? As long as I remember, when "M Day" was written, no one knew anything about speech on August 19, the text was found later.*

This number was calculated by me. Moreover, this calculation was not difficult. I just needed to sit down and think. head. Think about this. Until the very evening of August 18, Hitler was considered an enemy of progressive humanity, a cannibal and a villain. And from the morning of August 19, Hitler was considered a normal political figure, with whom one could sign some documents, with whose representative one could drink a glass of champagne. It was possible to negotiate with him about something.

- *Why exactly in the morning of August 19? Where does it come from known?*

- We know this from the fact that on August 19 the Soviet Union sent Hitler, as it were, an invitation to negotiations. In principle, everything was organized in such a way that it would seem that the initiative came from the German side. Up to this point, all our press, radio, politicians - all unanimously talked about the fact that Hitler is not a good person. And suddenly everything changed. Encryption is going on in Germany - send Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop arrives, they quickly divide Europe in half, and the Second World War begins a week later. The invitation was sent on August 19, Ribbentrop arrives on the 21st, the pact is signed on the 23rd...

- *Apparently, on this day, August 19, many, let's say, small events happened.*

- Well, not only small ones, but also large ones. Until 19 August no invitations were sent to Hitler. Well, there were some contacts there, our representative Astakhov and others were in Berlin, then Shkvartsev, who went to Berlin. Something was happening there, something was smoldering, but it was a latent fire. And suddenly an invitation to Hitler - come on, send Ribbentrop, we will divide Poland, we will sign a treaty of friendship, and so on.

lee.

So, according to my calculations, it turned out that if until that day Hitler was an enemy, and after that day Hitler was an insider, it means that on this day Stalin had to gather his inner circle and give a new direction.

Like a regiment commander who gathers battalion commanders, companies, perhaps platoon commanders, and says: "Brothers, yesterday we worked on potatoes, but today we are sent to cut down the forest "or" we go to lager." Something new is happening. It used to be like this, but now we will do it differently. Stalin had to explain the situation that day.

I must confess that the assumption that

on that day there was a meeting of the Politburo and Stalin made a speech, the content of which I roughly calculated was a manifestation of impudence on my part. That's why I didn't have any documents. But there was a calculation, there was a simple logic, reasoning, which was later fully confirmed. Yes, there was such a meeting of the Litburo, Stalin was speaking, and Stalin explained to his closest circle that we would now

do.

- *You mean the recording of Stalin's speech, distributed by the GABAC agency?*

- Yes. This is number one. And then Tatyana Semyonovna Bushueva found this speech in the presentation. Now people who are serious about this have collected evidence that speech is real. But the most important thing is that if everything that is written in this speech, the GAVAS agency

invented, then you need to take off your hat to him and bow thread. For they predicted everything that happened afterwards. One can argue endlessly about whether this speech was or was not. But we see Stalin's deeds. And the coincidences are simple and amazing.

The point was this. Any knowledge becomes science only if this knowledge is systematized. For example, geographic coordinates are gridded on the globe - after that they turned into a science, geography. Prior to this, the sailors

swam by eye.

And I have always been surprised by the lack of a system in presenting our history. I myself constantly tried to systematize the data known to me to the best of my ability and ability. And when this systematization succeeded, it was accompanied by very small discoveries.

ties.

**Here are some examples.**

How many field armies did we have? Nobody ever said this. I got cards and began to write down the information that I could find there. Here is the first Red Banner Army in the Far East, here is the second

hell, here's the third one. It is known when they were created and who led them...

Further, how many military districts did we have? You start reading: here is the Moscow District, here is the Trans-Baikal District... And how many are there? At that time it was impossible to find such data anywhere. But I collected them: 16 military districts and one front - the Far East. Who commanded them? Wrote. And then suddenly it comes to light - I make a small discovery for myself.

— *Excuse me, one technical question.*

*The front is a concept associated only with the military actions? When are fronts organized?*

Front is a concept that has several meanings. The first is general, for example, the Soviet-German front. Second: the organizational unit is the front, headed by the commander. A front is a group of armies. It is made for war. So, since 1939 there was a front in the east - the Far Eastern Front. And throughout the rest of the territory there were military districts. Sometimes we do the opposite. The most powerful military districts in the west had much more forces than the Far Eastern Front. For example, the Western Special Military District had 3-4 times more tanks than in the Far East. Why was this done? To show the whole world that, they say, we have only one front - in the Far East, General of the Army Iosif Rodionovich Apanasenko commanded it. And in the west, everything is peaceful with us. Although the western districts had already been turned into fronts by the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941

of the year.

*Before the German attack? This is a very powerful moment. And according to the rules, military norms, at what moment does a district turn into a front? How long before the start of hostilities?*

— The fact is that between the military district and the front, in principle, the difference is only in names. Nothing



no longer changes there, there are no differences. For example, there is Army General Pavlov, commander of the Western Special Military District. At some point, he turns into a front commander. And his headquarters, the head of the operations department, the head of intelligence, Colonel Blokhin, all remain there. He still has four armies under him: the 10th in the center, to the right - the 4th, to the left - the 3rd and behind - the 13th. And the name changes at the very last moment.

*"According to your calculations, in two weeks?"*

- Yes, according to my calculations - in two weeks. The fact is that for those around this change of names is absolutely not visible in any way, even for military personnel ... Di

Vision lives, exercises are underway, pryka is descending from above  
PS ... From the corps commander, from the army commander ... And there the front has already been deployed. The command posts of the fronts were brought forward in the early spring of 1941. We know that during the war the district will be turned into a front, and in advance we build a command post for the front, build an underground communications center, and so on. And the title change - this time - and that's it.

Let's get back to systematization. I wrote down how many armies we have, wrote out the names of the commanders ... Stop! Immediately open! You can call it whatever you like, for me it is a discovery. North Caucasian military district. Commander Lieutenant General Konev Ivan Stepanovich. 19th Army. Commander - Lieutenant General Konev Ivan Stepanovich. How does he command both the district and the army? Something is wrong here. I look further.

20th Army, Orlovsky Military District, we take the commander of the army and the commander of the district. The same person is Lieutenant General Fyodor Nikitich Remezov.

The 21st Army - Lieutenant General Gerasimenko, and the Volga Military District - also Lieutenant General Gerasimenko. namesake? No. All the same Vasily Filippovich. Unclear!

18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, 28th armies - they

all have commanders who are also commanders of districts! The same faces!

Now we take the TASS report, for example, dated June 13, 1941. And everything related to June 13, we collect in a separate folder.

- *And what is the content of this TASS message?*

- This is the content. There are rumors that Germany is going to attack us. But this is nonsense. Germany is not going to attack us.

So number one. Headshot effect! Why have we always and everywhere said that the enemy is around, that the enemy is not asleep, but here only once in history, on June 13, 1941, we announced that the enemy does not want to attack us! Everyone usually says to this: "What a stupid Stalin!"

Now this message is in any directory. And at that time he was nowhere to be found! Everyone quoted him, but there was no text. I find this message, I read it.

And it says this: there are rumors that Germany is going to attack the Soviet Union. All this is nonsense, Germany fulfills its obligations as well as the Soviet Union. There are also rumors that the Soviet Union wants to attack Germany. What are you! Never! As for the transfer of troops, we are here for the sake of exercises.

Interesting, I think. In the very harvest. Just when it's time to harvest, in the fall, they organize exercises. Ka some nonsense.

Everyone usually pays attention to the first part. But the first part is a preamble. This has always been done in our country. For example, at the end of 1938, the Decree of the Central Committee on the work of the NKVD was issued. It all starts with ritual praise. That the NKVD achieved great success in the fight against the enemies of the people. And talk about how successful they have been. Then follows the terrible word "however ...". And - it started. As a result, Comrade Yezhov left his post, then he was shot, and all the Yezhov brethren were shot. That is, pre

an ambulance about great successes is just an introductory part that had nothing to do with the content.

This TASS message is the same: "There are rumors that Germany wants to attack us." Yeah. What is written next?

This introductory part was needed to smoothly move on to the main thing. That, they say, there are rumors that the Soviet Union wants to attack. So, no, by no means! It's just a transfer of troops.

On June 13, this TASS message sounded, on June 14 it was published in newspapers. So, June 14 is the day of mourning for the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and Moldova. On that day, the Chekists pushed residents by the thousands out of their apartments, from their houses and sent them to where these people never returned from. There was a cleansing of the front line, the so-called "undesirable element" was sent. On the one hand, there are rumors that we do not want to attack, on the other hand, we act differently: on the night of June 13-14, thousands of people in wagons go to Kazakhstan, the Far East, and so on. We say one thing and do another.

Further. I look and see: the 16th Army from Transbaikalia is advancing into the western regions of the Soviet Union, the 19th Army from the North Caucasian Military District, the 20th from Orlovsky, and so on.

This means that Lieutenant General I.S. Konev from troops of the North Caucasian Military District formed 19th Army and secretly advances it into the western regions of the Soviet Union. The 21st Army is advancing from the Volga District, the 22nd from the Urals, the 24th from the Siberian ... All the commanders of the internal military districts have abandoned their districts, taken all their headquarters, all their troops and are secretly moving west .

Here is a TASS message... We do not want to attack Germany. And here are the actions of the Soviet Union.

More about systematization. Let's go back to 1939. On August 19, Stalin sends a message to Hitler inviting Ribbentrop to Moscow. Ribbentrop rides. IN

On the same day, August 19, Comrade Stalin decides to establish a common frontier with Hitler. And on the same day, August 19, the titanic, unprecedented deployment of the Red Army begins. You read the history of the division: formed by order of August 19, 1939. And there are many of them. Before that, on August 18, 1939, we had 96 rifle divisions, and on June 21, 1941 - 198! The number of rifle divisions was doubled. And each division is 14,800 people. On August 19, 1939, there were 0 tank divisions, and on June 21, 1941, there were 61 divisions. There were 2 motorized divisions, now -1.

Hitler attacked Poland with 6 panzer divisions. And then it sounds over the country that we are not going to attack

let's go...

I repeat once again - systematization, and nothing more!

- *By the way, "Day M" - was that an official expression?*

- Yes Yes. It is very common. For example, Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky: "We knew what we had to do on M-day. But when the packages were opened, a lot of things were written there, but with the exception of what we have to do if the enemy attacks us.

- *So, about the mobilization that began on August 19.*

- Speaking of mobilization, we must remember Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. In the Soviet Union, there was only one person whom Stalin called by his first name and patronymic: Boris Mikhailovich. This is Shaposhnikov. Marshal of the Soviet Union. True, at the time of signing the treaty with Ribbentrop, he was not yet a marshal, but only a commander of the first rank. When Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the documents, he stood next to Stalin. They both stood behind and rubbed their hands. Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov is still at the end

20s published a powerful book called "The Brain

army." In this book, he explained what mobilization is. Mobilization is a situation when we transfer the country and the army from a peaceful position to a military one. Shaposhnikov gives an example. There is a sentry, and he has a pistol in a holster. This is peaceful time. So he stretches out his hand, grabbed this revolver of his and cocked it. This is mobilization. Next comes the war. Shaposhnikov warns that mobilization cannot be partial, mobilization is war. If the cowboy grabbed his gun and cocked the trigger, then there is no turning back. If we have decided to start mobilization, then we go to the end. If we begin mobilization, the enemy also begins to mobilize. We can and would like to stop, but the enemy does not know this ... If we drew our pistols and cocked the hammers, then the enemy tends to shoot earlier. He doesn't know what we're going to do next. Therefore, his interest is to shoot as soon as possible.

Shaposhnikov developed a very powerful and very clever system. He explained that a lioness who hunts a zebra cannot catch up with a zebra, because it is not so arranged. Therefore, her attack is divided into two parts. First, she secretly sneaks up, and then a jerk follows. Terrible, powerful jerk. And he recommends doing the same for mobilization. First we sneak, we sneak, and then we make a dash. This breakthrough - the beginning of open mobilization - should not take place before the start of hostilities.

Shaposhnikov writes about the stupidity of all countries in the First World War. War has been declared, and everyone is beginning to mobilize their armies: Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France. The enemy's border is open, empty, go ahead! But the mobilization is not over yet. When everyone was mobilized and reached the border, it was already too late. All the armies mobilized, approached each other - a positional dead end. Shaposhnikov proposes to carry out a secret mobilization, to mobilize the attack echelons of the invasion, and at the moment when we start a war, these invasion echelons immediately enter the territory.

ryu of the enemy. Immediately, not allowing him to mobilize, occupying his territory. But under the cover of these troops, we mobilize the second echelon, the third, and so on.

"Day M" is the end of the secret mobilization and the blow against the enemy, under whose cover it is possible, no one do not hesitate to conduct open mobilization in the country.

— *This concept of the aggressor, which is by no means case is not suitable for defense?*

- In no case! Moreover, the one who made the decision to mobilize (these are the words of Shaposhnikov), he made the decision to go to war. He does not share these concepts. Mobilization cannot be partial, it can only be universal. Just like pregnancy cannot be partial. We have begun mobilization, which means we have decided to go to war. It is impossible to dodge this!

So, on August 19, 1939, when Stalin gave the green light to Hitler, Ribbentrop was invited for negotiations, at the same time, on the same day, the secret mobilization of the Red Army began. And "Day M" is the day when this secret mobilization was supposed to turn into a deed. When secretly mobilized troops break into enemy territory and "M-day" is declared, then we will openly do what we are striving for.

— *Secret mobilization began with the formation new armies?*

- Divisions, brigades, corps, armies. For example, in August 1939 we had 4 tank corps. They were called first mechanized, then from 1938 - tank, then - mechanized again. When Hitler attacked us two years later, there were already 29 of them. In August 1939, we had no airborne corps. There were already five when Hitler attacked, and five more in preparation. When it was getting ready

Hitler's proposal to partition Poland, there were no armies in the European part of the Soviet Union. The districts had corps, but not armies. There were only two armies - the First Red Banner and the Second Red Banner - in the Far East. When Hitler attacked, there were already 28 armies. 23 - on the western borders of the Soviet Union or on the way to the west. And in the Far East - five armies. And very weak...

— *Did the general mobilization concern not only the army?*

- Yes, sure. Mobilization also affected the economy. First of all, people's commissariats for ammunition, etc., were created. The entire industry was transferred to the wartime regime ...

— *What did that mean?*

— Resources have been mobilized. In the autumn of 1940, the so-called "Labor reserves" were created. Millions of teenagers were forcibly placed in the barracks, attached to military factories and forced to work hard. The mechanism of enslavement was simple. It was announced that the standard of living of the Soviet people had risen to such a high level that tuition at the higher educational institutions and in the upper grades of schools had to be paid for. The motivation is absolutely amazing: "in connection with the increased standard of living" - go ahead, pay. But we had nothing to pay the citizens with, so people poured out of the senior classes and from higher educational institutions. Only those who had something to pay remained there. And about all the rest, our native authorities showed for the bot - in the "Labor Reserves". You get there on mobilization, and escaping from the Labor Reserves (and did you get there at the age of 13-14) was elevated to the rank of a criminal offense. For escaping they were given a full term and put in the Gulag. And it was not at all easy to escape from there. "Training" in the "TR" - 2 years with a combination of the implementation of production standards. You will be taught and then

for this study, you had to work for 4 years at the plant to which you were assigned, without the right to choose a place of work and working conditions.

*So this is forced labor!*

— Not only teenagers, but also adults were enslaved. A decree was issued prohibiting people from leaving their place of work without a transfer. So, giant aircraft factories were built in Kuibyshev. For example, in Moscow they took a whole workshop and transferred it to Kuibyshev. Or in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. People had no right to refuse. The peasantry was enslaved at the beginning, and the workers at the end of the 1930s.

*- An interesting comparison. In the early 1930s, when there was a wild shortage of engineers and industry it was necessary to build, they were lured to higher educational institutions! Through the workers' faculties and so on, everyone who wanted to, whether they were preparing to enter universities at reduced courses, etc. And in 1939 the situation was the opposite: we needed there were hard workers, there were already enough engineers.*

- Not even that. Those who were of the appropriate age were simply "raked in", high school students - to the "Labor Reserves". And the students were simply sent to the army and made cadets of military schools. Here is my father, who entered the industrial

Institute, drafted into the army.

*Was he called to the school?*

— No, first he served a year as a soldier. There was still a year left, he hoped to continue his studies. But after that he was told: you will go on to study at the school. And they didn't ask for wishes.

*- In a mobilization way?*

- Precisely in a mobilization way. In remembrance  
niyakh Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Georgievich



Kulikov also described such a situation. In 1939 he entered the infantry school. And they released him on June 19, 1941. He managed to get the rank of lieutenant. My father didn't make it.

*- It turns out that the mechanism of mobilization in the economy is as follows: a sudden draft into the army of all ages, and the vacuum in the industry is being filled pupils and students.*

- Only schoolchildren. Students - in the military schools.

*- This was the main process of translating economy on military rails?*

- Exactly. A certain Pasha Angelina suddenly comes forward and calls on a hundred thousand friends to get on the tractor. One hundred thousand friends! Two hundred thousand tractors and stock for agriculture were prepared. She called a hundred thousand, and mobilized two hundred thousand. The Red Army took care of the men, they took them under a warm wing. And wives tires replaced everyone in the factories - factories set fall women! Tractor brigades - mi woman. On the collective farms, the women were left alone.

*- That is, secret mobilization assumed an instantaneous, within a year or two, an explosive growth of the army and military industry. Transfer of the entire country to forced labor for good.*

- Yes. Of all my books, I love M-Day the most, not because it's so good, but because it was material that could be argued like Theo rheme in geometry.

Usually one-third of the conscripts were drafted into the army, the rest did not serve in the army. And so, on August 19, 1939, Comrade Stalin decides to convene the 4th Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet. For some reason, he needed an extraordinary session.

On August 31, Comrade Voroshilov makes a report on the need to introduce universal military duty, and on the morning of September 1, 1939, simultaneously with the German attack on Poland, this session adopts a law on universal military duty. And they explain to us that it was the right and quite logical decision, the law was adopted in the conditions of the already begun World War II. But the one who gave the order to the delegates to assemble in Moscow and adopt such a law thought about it on August 19! On September 1, Hitler did not know that he had started World War II, and on August 19, Stalin ordered: come on, guys, get together in Moscow, we need a law on all general military duty in the conditions of the outbreak of World War II. Great? On September 3, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany, and Hitler was stunned by the news. He was not designed for such a turn. He plunged into World War II out of stupidity. But on August 31, 1939, Comrade Voroshilov was already reporting to the representatives of the people that without universal military duty we would not be able to live. While Hitler was an enemy and a cannibal, they somehow managed to survive without a general, and then they signed peace with him, and we sharpen our axes.

By the way, on the same day, September 1, the rank of lieutenant colonel is introduced. Before that, we had a junior lieutenant, a lieutenant, a senior lieutenant. This is "kubari". And then there were senior officers: captain, major, colonel. Accordingly - one, two and three "sleepers". When

On September 1, 1939, the rank of lieutenant colonel was introduced, then he began to wear three sleepers, and the colonel from that time began to wear four sleepers.

*- When was the army charter adopted? In accordance with what charters were military operations planned?*

- The army has many charters: drill, disciplinary, internal service, guard. At the tactical level, subunits and units conduct combat operations guided by combat regulations: BUP - combat

howling infantry charter, BUBA - combat charter for bomber aviation, etc. And at the operational and strategic level, that is, from the division and above, there is a single field manual for all. Charters are constantly updated and improved. In 1939, the PU-39 was put into operation. Here is just one phrase from it: "The Red Army will be the most attacking of all the armies that have ever attacked." And then everything in the same spirit. And they say to me: "So he's not signed." That is, it was not approved. That's right: the title page said: "project". However, the previous PU-36 was canceled and PU-39 was printed and sent to the troops. It was taught in military academies, exercises and maneuvers were carried out, war was planned, troops acted on it. And there was no other regulation. By the way, the previous PU-36 was no better. Just not so sincere: but he prescribed all the same actions. The absence of an approving signature is easily explained. There was an absolutely terrible squabble at our tops. Something is accepted, but a loophole is also left for withdrawal. Let's say there was a "Temporary instruction for conducting deep combat." "Temporary" instruction! That is, if they start accusing you because of it, that you are an enemy of the people, then you say that this is not a permanent, but a temporary instruction!

But there is no other, only temporary. Or: "History of the CPSU(b). Short Course. There is no other course and was not foreseen! Short course only! If even some comrade, even Comrade Stalin, will be reproached for not reflecting this or that, there is an excuse - this is a short course!

So we had a draft field manual. There are no other documents and never will be. There is a project according to which the entire Red Army acted. The current project is what it is. All the years I've been trying to get it, but nowhere, absolutely nowhere! destroyed, for

sweep away traces...

Stalin already knew on August 19, 1939, that he would introduce universal military duty in the country. It's allowed

It was necessary to instantly increase the army to five and a half million people (and now they say that even more!). The service life was still set to 2 years. To not scare people.

So, Stalin demands to convene an Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Court and on September 1, 1939, he adopts a new law. But he could not help but understand that in two years, on September 1, 1941, all this mass of people would have to go home. Or... Until September 1, 1941, he must enter the war.

*But the economic burden on the state  
such an army is so unthinkable that everything loses  
meaning if the war does not start.*

- It was a complete ruin of the entire state. There was nothing to feed the army, because the number of livestock was lower than in 1916. And the year 1916 is already a brutal year, when all the peasants are at the front, the women are in the household in Russia. This is the crisis year of the First World War. In peacetime, the number of livestock in our country was the same as in 1916. And the country could not feed itself. That is, this mobilization meant either war or the economic collapse of the state. The transport situation alone was worth it!

*- What other points indicate exactly the beginning of July  
as the expected date for the attack on  
Germany? Other historians who, willingly or not, support you,  
all more or less agree,  
that July. The debate about whether it is about July 6, how  
this is supposed to be on "Day M", or about the tenth, or about  
fifteenth...*

- Here are some. The TASS message sounded, the armies of the second strategic echelon moved forward. Here are the numbers in front of me. Let's say the 19th army of Ivan Stepanovich Konev, whom we just talked about, had 110,339 people, the 20th army - 113,093 people, 21st Army - 106,112 people, 22nd - 83,162 people,

The 24th - 88,029 people, the 16th Army had 1443 tanks. Just imagine - 1443 tanks. When Hitler attacked Poland, he had less than 4,000 tanks. And here there is only one army from Transbaikalia, the second strategic echelon - 1443!

They are all moving. And the date of full concentration is clearly defined - July 10, 1941. And they tell me, here it is, the date is July 10. Date - when the second echelon was supposed to concentrate! Consequently, the Red Army was to enter the war after 10 July. It would seem, right? Not this way.

Because all our pre-war textbooks say that there is simply no need to wait for the concentration of the second strategic echelon. And this has been proven many times. Suppose the Soviet Union starts a war against Japan. This is the same exemplary war as against Germany, only everything was successful against Japan, but not against Germany. The war with Japan is for us the model by which we check the year 1941!

All the "mistakes" of 1941 were repeated in 1945. We moved airfields to the border, command posts and so on. And there was a gigantic movement of troops from West to East. 5th Army, 53rd Army, 39th Army... So, it was believed that why should we concentrate all the swarm echelon when he has nowhere to concentrate there! But when the first echelon goes forward, then in its places — in the abandoned barracks, camps, some places of unloading — that's where the second echelon comes and unloads. You don't have to wait for him to come. Therefore, my conclusion is not after July 10, but before July 10!

We can argue about the 6th... Besides, it's Sunday. Stalin liked to attack on Sunday.

*- In the article by Mikhail Meltyukhov it is said that Suvorov's only argument why he considered 6 July day "M", was Stalin's love for Sunday attacks.*

— No, it's not. Although it is true Stalin loved Napa

give on Sunday, like Hitler, by the way! This is number one. Number two, and most importantly, it was the last Sunday before the full concentration of the second strategic echelon.

And numerous sayings. Something like this: General of the Army Ivanov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, wrote that Hitler managed to forestall us by two weeks. How do you "prevent" it? By this alone he asserts that the war was pre-emptive. This is the general of the army speaking, the Soviet one, officially!

What does it mean to anticipate? If I'm preparing a defense, how can you forestall me? Here in the Far East they sit in trenches, dugouts. And suddenly the Japanese attacked. Well, how can they preempt us? What does it mean - "advanced by two weeks"?

*- In "Day M" interrogations of Vlasov are mentioned, during during which he confirmed the offensive intentions of the Red Army. Where are they cited?*

- The protocol of interrogation of Vlasov dated August 8, 1942 is stored in the city of Freiburg in the central military archive of the Federal Republic of Germany. The protocols were repeatedly published, in particular, excerpts from it were printed by Krasnaya Zvezda on October 27, 1992. In the same place, in Freiburg, other protocols of interrogations of Soviet generals are kept: Luka on, Ponedelin, Trukhin ...

When it comes to relying on sources, there is something else to note here. Official military history is very rarely based on documents. For example, our official science says that Stalin exterminated forty thousand generals, military leaders. I ask: where did this come from? Dear comrades, do you have documents confirming this figure? Who said it first? I found the document myself, poked their nose into the document, and the document says that there were forty thousand fired. Of which a huge number were returned back. I rely on documents much more often than my opponents.

As for the criticism against me... Well, here's one about

piece of criticism. I wrote that before the attack on the USSR, the Germans should have prepared six million sheepskin coats. Volkogonov laughed wildly about this: "But they planned to capture the Soviet Union in three months!" I say: "Capture in three months, then it will be winter anyway! Fight with partisans, carry out occupational service, and so on. That is, the stupidest remark was perfect.

The fact is, neither Gareev, nor Volkogonov, nor any other of the military leaders, of those who wear big stars on shoulder straps, no one has ever specifically criticized me. When Gareev writes something about me, he writes past me. He never convicts me of something, of some wrong things. He talks, and so does everyone else. The most brilliant example is Gorodetsky, *The Myth of the Icebreaker*. Our works lie in different planes, they do not intersect in any way.

— *But in some ways Gorodetsky disagrees with the Icebreaker?!*

- Not with anything! The application there is as follows: "I won't argue with Suvorov!" And he says that Hess flew to Britain, described what he was fed, some diplomat said something to someone ... This has nothing to do with me at all. Neither for nor against ... This does not intersect with me in any way.

- *And attempts of some serious objections are not was?*

- No. There are nitpicks on the little things. For example, very "powerful niggles": I say that if the engine the tank is in the stern, and the power transmission is in front, then you need to transfer the cardan shaft from the engine to the power transmission. And since the driveshaft goes through the entire tank, then the floor of the tower (its rotating part) needs to be raised above the driveshaft. All this leads to an increase in the height of the tank, and for every centimeter you comb you pay with armor. And armor is weight, and

being overweight is like running up to the sixth floor for a man with a sack of potatoes. One uncle speaks, laughs terribly, and says: the presence of a cardan shaft does not affect the height of the tank, but affects the height tank hull. Here the body of the tank becomes higher. Well, I say that on the forehead, that on the forehead! After all, if the hull of the tank has become higher, and you have the same turret and the same suspension, then the tank has become higher! That's how they caught me!

— *There is one very active character on the Internet, besides, a communist, I came across him. Na wrote a couple of articles, which, according to him, "refuted Suvorov." His main thesis was that*

*I don't remember which book, when summing up the statistics on voting in favor of the Nazis in 1932 year, it seems that the figures you cited were not correct. I did not even want to delve into whether they are true or No. But the conclusion from this was this: once on this sing Mali, so it's all a lie ..*

- Yes Yes. I've dealt with these numbers. The fact is that there were many votes, they went one after another, and when I gave these figures - I didn't invent them myself, I also copied them from somewhere, from some source - some Soviet source gave such figures, I repeated them. It turned out that there are other numbers. So what? Take one number or another, but about

the general picture does not change in any way: the communists, in their own way, leading ensured Hitler's victory.

- *It's not about numbers at all, it's about logic: a person, on the basis of such ridiculous material, publicly declares that he has refuted Suvorov. Then our argument*

*By the way, it ended quite funny. I said:*

*"Great. If you refuted it, then please*

*half a page - the main theses of the "Icebreaker" and which of them have been refuted. And that's it. Silent.*

*And it was even funnier when I recently spoke with a very nice German, very qualified*



*bathroom historian, and asked him which of the Germans could speak, participate in the discussion on this topic. He replied: "For politically correct reasons, you will not find a single historian who depends on receiving a grant for his scientific research and who would dare to speak out in support of Suvorov. Not because everyone disagrees, but*

*because they will fall out of the system."*

- Recently, another very serious accusation was brought against me - I kept silent about the Jewish problem. The article was called like this: "About the main thing, Suvorov implored chal."

*Why was there a need to talk about her ?*

- Don't know. Well, who the hell knows how to drag this problem into the discussion of Stalin's plans for attacking Hitler!

*- Can you briefly outline the essence of the idea of "Ledo Cola" and "Day M"? For people who don't have these books read. The essence of the concept and the main arguments.*

- Number one. After the First World War in Europe, no one could practically unleash the Second World War. For: Great Britain was preoccupied with her colonial questions, had a small army, and a huge navy, to protect the colonies and the routes of communication with the colonies; Great Britain had no reason to start a war; it had no ambitions on the European continent.

France had no reason to start a war, because under the Treaty of Versailles she got everything she wanted, and moreover, she built a line of defense on her borders like the Great Wall of China - that is, she had a purely defensive strategy.

Germany was completely disarmed, I will not enumerate what was there and how, but Germany, as a military and military-technical power, was completely liquidated and also could not start any kind of war.

In this situation, the Soviet Union would live and be happy. However, the Soviet Union did everything to ensure that Germany again embarked on the path of preparing for war. Prepared German tankers, pilots and more. Question: against whom? Of course, not against yourself. So against whom? against the rest of Europe.

*- In one pamphlet of the early thirties, I met such a calculation. The Red Army was in 1931 so many people. total army all neighbors - Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, all of them - amounted to so many thousand people. For so that the Red Army could defeat them all, she should have had so many. Some crazy, delusional doctrine that supposed that all these small countries will unite against the Soviet Union and attack it.*

- Yes, yes, nonsense, of course, complete. So. No one, of course, could attack the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union was preparing Germany for a new war.

Number two - Stalin helped Hitler come to power  
sti.

Number three. The entire domestic policy of the Soviet Union was subordinated to an aggressive foreign policy, for the Soviet Union could not exist side by side with other states. Therefore, the production of weapons in the country was absolutely monstrous, but these weapons were not produced in order to protect their people, for for the sake of the production of weapons, Stalin and his henchmen staged a famine with millions of victims. Why should we produce weapons if people are dying because we produce them?

Further. If Stalin did not want to fight Germany, then he had to maintain a barrier of neutral states between Germany and the Soviet Union. Then there would be no German attack! But Stalin and Hitler together divided Poland, a common border was established between the USSR and Germany. Stalin pushed his borders to the borders of Germany wherever

it was possible, from Finland to Romania. That is, from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. All neighboring countries became victims of the Soviet Union. Including Lithuania, which did not even have a border with the Soviet Union until 1939.

Next moment. The Second World War was deliberately started by the Soviet Union in 1939, and from the very beginning - from August 1939 - the Soviet Union was a participant in the Second World War. And he was an ally of Hitler, together with Hitler they destroyed Europe. Stalin's plan was to crush Europe with Hitler's hands, and then strangle Hitler himself. Just as with the hands of Yezhov, Stalin destroyed all his potential enemies and even those who could be ranked among them, and then strangled Yezhov himself. And all this was called "Yezhovism", although it was pure "Stalinism".

Everything that was done in the Soviet Union for defense after Stalin felt that he could strike at Hitler, that Hitler had already "plunged" into the Second World War and could not attack, all this began to be destroyed, and the training of the Red Army was extremely offensive.

And the last. The defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941 is explained by the fact that all the plans, all the preparations - all this went precisely to the offensive, nothing was done for defense.

*- Most of the "opponents of Suvorov" are irritated, literally infuriated by the very idea that The Soviet Union could have attacked Germany in 1941 and that in itself such preparation was carried out. To science this position is irrelevant. She is a product traditional false Soviet propaganda stereotypes.*

- This point of view of my so-called "opponents" is insulting both for our entire people and for our history. That is, even if we ignore who is right and who is wrong, if we abstractly look at

the very idea, their point of view is immoral. It turns out that the Soviet Union waged war against fascism by force, that we were the liberators of Europe against our will, the anti-fascists against our will. If Hitler had not attacked, then we would have remained friends of Hitler, we would have drunk champagne with him, we would have destroyed Europe together, we would have carried out joint punitive operations, for example in Poland, so red flags would have fluttered over Hitler's and over the Stalinist concentration camps.

This is precisely how Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Georgievich Kulikov objected to me. He fought from June 22, 1941. But then it turns out that you, Viktor Georgievich, are an unwilling anti-fascist. If you had not been attacked, you would have remained a loyal Nazi. Here Vlasov, being in captivity, began to cooperate with the Germans, this is not good. What is the difference between him and you?

After all, you served in the army that was an ally of Hitler. And Vlasov served in the same army that was Hitler's ally. What is the difference between you? It's just that Hitler hired Vlasov, but he didn't want to deal with you. That's the whole difference. And if he wanted to, then you would serve him faithfully. Is it the same way?

*I have always wondered why it is considered that the suggestion that the Soviet Union was preparing to attack Germany somehow undermines the Soviet Union. Otherwise, he would be good, but it turns out that he is bad. After all,*

*that Hitler had already managed to accomplish, it would seem, to become his open enemy - only for the sake of reputation countries.*

- Here is an alliance with Hitler - this compromises the Soviet Union. When they say that in 1939 we signed an alliance with Hitler, because there was nothing else left for us to do, and we went to destroy our neighbors in order to stay alive ourselves - this, excuse me, is a purely criminal, Urkagan attitude to life: die today , and I

I will die tomorrow. Let's kill anyone, just to stay alive.

My concept is even formally much more patriotic. After all, it is obviously more noble to intend to break with Hitler than to conquer the rest of the world in alliance with him. The latter option is much more compromising.

*There is one point in these arguments that works against Suvorov. They're based on a paradox that many may take at face value. It turns out that an alliance with Hitler is immoral, and an attack on Hitler is, as it were, more moral. Opponents, of course, are discouraged by such a turn of the topic, but at the same time, a completely false one suggests itself. the thesis that Stalin's "good" attack on Hitler compensated for the "bad" alliance with him. There are historians who support the "Suvorov concept" of preparing an attack on Germany and Europe, but at the same time they consider Stalin's policy to be completely correct and justified. Well, he would do well if he attacked. Dazzling foreign policy prospects would open up before the USSR.*

*Although, of course, in reality, one cannot speak of the nobility of Stalin's words under any circumstances. circumstances. After all, Stalin was not going to either fight fascism or punish the Nazis for some kind of sins. He didn't care who he attacked first, Nazi Germany or Western democracies. He was going to hide anyway.*

*sew them all.*

*In fact, one can understand why a lot of people are annoyed by the very idea that Stalin could want to attack to Germany. Most likely because she pulls for another very dangerous thought. If you agree with the fact that Stalin was preparing an attack, then there is The next question is: who next? And one more question - what was the foreign policy like in general? Stalin, what he wanted to achieve. And the answer is right*

an extremely unpleasant one arises: Stalin, and consequently the USSR, had no other goals than achieving world domination. The habitual myth about Soviet anti-fascism, about the liberation mission of the Soviet people, and so on, is immediately destroyed.

“Yeah, that’s exactly what annoys everyone!” About Europe no one remembers.

*Another interesting psychological point about purely Soviet perception of history. You told earlier about the colonel who read the history of the war to you. About the rout on June 22, you can*  
*there was talk, but about the defeat near Kiev - no. After all, in*  
*In general, it was a deliberate deception. People who read this story, they understood that it was*  
*lie?*

— No.

- *Someone designed this lie?*

- The fact is that all this lies were constructed from the very beginning. Already on June 22, it was immediately announced that we were attacked and forget everything that happened before. And everyone immediately wanted to forget, and everyone immediately forgot everything! We are the victims, we were attacked...

— *Including the generals who developed all this?*

— Well... The fact is that many people have knocked it out of their memory. In the Soviet Union, it was generally customary to remember only what was safe. It was better for health. After all, real memories could not be shared with anyone. When I published my books, in which I explained on my fingers how it happened, I began to receive many letters from front-line soldiers saying: “Yes, it’s true!” But before that, they somehow didn’t think about it and didn’t remember.

But when it comes to the developers of these plans,

then number one is People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko. He never wrote any memoirs about the war. They pressed him, demanded, but he did not succumb. This was an honest man. He understood that they would not be allowed to tell the truth, but he did not want to lie. Number two is Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Chief of the General Staff. All plans were in his hands. Here he wrote memoirs. In my books I show that almost everything he wrote was a lie. Zhukov understood everything, he knew that he was lying, he was lying from everywhere.

I always take him at his word. Here he writes that earlier they had doubts, but when the defectors went on the evening of June 21, "we understood - this is war." And then, a few pages later, he reports that on June 22, somewhere around three o'clock in the morning, he starts calling Stalin, well, he does not wake up, such a stupid Stalin!

I say: wait, wait, if it was clear to you, Comrade Zhukov, on the evening of June 21, that they would attack, and you were sitting in Stalin's office, and Stalin went to bed, how did you let him go, huh?

It turns out nonsense, why did you start waking him up at 3 o'clock, if everything was clear to you the day before ... In your memoirs, this scene should be key, fundamental! "On June 21, everything was clear to me, we were sitting in Stalin's office, we were arguing, he didn't believe me ..." Everything was clear to him, but he sat silent, and then at three in the morning he began calling Stalin, waking him up. Zhukov's lies have been exposed in two special books dedicated to Zhukov, and in other books the same, from case to case ...

Another person who developed such plans is Vasilevsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union. He was a major general in the Main Operations Directorate. This one also lied.

*" But there were upper echelon military men who everyone understood, the commanders of the districts ...*

- Yes, sure. But there are very few of them left.

alive. There are few left who could write memoirs. For example, the Western Front was commanded by General of the Army Pavlov. They put all the blame for the first defeats on him, hung all the dogs around the neck and shot him. Colonel General Kirponos, commander of the Southwestern Front, was killed in action while leaving the encirclement. It was our most powerful grouping. The Kiev military district at the beginning of the war turned into the Southwestern Front. Fyodor Isidorovich Kuznetsov was a cretin, he started the war as a front commander, then went down to the army commander, then ended the war as a corps commander. So, little by little. To put it mildly, not a very smart person. He left no memoirs. Who else? Colonel-General Nick Cherevichenko, Yakov Trofimovich. As of June 22, Stalin has 28 fully deployed armies. Eight commanders are major generals, nineteen are lieutenant generals, and only one commander is Colonel General Cherevichenko. He commanded the most powerful of all Soviet armies - the 9th. Which for some reason would have been deployed on the border with Romania. So, Cherevichenko described the Civil War, but kept silent about the Second World War. But it would be interesting to know why Stalin placed the most powerful of all his armies on the Romanian border.

The North Caucasian Military District was commanded by Lieutenant General Ivan Stepanovich Konev. Before the war, he turned all the combat units of his district into the 19th Army, with which he moved to the Cherkassy region. It was the second strategic echelon. Seven armies advanced there, including the 19th. He does not write anything about the beginning of the war. He began his memoirs in 1945. The first book is dedicated to the end of the war. And the second book is about 1943-1944. Konev describes the war from the wrong side. Until 1941, he did not reach.

Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin. He commanded the 16th Army, which advanced to the West from Transbaikalia. He was also silent. He also did not write memoirs. People of this plan understood everything. There was censorship in the Soviet Union



and there was self-censorship. Don't talk too much. If you blurt it out too much, it won't be good. And all previous events were reworked by the memory in the most decisive way. Subsequent events left an indelible imprint on all previous memories, distorted and refracted them.

"Hitler attacked!" It was so shocking that everyone, out of the simplicity of their souls, forgot about everything that happened before. And the one who remembered, he was silent.

Here is Army General Batov Pavel Ivanovich. He was behind the deputy commander of the Transcaucasian military district. Before the war, he was transferred to the Crimea, where he prepared for a landing operation. But where can our troops be landed if they were loaded onto ships in the Crimea, and there is no enemy on our soil? He does not write anything about this in his memoirs. Not a word about how and why he got there, what he did ...

*- Suvorov's books are full of arguments about that the Soviet Union was going to attack Germany. Let's try to put together the main arguments. That which proves absolutely irrefutably that the preparation for an attack is indeed*

*lass.*

Number one. There was a line of fortified areas on the old frontier, which we have disarmed and abandoned.

Number two. They began to build a new line of fortified areas along the new frontier. They can say that, they say, here it is, defense ... No! This is a purely offensive line. Why? No obstacles are created in front of it, fire defenses were advanced directly to the border. And all this was built in secondary directions, in order to be able to expose secondary areas and gather all the striking forces into a fist in the main directions. The construction of a new fortification line was not intended for defense.

Before the war, there were pre-trained partisan detachments, secret partisan bases in

forests with a supply of weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, medicines, etc. The detachments were dispersed to hell, and the bases were liquidated.

All bridges, railway stations, water pumps were mined. This is very important, because the supply of the aggressor troops on a strategic scale can only be carried out by railroads. And the railways were powered by steam locomotives, and a steam locomotive cannot run without water, it needs a lot of water. If all our water towers were blown up during the withdrawal, then the whole blitzkrieg would be choked to hell. But ours cleared the whole thing.

Border guards cut barbed wire on their plots.

*Did you make passes?*

- Yes. For whom? For the aggressor? They cleared the border bridges. For what? For the aggressor?

Four million sets of maps were thrown at the border. All are maps of Europe. There were no maps for their territory. The country was fully preparing to fight only on foreign territory.

*Are these maps in the German archives ?*

- I have it, right at home. There is a map of March 1941. East Prussia. Above is the inscription "General Staff" and so on...

Next moment. At the end of May - beginning of June 1941, Russian-German phrasebooks for soldiers and junior commanders were issued in huge quantities. They were printed in Moscow, Kyiv, Minsk, Leningrad... Russian-German phrasebooks that can only be used on German territory.

Following. Songs were written; such as "The Great Day Has Come" came out in millions of records.

Or this: "Over Zbruch, over Zbruch, the red army is coming. We will teach you to love the country, Tymoshenko leads us. I remembered, marshal, the heroic path, I remembered

for the twentieth year, like an eagle, looked at the army and commanded: "Forward!" And we went in a formidable cloud, as we know how to walk, in order to smash the new and powerful fascist scum. We are moving forward with battles, and, wherever you look, Tymoshenko is with us, Tymoshenko is ahead!"

I say: "Brothers, nothing like this has ever happened. He did not look like an eagle at the army. and did not command "forward".

This song was written after May 7, 1940. For before that Timoshenko was not a marshal! No one would have dared to write poetry and call Timoshenko a marshal before Comrade Stalin awarded him such a title! The song was written after May 7, 1940 and before June 1941. And when the war began, everyone forgot about the song. Otherwise, it doesn't work out - "Over the Zbruch... Timoshenko is ahead"... After all, they were running all the way to Moscow, but Timoshenko was ahead, or how to understand?

And "The Great Day Has Come" is not just anything, it is Shostakovich!

*Where do these songs exist?*

- I have them. I found them. Now I am dictating "Icebreaker" on CD, I wanted to insert these songs there too, but there is so much material that the songs had to be cut out. But in my future works they will definitely sound.

So, we had fortified areas - they were destroyed. There were partisan detachments created in peacetime. That is, the enemy comes - they are already acting. They were dispersed.

Following. There was a security band. The enemy enters into our territory, while all the bridges to hell. Try to build bridges across 41 thousand rivers in the European part of the USSR! All stations, all water towers had to be blown up... They stopped all this and started building railroads to the border, widening roads and so on. 10 railway brigades were created, and the railway brigades are 3-4 thousand people each. These brigades were supposed to change the narrow European gauge to a wide

cue soviet standard. They and the corresponding equipment were all prepared.

Next moment. Dnieper flotilla. The Dnieper bridges can be counted on the fingers. They were all prepared for the explosion. And so that the enemy did not lead the crossing, there was the Dnieper flotilla. So it was dispersed in 1940.

If Hitler had approached the Dnieper, we would have destroyed the bridges, and heavy monitors would have walked along the Dnieper ... Then there were no these damn reservoirs, and the Dnieper was wide. The left bank is low-lying, full of canals and marshes, where it was possible for boats to hide...

only found out that the Germans were building a bridge somewhere, high chili, bombed and again hid in the bushes. Everything is overgrown with vines, swamps, birds ...

So, they liquidated this flotilla and made two from one Dnieper flotilla. One - the Pinsk flotilla, brought it upstream of the Dnieper to a tributary. There, in winter, the Dnieper-Bug Canal was built through the swamps to connect the Dnieper basin with the Bug. Through the Bug you can go to the Vistula, and then - the rivers of Germany. All this was prepared in 1940.

And the second part of the Dnieper flotilla was lowered down to the mouth of the Dnieper, passed and left at the mouth of the Danube. We have a very small piece of Soviet territory at the mouth of the Danube. No one could attack the Soviet Union through the Danube Delta. There are swamps, swamps, reeds. But powerful river ships were brought there. For what? Then, to go up the Danube.

The most powerful of all Soviet armies was deployed not against Germany, but against Rumania. Two mountain armies were deployed along the border. There are no mountains on our border, there are mountains on their territory. The goal is to cut off Romanian oil.

Further. Airborne troops. In a defensive war they are not needed. Our problem in a defensive war is to withdraw our troops from the encirclement, and not to throw in new ones. But we have

instead of the partisan detachments, which were dispersed, they began to form airborne corps. Five airborne corps were already ready by June 1941, and five were under deployment.

tyvaniya.

Following. The Soviet Union carried out a secret mobilization. And due to this mobilization, so many people were drafted into the army that the country's economy was on the verge of collapse. We have already said that on September 1, 1939, universal military duty was introduced. Why? Because World War II started on that day. However, on September 1, 1939, Hitler did not yet know that the Second World War had begun. Why didn't he know this? When Great Britain and then France declared war on Hitler on September 3, it was a shock to him. He thought that everything would work out with Poland, like with the Anschluss of Austria or like with Czechoslovakia...

But it turns out that Poland was not going to forgive him. So, Hitler did not know that World War II began on September 1 ...

By introducing universal conscription, Stalin in one fell swoop increased the army from one and a half million to five and a half million, and even prepared reservists. And these five and a half million had to be sent home on September 1, 1941! That is, before September 1, 1941, Stalin had to enter the war! Or let all these millions go home.

- *Or it was necessary to immediately announce a three-year service.*

Well, they didn't go for it. After all, if a soldier has served two years, and he is told that this is your third year, then this will be the collapse of the army. At some of the first Olympic Games—not those ancient Greek, but the pan-European Olympic Games—a long-distance runner had to run to the finish line, and he was asked to run another 50 meters to the place where the royal family was sitting. It looks like it was in the UK. And he could not run there, he had no strength left

elk. So, if a soldier who has served two years and counted the hours, minutes and seconds is suddenly told that he needs to serve a third more, then the army falls apart. Such an army cannot be held back by any force. In peacetime, this does not happen.

*- It turns out that the peak of the training of the Red Army was in the summer of forty-one?*

— Yes.

*“ And it couldn't be delayed?”*

- In no case. It was necessary either to start a war, or to dismiss everyone at home. But then it is not clear why the incredible expenses for the training and maintenance of this gigantic army were needed.

*- In 1939, several ages were called up at once?*

- The fact is that earlier they were drafted into the army from the age of 21 and only one third of the draft contingent. And then suddenly they introduced a conscription from the age of 19! Previously, no one knew whether they would call him or not. And then suddenly Stalin decided that it was stupid to call from the age of 21. Why? I thought about it. Why did they earlier call from the 21st? I served in the training division. We received boys from the age of 18, sculpt from him, like from plasticine. And if a person had deferrals and got into the army at 20, 21 and 22, he was already a peasant. He already understood something in life, it is very difficult to work with him. This is not a kid from school

benches.

It turns out it's not clear. A person works, and suddenly at the age of 21 he is called up for service. Maybe he already has a family. Why not call him at the age of 18-19? This is a headache. The state is unprofitable! It is clear that this is not beneficial for a simple person. Why did the state go for it? So this system can be understood only at the moment when it is over. It ended on September 1, 1939. We have declared universal military duty, and we call on the entire contingent at once, those who are 21 years old, and all those who are 20 and who

19 years. Really, great?! And those who are 18 and who have a secondary education were also captured and sent to military schools. And my father was among them.

And besides everything, they say: "Vanya, you are already 25, but you haven't served before?" Didn't serve. But come here! And the army, its power has grown incredibly. Well, imagine that you now need to place at least one million soldiers on the territory of Germany. In a clean field. Can you imagine the burden on the state?! And there was not a million. There was an increase from one and a half immediately to five and a half million. Not to mention the fleet and parts of the NKVD. Those should also be taken into account.

But on the other hand, these are workers, they need to be dressed and put on shoes, but they themselves do not produce a damn thing. What a load on the economy of the state! In addition, in February 1941, the transfer of troops began. To the West, to the West... They began to transfer more and more, in May this reached some monstrous proportions, and on June 13 it was the complete movement of the Red Army from all the Far Eastern, Transbaikalian garrisons to the West. All on the same frontier. Forward!

And so I asked a question in my book, wrote it in capital letters, but not a single critic answered it. I said: The Red Army (this is the main proof!) could not turn back. The movement started in February. In March, it intensified, then intensified, intensified, until it turned into a universal one. You can't turn back. It is impossible to leave all this army in the border forests, because by spring it will decompose. You can spend the winter anywhere, but in the border regions there are no conditions for combat training. A ar

mia cannot live in dugouts and do nothing.

This mass could not be kept on its territory in the border regions and could not be returned back! For transport reasons ... And in general, what a stupidity: starting in February, moving the entire army to the border, and then, from July, transporting it back to our Far Eastern back streets!

I repeat the question: "The Red Army could not believe

rush back and could not stay in the border forests  
sah for the winter. Question: what was she to do?

None of my critics ever mentioned this  
question even indirectly, even remotely. Nobody ever!

The army itself, plus headquarters, plus command posts,  
plus supplies, hospitals, a hospital base, maps, for supplies of  
blood, meat, footcloths, liquid fuel - all this on earth. All this was  
laid out on the ground and could not exist for more than a few  
weeks.

One more moment. In 1940 or 1941, we organized the  
People's Commissariat of Ammunition. Already between the  
signing of the pact with Hitler and the Hitler attack. The People's  
Commissariat of Ammunition issued such an amount of  
ammunition that there was nowhere to store it. And production  
increased. Industry from February 1941 switched to a wartime  
regime. Aviation pro  
mentality, for example, has definitely shifted.

- *What does it mean - "wartime regime"?*

- The wartime regime really means that the shift is 10 hours,  
and there are two shifts! Hitler began to transfer his military  
industry to the wartime regime after the defeat of Stalingrad.  
Prior to that, he worked in one shift. He kept an eight-hour work  
day.

- *Here you can also recall, by the way, the law of 1940  
years of a ban on changing jobs.*

- Yes. Taken together, this meant the complete mobilization  
of industry. The workers were attached to the factories.  
Peasants were attached to the land even earlier.

- *In the "Icebreaker" there is an extremely convincing  
glider episode.*

- Yes. Two words about it. The most powerful and largest  
aircraft in the world were built by our designer Oleg Antonov.  
But Antonov before the war built not only



transport aircraft, but also gliders. Interestingly, these gliders had telling names. One - KT-40, this is the "Wings of the tank". Wings were attached to a light tank, it was pulled up by a towing vehicle, a DB-3 bomber, then the glider was unhooked and gliding. He could only get on the freeway. In field

those he turned on the engine, accelerated the tracks to maximum and sat down somewhere.

But there are no freeways within our borders. For that is, near our borders - somewhere in the area of Koenigsberg. This is just right!

In addition, another Antonov glider was called "Mass". Excuse me, why do we need "mass"? So, in the spring of 1941, Zhukov ordered the mass production of gliders. Because the airborne troops are paratroopers and glider pilots. They are parachuted or landed on gliders. But storing gliders is difficult. This is a very flimsy construction. You need to store the glider in the hangar. If they were mass-produced in the spring of 1941, then it was impossible to keep them under snow and rain until 1942.

you can: gliders were built, but hangars were not built for them.

*Are they generally disposable?*

- Well actually yes. If you have one that lands on enemy territory, that one is disposable. However, Antonov went further. He created an inflatable glider that could be dropped there, then blown up, folded into a ball, loaded onto a transport aircraft, brought back and inflated again. So the gliders, which had nowhere to store and which could not survive the winter in the open air, prepared a crazy amount just in time for the spring of 1941.

Even before mobilization, Soviet industry was designed primarily to produce military products. I have had an unfinished chapter for twenty years, called "The Irreversible Miracle."

This is what the chapter is about. Here is some kind of knitting and darning workshop in Belarus on the second day of the war suddenly began

production of raincoats for the army. The Germans attacked and they immediately began to produce raincoats. But in order to start production, you need to have stocks for these raincoats. Green threads, samples, equipment. They say that a miracle happened: the war began, and we immediately, instantly began to produce military products. And on the other hand, we can't get this miracle back. This military-industrial complex is worth it - and damn it, no matter how much you fight, the converters are there, the state program ... It's impossible to take and make the military plant produce something for the people ... It doesn't work at all. The war ended 60 years ago, and the military industry cannot produce peaceful products. Let the tanks out, please. The largest plane in the world - please. You launch a cancer into space - please. And to build a car - so you need to buy a special plant in Italy with samples and equipment. And we can't let go. Moreover, to transfer some military plant to the production of peaceful products. Does not work...

- In the early thirties, the Americans designed and equipped all Soviet tractor plants - Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov ... They reconstructed Kirovsky in Leningrad. Prior to this, the Soviet Union was not able to produce at least one of its own tractors. They tried to produce seamless Fordsons in Leningrad, but did not

successfully.

It would seem that it is a noble cause to provide agriculture with mechanisms. It is only strange why, in order to help the village with tractors, it was necessary first to destroy this village, and to kill people by the millions. Initially, it is doubtful that Stalin tried for the village.

— *There is no doubt that tractor factories were originally built as military ones . Yes and almost 600 thousand cars for the army should have*

*whether to release (and produced) factories, also built  
nye Americans.*

— I have never seen figures of tractors supplied to agriculture in the thirties. But in Mikhail Meltyukhov's article "The Eve of the Great Patriotic War" he found the following data: according to the mobilization plan of 1941, "after mobilization, the number of armed forces of the USSR was to be 8.9 million people, the troops were to have 106.7 thousand - guns and mortars, up to 37 thousand tanks, 22.2 thousand combat aircraft, 10.7 thousand armored vehicles, about 91 thousand tractors and 595 thousand cars. That is, the troops were supposed to have 2.5 times more tractors than tanks. What is the role of tractors in the army?

The answer here is very simple. The diary of Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, has been published. He writes there: "It's good for the Russians. Their artillery is tractor-drawn, and we are on horseback." There are photographs where our tractors are pulling German cars stuck in the mud. Those tractors that were abandoned by us were very useful to the Germans. The tractor was very widely used as an artillery

tractor.

*- Tukhachevsky in one of his letters to Stalin suggested  
tens of thousands of tractors of the second echelon to put on  
armor and let it go forward as slow-moving tan  
COV...*

Yes, I'm writing about it right now. well it's technological barbarism.

*- While reading The Last Republic, I noticed such a thing. It talks about  
quantitative  
and the qualitative ratio of German and Soviet  
tanks. Evidence is given that the Soviet tank forces were much stronger than the  
German ones - both quantitatively and qualitatively. And arose*

*such an idea - it is difficult to admit that the German designers were just dumber and weaker advice ski...*

- Certainly. Military designers solve problems, put before them by the military leadership.

*- It turns out that until 1942, German designers were simply not tasked with creating tanks capable of capturing the Soviet Union and resisting Soviet tank forces. Moreover these same German tanks - in small numbers, light, with bulletproof armor, armed with bullets or small-caliber guns - brilliantly completed the tasks that were in front of them*

*delivered before 1941. They captured France, captured other European countries. Rommel with them in North Africa fought quite successfully. And wherein there were no complaints about the technical imperfection of the tanks. Problems came to light only in 1941, after the fall on the USSR.*

- Yes, sure.

*— Here. It turns out that Hitler was not going to fight the Soviet Union under any pretext. Did not plan, unlike Stalin, to violate Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact. And if I planned I would have started with the preparation of the war against the USSR, moreover, even before the conclusion of the pact, and not a year later. Not I would try with all my might to seize the island of England, which is useful - in the sense of conquering living space - like a goat of milk. Tem more so when with the USSR - a common border. Another argument in favor of the spontaneity and preventive nature of Hitler's attack on the USSR.*

*"It turns out that he wasn't going to. If initially there were plans to conquer the USSR, at least the European part, then the tanks should have been developed accordingly. In terms of power, frost resistance ... Just to be able to reach the Urals in one go.*

- *The reaction of people to your performances is interesting.*

*Who reacts in different countries? Like discussions pass? Once, it seems, almost beaten.*

Yes, I was very lucky then. It was in Austria, I spoke to the officers there. I'm lucky that I don't look like a professor. Just like - it is written in the "Aquarium"! - the main thing for a spy is not to look like a spy. And I don't look like a professor either. And with me on the presidium was an uncle who looked very much like the professor. So all the stools flew at him.

I see my task as a historian-educator in bringing my readers, listeners, spectators to the point of massacre. Figuratively speaking! I don't set myself any more goals. What does it mean? I have to pique your interest! A person must search for himself. Did I bring to scuffle, well, let's say, certain sections of readers in Russia? I think I got it!

- *Not the right word! Still would.*

"At least the battle is on, and it won't end.

The first publications were a quarter of a century ago.  
And the battle doesn't stop!

*When was Icebreaker first published?*

- The first publication of individual chapters - in May 1985 in the newspaper "Russian Thought". They didn't take it before, but now the fortieth anniversary of the Victory is coming! I was told that by May 9 we will not publish such crap, such nonsense, serious people will be published here, such as Alexander Moiseevich Nekrich. They then, with his help, explained how stupid Stalin was. But, they say, when we finish these publications, in order to amuse the public, point out different points of view, we will not print chapters from the Icebreaker.

Somewhere the end of May was mine. The first chapter began, which began with the TASS Report. And - away we go! After that, the battle does not subside! Just now they sent me a tip on the book "What happened on June 22, 1941" by A. Usov, 2006. "She," as it is written in the preface

conditions, - breaks Rezun and the rezunists. Finally, I will be finished!

So, I think that while you inspire a person with something, it is not effective. But when the disputes began, people themselves are looking for evidence of their point of view, correct or false, they swear, they are looking for themselves, as we were looking for, parting, they say "fool" - "fool himself", but after all this they come to the conclusion that they cannot sleep, delve into the library to show that the other is a fool, look for proof of their correctness in some textbooks, in some memoirs... That is my modest task. I don't want to convince anyone. But only to inflame attention.

*How are you received in different countries?*

- Usually very good. Here, for example, one wait - in Tallinn. We had a long program there. I was treated very kindly. We drank, ate, and in the morning we were leaving. And at the last moment it dawned on someone that Suvorov was leaving, and Central Television did not show this on the news. I need to pass control, and here is a TV camera, here people are standing. On the one hand, I am a shy person, but on the other hand, I am pleasant. The TV camera is filming me, they start asking questions. My voice is loud, I get turned on, I start screaming into the TV camera. They ask me about President Putin, about what I did in Tallinn. Here the people begin to push away the TV camera, shoving tickets at me, on which I have to sign, and immediately the readers ask me questions. I say: "Brothers, my plane will fly away!"

They just pushed me onto the plane, and Tatyana and I flew.

By and large, my biggest triumph was in May 1992 in Poland. It was the first public performance, I was almost crushed there. But in Poland there were no negative moments at all. It was like this. Me you

I go to the airport, reporters immediately ask me if this is a provocation: our Lex Walesa

flew to Moscow to tell how we are sitting here without fuel, and here Suvorov is in Warsaw ...

I didn't know anything about it. The contract with the publisher was signed earlier, seven months before the release of the book, and it stated that on the day the Icebreaker was released, I should be in Warsaw. For advertising. The publisher did not know whether the book would work or not, he wanted to make sure. Here I come.

There was also a whole preliminary story - how I got to Warsaw. The government refused to accept me. Someone from somewhere let it slip that I would appear. But I didn't know for seven months that on this very day Lech Walesa would fly to Moscow to tell Boris Yeltsin how the Poles love the Russians and that oil prices should have been dropped. So, he just flew away, and I'm flying in.

The Polish government appealed to the British government to detain me, not let me out, because it turns out to be a diplomatic scandal.

— *Wait, did you have a Polish visa?*

— Ultimately, yes. I applied for a Polish visa and received it.

Suddenly, at the last moment, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs realized that this was an overlay, and appealed to the British Foreign Office: we tearfully ask you to detain him. The British Foreign Office treats with understanding and insistence strongly advises me not to go...

I went to the ticket office and returned my ticket. I came back and called Bukovsky. I say: "Volodya, I have a contract. I don't give a fuck about him, with all that, but I have a contract. Izda tel is right in his own way, he made a book, under the contract I must be in Poland. But they don't let me in. And from the giver has the right to rip me off for not fulfilling the terms of the contract. And now he will completely rip me off ... But I have no money, where do I get the money from? Nobody publishes my books. And those are not allowed, and these are not recommended to go. And why does the UK need these scandals... And Bukovsky says: no problem, you'll go now. I say: how? He replies: rely on me, everything will be fine.

He calls Poland. And Solidarity is still alive,

still breathing. He admits "information leakage". You, they say, are Poles, what did you fight for? What do you tolerate? They, of course, "how is it?". Polish ambition, you understand .. He answers that the author wrote a book, a little bit against the Soviet Union, against communism, but Poland does not accept him ...

- *Who did he talk to?*

- He has his own contacts there - in the press, in Solidarity ...

And the press exploded. What were you fighting for? People are not allowed into Poland! To please Moscow! The Polish Foreign Ministry changed its tone. They call the British Foreign Office: we invite him! On behalf of the government! Well, they call me from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and say: pack your suitcase and go. And I say that I don't have a ticket. And there is no plane to Warsaw. Then they didn't go every day. Go, they answer, the government of Poland asks you. There is a plane from Heathrow to Vienna, and from Vienna to Warsaw. And then there was no civilized airport in Warsaw. I say good. Only the plane flies to Vienna at 4 o'clock in the morning. I say, what am I going to do there? Everything is paid for you, a suite at the airport, you oversleep, they will remove you and put you in Vienna.

Fine. I'm flying. If the plane took off at four, then it means that he didn't sleep a damn thing. I go out to the airport - my suitcase is gone. The heat in Poland is terrible. The month of May seems to be the 21st, the heat is over 33 degrees. Because I am so important, VIP, my suitcase was left in Vienna. I was so protected.

I did not have time to leave - questions for me. Then I watched the news - "Here he is flying! Here he is landing! Here it is!.." And I'm dirty, I didn't sleep at night. There is no suitcase.

I go out, TV cameras, a bunch of journalists. My first question is: Lech Walesa flew to Moscow, and now you have arrived!

I say - so what? And they have their own: Lech Walesa flew to Moscow, and you are here! I say: so what is the question? Do you want me to say that Moscow will think about it? There was some kind of commie, he pushed me to speak out ... That's what, they say, there



think? I say that they will think that Poland is a free democratic country, they invite whoever they want, they will be more respected! On that day, 28,000 copies of Icebreaker were sold in Warsaw. One day. They would have sold more, but they didn't.

It turned out that I did not sleep there for three days. Very strong nervous tension. We get up in the morning, they take me somewhere. TV cameras. Press conferences. "Let's drink vodka!" Some other questions. Then I go to sleep, I go to the hotel, but I can't sleep. I opened the window, I look at the stars, I walk, I walk. And at five o'clock we have to go to Krakow. I go downstairs, and I don't have a clean shirt, nothing - everything is left in that lost suitcase. I have nothing to change into. Don't worry, they say, let's go, we'll find something for you to change into.

We drove, I don't remember how long, from Warsaw to Krakow. The heat is terrible. We arrived there. I would like to take a shower. No need, they say. Here's some vodka for you - and let's go out. He performed non-stop all day long. Then, in Krakow Castle, they gave me some kind of royal room. And I go out onto the balcony and - I can't sleep, I'm so inflated. On the third day they took me to Bydgoszcz... Then we come to Warsaw, and there is a sensation. Suvorov's suitcase has been stolen! The KGB took him to Moscow! Yellow press, brown and other...

That was my triumph.

*Are you loved in Bulgaria too ?*

- They love it in Bulgaria. There is even a "Suvorov Lovers' Club". We traveled around Bulgaria with a security guard with a gun. Tsvetan Tsvetanov was his name. We traveled all over Bulgaria with him. And there at night on the freeways (it was in October 1996) - the roads are empty. Nobody here. Because there is no gasoline, cars are parked, people are begging. Terrible horror. We go along the road, and only Turkish buses, Turkish refrigerators, drive Turkish tea, tobacco or something else to Europe through Bulgaria. Tsvetan only drives at night. From Varna we went to the Pirin Mountains, there is a sanatorium of the Central Committee, in which we had two

day to rest. And here we are driving through the mountains at night. But whose in the mountains is already freezing, and the road goes along a serpentine. He drives, Tatyana grabbed me, I grabbed her. The people are southern, but there are no posts on the road ... An abyss, and he is so famously over the abyss ... And a Turkish bus was attached behind. Right in the ass rests, shines headlights. And you can't give in to him, narrowly. And the bus presses and presses. The Turk ran into the Bulgarian!

And so we go five, ten minutes. Tsvetan lowers the window. We're in the back seat and the cold wind is on us. With the window open, he rides for a minute or two. Our teeth are already chattering. Suddenly, with his left hand, he takes out a huge pistol and puts it out the window. The car drives on the right. It turned out that he chose such a turn so that the bus driver could immediately see what he had in his hand. He immediately backed off.

*- Did the government give protection?*

Yes, the government. We came to Bulgaria at the invitation of Prosecutor General Ivan Tatarchev. He wrote to me in a letter: "I invite you on behalf of the government and on my own behalf. I don't know what Russia thinks about you there, but you didn't do anything bad to Bulgaria, I will protect you as my personal guests, so come." We arrived in the morning, the Attorney General met us, then he entrusted us to his guys. I don't know if it was an overt or covert guard. In the end, he came to us, brought us to the airport, to the gangway, and said: "Here my mission ends, this is the border of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian air defense is alerted." I don't know how much he was joking, but the fact that the Attorney General met us and escorted us from the ladder to the ladder was.

*" After your escape, you naturally received British papers with a new name. Under what names do you drive?*

Well, I have a lot of passports. In Tallinn, for example, traveled with the documents of Viktor Suvorov.

*Mikhail Veller*

## ICEBREAKER Suvorov

After the Icebreaker, the history of World War II in does not exist in its former form.

We sat for a liter bottle: a colonel, a journalist, a military historian and a writer. Everyone preferred to get in their own way, so that the author's remarks after a direct speech are meaningless: "who said" and "what did he say" were mixed into okroshka. All are strategists.

- After all, Suvorov did not say anything fundamentally new. I remember, as a student, I read Notes of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Shtemenko. Sixties, Soviet memoirs, military censorship, everything is in order. And now: September 1939, the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. We enter Poland. We drive at night in the "emka" to the destination. Seems to have lost their way. Stop: we begin to understand the map. Getting lost is not worth it. We are afraid to jump over the demarcation line to the Germans.

Hey, I think: how so? A? There are still battles going on between the Germans and the Poles in some places. We haven't met the Germans yet, we haven't got along. There were no joint Soviet-German victory parades in Brest yet. And the demarcation line is already there!!

So, did it happen beforehand? So, even before the meeting, we agreed on what to whom? Does this mean that the border was drawn in advance? So, was there, perhaps, a preliminary conspiracy, secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact? And so we denied them!

Pierced Colonel-General Shtemenko. Military censorship has fallen. Oops! They divided Poland with the Germans before September 1.

It was then that it dawned on me that we, just like the Germans, grabbed everything we could. And it is impossible to believe the official versions.

— My dear, how could one believe the official Soviet versions even before that? All the Baltics remembered very well how in 1940 the "revolutions" took place and the Red troops were "invited". You take a thick volume of "Soviet Estonia", open the "History" section, scroll through to 1940 - and eat a pill: the veteran recalls: "We knew that there would be a revolution soon"! They didn't "prepare", they didn't "fight", but they "knew"! And how simultaneously, how timely these three revolutions took place! And here is a photo of a happy meeting of the population with the requested liberators: liquid

chains on the sidewalks, and then for one block only hwa melts, and a bunch of activists at the lead tank with a banner. And everything is clearer than clear: a normal occupation, covered for decency with a fig leaf.

To lie - you need a head like a horse: pain neck. Surely all sorts of absurdities will come out.

- Why did Stalin forbid to surrender Kyiv to the last? Yes, because according to all military laws, the Germans could not take it !!! The attacker must have a threefold numerical superiority over the defender - this is an old law. One dug into the ground, shot the area, saved up the reserve - the other rushed at him across the open field, vulnerable to all types of fire impact. So the advantage in terms of species was near Kiev with us, the defenders! There were more of us, not them! And what? Fritz smashed us to smithereens! .. Zhukov at least knew that we didn't know how to fight, but Comrade Stalin didn't understand that there seemed to be a lot of troops, but little sense.

And immediately the question is: why the hell did they gather so many troops and what were they taught? If there are more of us, but they don't know how to defend themselves, why are there so many of them and what do they know how to do?

- Wait. Let's be fair. Suvorov is a stubborn man. He sees only Soviet aggression in everything. It comes to absurdity. Here he writes with pressure about "BT":

tank aggressor. Yeah I understood? Aggression is already at the level of engineering design. Have you ever heard of a "tank defender"?! A peaceful Soviet tank with a cannon for self-defense, yeah.

Yes, a tank - any one - is, in principle, an offensive weapon, a weapon of breakthrough, breaching the defense, offensive. And Suvorov knows this very well. But there was no way he could resist twitching: look, everything that the USSR had in the military was exclusively for aggression.

What about heavy bombers? Like, we would have built a thousand Pe-8s and could have dropped five thousand tons of TNT on the German rear in one raid, this is five megatons, this is already an atomic bomb, and the Khan of Germany, and we would have suppressed the German power, and doomed not German aggression to failure: here is the best weapon of defense! But Stalin abandoned strategic bombers - he did not expect an attack, he himself wanted to attack, and he invested all his means in attack planes, escorting his invasion army.

Well, first of all, there are not five tons of TNT in a five-ton bomb. The bulk of the weight falls on the body of steel cast iron. And in any bomb, explosives weigh only a small part. From the strength of 20%. So not five kilotons will carry a train of a thousand cars, but only one. But

it's nothing.

But secondly: during the war, the Allies riveted 30,000 (thirty thousand!) Strategic four-engine heavy bombers. But they could not "bomb" Germany out of the war. The pre-war Douai doctrine did not justify itself. So our one thousand would not have decided anything, and Stalin, it turns out, was right.

Thirdly: he was right not from an excess of aggressiveness, but from a lack of capacities, materials and engines for all military programs. Five thousand needed engines (because the fifth one was in the fuselage for pressurization at altitudes of the other four) were consumed by fighter and bomber front-line aviation, the need for which was more acute and urgent.

- Suvorov in general is a fundamental perpendicular. He looks for lies in everything, refutes all the statements that were before him, and very often falls into delirium himself. Here is one of the well-established versions: before the war, they destroyed their command cadres, so they fought worse and suffered more losses. No, says Suvorov! Here, read those diaries of Goebbels from the spring of 1945: "Our generals are bad, Russian generals are better." And the Germans would have shot before the war, like Comrade Stalin, four thousand mediocrity in general's shoulder straps - you look, and they would have found better generals, says Suvorov.

Firstly, generals interfere with a bad dancer. So far, then, in the 41st - 42nd German generals beat and drove the superior enemy - they were good for Goebbels. And when in the 45th they could no longer hold back to fight a many times superior enemy - became bad. We must find those responsible for the defeat! It was not the Nazi elite itself that lost the war politically!

And secondly - well, the Germans did not have four thousand generals. Not Russia. All the commanders of divisions, corps, groups, their deputies, headquarters staffs - and half as many generals will not be typed. It would have to shoot everyone and grab more colonels. It is a great loss for us that Suvorov was not born earlier and did not work before the war as Hitler's chief adviser.

- It was previously written that at the beginning of the war our equipment was worse than German? Well, he tries to assert that the German one was worse, bad and stupid. Originality! Surprise! Creating scandals, reversing history, attracting masses of readers! Yes, he is a showman from military history. Zhirinovsky forty-first!..

Here is the Dora supergun shelling Sevastopol. Yes, we can assume that the costs of its creation, transportation and protection did not justify themselves. However, it nevertheless destroyed the famous 30th battery: shells

passed through the thickness of armor and concrete and destroyed towers and casemates. Suvorov obviously knows this, but is silent.

But he writes something else. Firstly, they fired at the map, the gunners did not see the target, such shooting cannot be accurate, this shooting at squares is ineffective: these Germans are stunned! Suvorov plays the fool that he does not know about shooting from closed firing positions, about artillery spotters and artillery reconnaissance, and so on: as if he had not heard about the basics of artillery.

Secondly, the shells of the Dora and Karl were of no use even when they hit! Here is the evidence, here in the book of memoirs it is written: a huge hole into the depths of the earth with a diameter of the diameter of a super-projectile and a round cave below: all the force of the gap went there. Well, a miracle, not an intelligence officer! This type of rupture is called "camouflage" - when a projectile, especially with a high-explosive fuse, slowed down, along a steep overhead trajectory enters deep into soft or unsteady ground, damping the rupture. It can also be with a 75 mm howitzer at a high elevation angle, if the shell hit a soft meadow or peat bog, say. For the Dora, which is pounding a reinforced concrete fortified area with three-ton land mines, hitting soft ground is still a miss, and there is no need to throw a carload of earth upstairs. But when it hits a fortified and deep into the ground barrier - Khan's bunker with a three-meter concrete cap, hidden five meters underground. And Suvorov knows this perfectly well - he simply cannot resist, so as not to bend his line.

- It is a pity that such distortions make thoughtful people doubt everything that Suvorov wrote.

- From the point of view of serious military historians, Suvorov generally operates with some kind of arbitrary speculation. He does not have reliable, documented and verified facts, so he fantasizes at his own discretion.

— Ah, from the point of view of military historians? And who are these Soviet military historians? hired officials,

who, for a salary, bring history into line with the received order and ideological orientation. As you order - we will write, so for sure! That there were fewer of us and the equipment was worse. Or that there were fewer of us, but the technique was better, but the treacherous attack took us by surprise. Or that German losses were greater. Or equal to ours. Or ours is three times more. The same people wrote one thing or another and received titles and prizes for everything. Parasites and demagogues!..

- Well, yes, several thick books have already been published that refute Suvorov, but interest in them disappeared instantly, and they continue to read Suvorov. Books refuted women are generally cheap.

— Dear gentlemen and historical and literary comrades! On the part of finding spots on the Sun, any critic will give a hundred points ahead to a Doberman sniffing a drug courier. The very subject of our conversation already testifies to the fact that Suvorov's theory is well established and

hardened in space-time, like a mountain, according to which a swarm can be climbed by climbers and even driven into it with hooks.

Vertical ejection is the main thing in science. Any clerk can dig up facts. To assemble them into a mosaic and stun the world with the first picture seen - this is what distinguishes a scientist from a scientific sweeper.

Today, everyone is smart, and half of these smart people disagree. And the "Icebreaker" was released for the first time - that's the people opened his mouth: puffs, puffs, and object so sra uh and nothing.

- Well, the classic evolution of recognition: first - "what nonsense!", then - "something, in fact, is here" and finally - "but who doesn't know this." It is easy to be knowledgeable and understanding when you have been explained on the fingers. Ah, how simple and even primitive everything is with Suvorov! That's just for some reason before, no one brought it all into a single picture. And half a century of groans: oh, what a gullible fool Stalin was, and how few we were, and how poorly we were armed in front of the German steel avalanche! ..



- Here's what I'll tell you, historians: in fact, any elementary educated and reasonable person can become a doctor of historical sciences. But the officer-analyst of the residency of the Main Intelligence Directorate is already an elite. From him the demand is much tougher, right? And the responsibility is steeper, right? And he is supposed to be able to analyze according to his position. And forcing a GRU station officer into the realm of quiet historians is like a Canadian professional throwing amateur hockey players around in the old days.

- Good, by the way, screams about mediocrity-loser Rezun. A boy without a hairy paw entered the elite with a rocket intelligence.

- Suvorov can refute a lot. Podta owl, dreamer, debater, nonconformist, call it whatever you like ...

But the main thing remains, and it is irrefutable! The opponents are trying to bypass the most irrefutable places in Suvorov, to keep silent.

Answer: why did we clear mines on the border bridges in June 1941?! If they themselves were preparing for an offensive, it was logical, clear, correct. But there is simply no other explanation!

Why did they begin to liquidate long-established partisan bases in their forests before the war?! We increase the army - and we destroy the possibility of a partisan movement. What is this preparation for?

Why were maps of foreign territory in abundance, but there were no maps for one's own territory? Does this envisage a defensive war?!

Why were military posters, phrasebooks, even songs prepared and replicated in advance?! So what were you preparing for? To war? But they were not ready for defense? Why? Yeah...

- Stalin rightly believed that Hitler was not a murderer himself, getting involved in a war on two fronts was a clear defeat. But it was far more beneficial for England to push Germany against the USSR - and let them exhaust each other. How can one believe the warnings of Churchill, a person who is extremely interested? And Hitler reasoned that

falling first is the only chance, the lesser of two evils, if the Union strikes first, the end is swift and inevitable. Everything is logical.

- Drop it. A sample of Suvorov cranberries - "Aquarium". A book for those who know nothing about the army and the USSR. For Western fools and lovers of hot someone. "In case of danger, the leader of the group must first of all kill the cryptographer, and destroy the notebook." Such information from everyone and for a long time was not spotted. And then, in case of danger, the first thing the cryptographer will do is kill the senior of the group.

Yes, this is not a document. This is military romance. But from it, many learned a lot for the first time. After all, even the abbreviations GRU have not been heard before!

"And yet, and yet. Suvorov was the first and only one to make a successful and comprehensive attempt to understand and explain what and why happened by June 22, 1941. No other theory stands up to scrutiny. His explains everything. If it's not true, why doesn't anyone else tell the truth that even looks like the truth? Estimate everything yourself: of course, that's how it was, guys. We just have a long cold

chili heads, polluted brains.

And as for his monomania - knitting all the bast in one line - this is already psychology. This is typical of all people who have developed and launched into the world a new and powerful idea. The idea captures them, and they already see all objects in its light. The whole world is constantly interested in them, first of all, from the point of view of their overvalued idea. Everything that is possible, they interpret in her favor and support. Here, kinks are inevitable. And Darwin, and Marx, and Freud - all suffered from this. This is fine. Excesses will then be found and corrected by followers and researchers. But as for the main thing, everything that is possible will be caught with this frequent net. Here, along with the fish, the garbage is raked.

Pour the last one for the defector Rezun. There were many traitors, but so far only one of them seemed to have found a great non-selfish idea. The man did not pay so little for his fame and money.

*Mark Solonin*

### THREE PLANS OF COMRADE STALIN

There is a fact. At dawn on June 22, 1941, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union came as a terrible surprise to Comrade Stal. Stalin did not believe in the possibility of such a development of events. Even on the evening of June 21, when ciphers flew from the command of the border districts to Moscow that the Germans were removing barbed wire on the border and the roar of tank engines was hanging in the air, when at least three Wehrmacht soldiers crossed the border Bug in an attempt to warn the Motherland of the working people of all world, - even then Comrade Stalin doubted the authenticity of these reports. Yes, and on the morning of June 22, it took Stalin several hours to finally accept the decision.

noteworthy.

Soviet radio broadcast cheerful Sunday music and read reports from the fields at a time when radio stations around the world were broadcasting the statements of Hitler and Ribbentrop. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Fascist Italy until noon unsuccessfully tried to find the Soviet ambassador in order to hand him an official note declaring war - on Sunday, June 22, the Soviet diplomat was deigned to relax on the beach. Chargé d'Affaires of the United Kingdom (British Ambassador S. Cripps had already been de facto expelled from Moscow by that time) Baggaley could not get a meeting with Molotov until 12 noon on June 22, and Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky arrogantly refused any - any discussion of the issues of providing assistance to the Soviet Union from the UK, referring to the lack of guidance.

The German attack amazed the inhabitants of the Kremlin offices, stunned them and plunged them into a state of shock. This is a fact.

There is one more fact, more precisely, a large group of facts. In May-June 1941, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union were in a state of covert strategic deployment. Moreover, all the components of strategic deployment (mobilization of reservists, strategic regrouping and concentration of troops, operational deployment of groups) were carried out in the strictest, unprecedented, even by the super-tough Stalinist standards, secrecy.

The troops of the western districts advanced to the border night crossings, and during the day they hid in the forests; formations of the internal districts were transferred to the West in wagons boarded up with plywood shields, and even the commanders of the formations did not know the place of unloading (and even more so - the purpose of the regrouping and the combat mission). The call for reservists was made by personal summons under the guise of "training camps." Until the very last hour, the government of the USSR did not present any claims to Germany related to the concentration of German troops near the border. Moreover, the official mouthpiece of the Soviet leadership - the TASS agency -

On June 14, a pacifying statement was circulated: no war is expected between the USSR and Germany, the parties strictly observe the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact: rumors of an impending war "are clumsily *concocted propaganda hostile to the USSR and*

*Germany forces.*

In June 1941, the Soviet Union was preparing for large-scale military operations, but at the same time, in every possible way, it tried to hide the ongoing preparations. This is a fact.

The task arose before historians: to combine these two facts into one picture, to give them an internally consistent interpretation. Simply put, one single question had to be clarified: if Stalin did not expect a German invasion, then for what purpose

thousands of military echelons marched to the border, and on the basis of the border districts, the front departments were deployed, and already on June 19 - two days before the attack, which Stalin did not expect - the front departments, on orders from Moscow, began advancing to field command posts?

Twenty years ago Viktor Suvorov gave a detailed answer to this question. He suggested—and substantiated it with open Soviet publications at his disposal—that Stalin was preparing for war. Always prepared, from the very first day of his power. Collectivization, industrialization, the Great Terror - all these are just different facets of Comrade Stalin's multifaceted work to turn the Land of Soviets into a huge military camp and divide the builders of communism into two categories: "labour force" and "cannon fodder". In August 1939, Stalin made the final decision to support Hitler. Support him like a rope supports a hanged man. Stalin helped Hitler start a war against a coalition of Western powers (England, France and their allies) so that the outbreak of a war of extermination would devastate Europe, through the ashes of which Stalin's armies had to march in triumph. In June 1941, preparations for this march were interrupted by an unexpected invasion by the Wehrmacht, blinded by Stalin's megalomania.

Subsequently, V. Suvorov's hypothesis demonstrated the main sign of a true scientific theory, namely: all new facts and documents fit into the framework of Suvorov's concept, like cartridges in a clip. Accurately and clearly, without destroying the structure, but only increasing its "lethal power". P. Bobylev, T. Bushueva, V. Danilov, V. Kiselev, M. Meltyukhov, V. Nevezhin, I. Pavlova, M. Solonin, Yu. hundreds of documents and facts are given that confirm the hypothesis of V. Suvorov and actually transfer it from the category of "hypothesis" to the rank of scientifically established truth (contrary to the now fashionable politically correct

In fact, I believe that truth does exist, and the task of historical science lies precisely in the search for truth, and not just in "writing texts").

On the other hand, in the twenty years that have elapsed since the publication of the Icebreaker, no alternative concepts have been formulated. There is not a single book, there is not a single article. No one has ever tried to give another explanation, another interpretation of the two fundamental facts I mentioned above. On the other hand, there is a huge stream **of criticism of Su**

**thief.**

The information field is filled and overflowing with wild noise, uproar, screeching, mocking laughter. Huge areas of Karelian forests have been used up for the publication of libelous little books, in which, with ritual cries, the already standard set of "presenting" is repeated. The personality of Suvorov is disassembled by the bones,

and "as proven by two and two" that he is very, very bad hoy man. He is not our man. Radish. Claims are repeated ad infinitum about errors in the production indices of the products of the Kharkov steam locomotive (that is, tank) plant or

incorrectly specified diameter of the left rear support roller.

According to D. Khmel'nitsky's profoundly correct remark, the producers of "anti-Suvorov" waste paper "even

*it is senseless to reproach them with dishonesty - the authors perform an exceptionally conscientious task, which excludes a conscientious scientific approach. Neither*

*in form, nor in essence, it cannot be included in the category of scientific and historical literature. These are works consolidating the ideological community."*

(Emphasized by me. - M.S.) From complete hopelessness, other critics confine themselves to endless repetition of the mantra: "Suvorov is lying in every word." On the "initiates", i.e. on members of the "militant anti-rezunists" sect, these cries produce a magical effect

vie, similar to the ritual of a shaman.

**"I don't need criticism, I need a version."** This

a phrase that an anonymous visitor wrote down on one of the countless Internet forums describes the historiographical situation that had developed by 2008 with the utmost clarity. Version, alternative to the hypothesis / theory of V. Suvorov, as it was not, and is not. Particularly noteworthy is the deathly silence of the masters of Russian "historical science". I hasten to clarify right away - by "silence" I mean the absence of a VERSION, the absence of a logical, coherent, fact-based interpretation of Stalin's actions in 1939-1941. There is a lot of noise, shouting and calls to "stop rewriting history". Other performances of Russian

academics are forced to the best domestic humor  
st burn with envy.

Here, for example, Comrade O. Rzheshesky speaks on the pages of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper (and this, if anyone has forgotten, is the official print organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), and says these words:

*"Rejected as untenable by most Russian and Western historians, this version (version of V. Suvorov. - M.S.) nevertheless sprouted on domestic soil, primarily for the reason that the media actually do not provide opportunities to oppose existing reliable documents and facts.*

That's it - they do not allow the head of the department of the history of wars and geopolitics of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the president of the Association of Historians of the Second World War, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Rzheshesky, to editorial offices and publishing houses. A venerable scientist cannot present to the public "the reliable documents and facts that he has." I, an "amateur historian from Samara," can show it, but the president and the professor are silenced. Terrible business. Not otherwise, as here "the Englishwoman crap" ...

And not only comrade Rzheshesky is bound hand and foot. In Moscow alone, golden-domed in the capital

<sup>1</sup> "A red star". April 10, 2001

The department of the Academy of Military Sciences has 257 doctors and 436 candidates of sciences. And this is only in Moscow. According to the statute, a doctoral dissertation must be "a fundamental research that forms a new direction in science." 257 scientific discoveries in the field of military history! Eminent scientists are moving towards the knowledge of the truth in fat herds. But in addition to doctors of military sciences, in Russian fields abundantly irrigated with petrodollars, incomparably more numerous flocks of doctors of historical sciences graze. And now there are also sociological and political science doctors...

The deafening silence of official military history is not just a "sign of agreement" with Suvorov's hypothesis. This is a white sheet of surrender hanging from the windowsills of the generals' dachas. Having at its disposal all the archives of Russia, having a crowd

full-time, paid at the expense of the taxpayer under

repairs, they have not been able for 20 years to present "the city and the world" a single document confirming the peace-loving aspirations of Stalin.

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If the scientific discussion about the general direction of Stalin's military-political plans can be considered completed by now, then **the question of the planned dates for the start of the invasion of Europe still remains open.** And this is not surprising - the official Soviet/Russian "historical science" made every effort to hide and distort information on this problem. Let's not forget that the identification of specific plans and deadlines is in principle impossible without access to that mass

sive documents of the highest military and political leadership

Soviet authorities, which to this day are tightly closed to any independent researcher.

As will be shown below, these plans are THREE nyalis, and a bizarre interweaving of scraps of information



The theory of Stalin's three very different plans poses an extremely difficult task for historians. The only thing that can be said today with all certainty is that it will not be possible to SOLVE this problem within the framework of the existing source base. If anything is possible, it is only to formulate a series of HYPOTHESES that will be confirmed or refuted by the next generation of historians. For those who consider the discussion of unprovable hypotheses a waste of time, there is no point in continuing to read this article. Everyone else, I ask you to put up with

the presence in this text of those who upset me and myself

parasitic words: "possibly", "most likely", "probably", "it is not excluded", "it can be assumed" ...

Stalin's first, original plan was extremely simple and logical. The texts now known, in particular, the so-called "Stalin's report of August 19, 1939" published by the French agency Havas on November 28, 1939; published by T. Bushuyeva a record of this "report", which she found in the Special Archive (repository of trophy documents)<sup>1</sup>; The report of a group of Czechoslovak communists published by M. Schauli on the instructions they received in October 1939 in Moscow from the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR<sup>2</sup>, most likely, quite adequately conveys Stalin's intentions of the autumn 1939 model - although the problem of the authenticity of the texts themselves still needs to be resolved.

Plan No. 1 is an attempt to realize an ancient Chinese parable about a wise monkey watching a fight between two tigers from a mountain. *"As a result of his stupidity, Hitler gave us the opportunity to build bases against himself ... From the point of view of the economy, Hitler depends only on us, and we will guide him economy in such a way as to bring the warring countries to revolution. A long war will lead to a revolution in Germany and France ... The war will weaken Europe, which*

<sup>1</sup> "New World". 1994, no. 12.

<sup>2</sup> The truth of Viktor Suvorov. New evidence. M., Yauza PRESS, 2008

*which will be our easy prey. The nations will accept any regime that comes after the war ...* " If we replace the ritual word "revolution" in a conversation between "comrade communists" with the words "devastation, chaos and anarchy" that are much more adequate to the situation, then Stalin's simple, like all ingenious, plan stand before us in all its glory.

In the autumn of 1939, there was no question of establishing specific dates for the invasion of Europe: the war was just flaring up, and the opposing sides were still very far from complete ruin and exhaustion. At this stage, it was Germany that seemed to Stalin to be the weak side of the conflict, to which he provided various political, psychological, and economic assistance so that the war would not stop at its very beginning due to the defeat of Germany. In this connection, one noteworthy point should be noted. In the above-mentioned report of the Czechoslovak communists, A.M. Alexandrov (Head of the Central European Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) that *"we cannot afford Germany to lose."* This phrase has a long and quite reliable history.

Stalin himself said it late in the evening of August 23 1939 during a conversation with Ribbentrop. On October 18, 1939, Ribbentrop decided to use this phrase in his public speech and, as a loyal partner of Stalin, sent the text to Moscow in advance for approval. In Ribbentrop's version, Stalin's words sounded like this: *"The Soviet Union is interested in Germany, which is its neighbor, being strong, and in the event*

*a test of strength between Germany and the Western democracies, the interests of the USSR and Germany will, of course, well, match. The Soviet Union will never want to see Germany in a difficult situation.* Comrade Stalin was sympathetic to Ribbentrop's desire to publicly intimidate the hated British

<sup>1</sup> USSR - Germany, 1939-1941 Collection of documents. Vilnius, Mokslas, 1989, vol. 2, p. 18.

French plutocrats and only asked for a slight softening of the wording. In the agreed version, Stalin's words sounded like this: *"The Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. The Soviet Union, therefore, cannot approve of the actions of the Western Powers, which create conditions for the weakening*

*Germany and putting her in a difficult position.* This correspondence was published 60 years ago by the US State Department in the famous Nazi-Soviet Relations collection of captured documents from the German Foreign Ministry, and historians have no doubts about its authenticity.

The deed (i.e., the anti-Western orientation of Stalin's policy) was not limited to words alone. The Red Army invaded Poland and occupied a little more than half of its territory, an action that formally brought the USSR to the brink of war with Great Britain, which gave Poland the notorious "guarantees" that its territory would not be touched. Then there was an attack on Finland, a traditional ally of the Western democracies, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, and the not formally legal, but quite real, prospect of the Soviet Union entering the European war as an opponent of the Anglo-French bloc.

An amazing document (surprising not for its content, but for the fact that it was not destroyed in time) was preserved in the bowels of the Russian State Military Archive. On March 5, 1940, Deputy Head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, Major of State Security Osetrov, writes a memorandum to the People's Commissar of Defense Voro Shilov:

*"On January 31, the commander of the troops of the Siberian Military District, the commander of the 2nd rank, Kalinin, made in district house of the Red Army, a report on the international situation ... Kalinin announced the inevitability big war in the spring of 1940, in which, with one*

1 Ibid. S. 20.

*side will be the USSR in a bloc with Germany, Japan and Italy against the Anglo-French bloc ... Military operations with England, France and their allies will be protracted ... "1*

In the last lines of the memorandum, the deputy chief "special officer" of the NKVD of the USSR draws extremely strange conclusions: *"Many commanders believe speech by comrade Kalinin confused and lighting in this kind of international environment politically harmful."* How would you like to understand such vagueness and caution in the assessment? Since when did "individuals" begin to hide behind the "opinion of many commanders"? And this after the NKVD successfully imprisoned and shot many thousands of Red Army commanders?

It can be assumed that on March 5, 1940 Comrade. Osetrov himself still didn't really know how it was now necessary to "cover the international situation", with whom and against whom the Soviet Union would fight, but just in case he decided to inform Voroshilov in order to relieve himself of any responsibility. Judging by the consequences of the pits - June 4, 1940 S.A. Kalinin received the rank of lieutenant general and continued to safely command his district - a report with open statements about the "inevitability of war against the Anglo-French bloc", and even in alliance with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, was not at all assessed as malicious slander on the invariably peaceful foreign policy of the USSR.

The war against England and her allies was not just talked about in the "district house of the Red Army". They prepared hard for it. A number of aviation historians (V. Belokon, A. Stepanov) drew attention to the obvious "anti-English" direction in the development of the Soviet Air Force at the turn of the 30s and 40s. Already having in serial production and in service with combat units, the DB-3f bomber, capable of with a bomb load of

1 ton fly 3300 km (the farthest on that mo

1 RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 70, l. 18-19.

ment the German He-111 had a combat range of no more than 2700 km), Stalin in January 1939 put before the designers the task of creating a bomber **with a range of 5000 km**. In accordance with these requirements, the twin-engine bomber DB-240 (Er-2) was developed and put into mass production at the largest Voronezh aircraft plant No. 18. Where, to what distance were the "Stalin's falcons" to fly on bombers with a huge range? From Minsk to Berlin - 1000 km, from Minsk to Hamburg - 1200 km, from Kyiv to Munich - 1400 km, from Vladivostok to Tokyo - 1200 km. The range of the serial DB-Zf was quite enough for the bombing of these targets. But for a strike on the British Isles, a bomber with a much greater range was really required (from Minsk to London 1900 km, to Manchester - 2000 km).

The most fantastic project was the "PB-4 product": a long-range, heavy, 4-engine and, for all that, dive (!!!) bomber. Such an incredible combination of parameters (never realized by anyone in metal) was determined by the task: the aircraft was intended to fight against large surface ships, which it had to hit with a super-heavy bomb, dispersed in a dive to a speed that allowed breaking through the armored deck of a battleship. PB-4 was developed in the "sharashka" - the prison design bureau of the NKVD, in which Beria carefully collected all the color of Soviet engineering thought: Bartini, Glushko, Yeger, Korolev, Myasishchev, Petlyakov, Stechkin, Tupolev, Charomsky ... According to Yeger's memoirs, When developing the PB-4, the British battleship Nelson and the Royal Navy base at Scapa Flow were considered as a typical object for bombing. And although the creation of an aircraft with such parameters exceeded the capabilities of aviation technology of that era, work on the PB-4 project continued until the end of 1939.

In a conversation about how "under the leadership of the Communist Party on the eve of the war a powerful

defense industry", they will definitely remember and name the T-34 and KV tanks, rocket launchers ("Katyusha"), the Il-2 attack aircraft. At the same time, it is customary to forget about the grandiose program for the construction of the navy. In the list of military equipment, equipment and weapons purchased in 1939-1940. in Germany (in exchange for fodder grain, cake and flax tow), almost half are numerous samples of naval (including special corrosion-resistant guns for submarines) and coastal artillery, mine and torpedo weapons, sonar instruments, carrier-based aircraft - scouts and catapults for launching them, propeller and turbine shafts, marine diesels, ship armor steel, and finally, the latest cruiser Lutzow, then completed in Leningrad.

Of the 25 billion rubles allocated in 1940 according to the plan for orders for weapons and military equipment, almost a quarter (5.8 billion) was allocated to the People's Commissariat of the Navy. By the beginning of the World War, the Navy of the great maritime power of Great Britain had 58 submarines, Germany - 57, Italy - 68, Japan - 63. The huge continental country of the USSR was armed (although not by September 39th, and by June 41) 267 submarines. Two hundred sixty seven. The question is, which country's naval blockade was to be carried out by this huge submarine fleet?

In the "Note of the Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet on the plan of operations of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet" (not earlier than March 27, 1940) we read:

*"Probable adversary: England, France, Rumania, Türkiye.*

*Air Force tasks: strike ships in the waters  
the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, the laying of minefields in  
the Bosphorus ... "2*

Report of the Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet to the Main Naval Staff on the plan for the development of aviation of the Black Sea Fleet

1 GARF, f. R-8418, op. 24, d. 2, l. 41.

2 RGA of the Navy, f. R-1877, op. 1, d. 195, l. 1.

for 1940-1941 assumed the following development of events:

*"... Tasks of aviation in theaters of operations:*

*1. Black Sea. Delivering powerful bombing strikes by bases: Constanta, Izmail, Varna...*

*2. Aegean Sea: Thessaloniki, Smyrna...*

*3. Mediterranean Sea: Alexandria, Haifa, Suez channel, o. Malta, Brindisi ... By systematic strikes on the Suez Canal, deprive England and the Mediterranean states of the possibility of a normal exploitation of this communication..."<sup>1</sup>*

In the same months of the spring of 1940, the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army prepared a document on 19 pages entitled: *"Description of routes in India No. 1 (Barochil, Chitral passes) and No. 4 (Killio passes, Gilchit, Srinagor)*. On 34 pages, a "List of military-industrial facilities" of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and India<sup>2</sup> was compiled. All of these countries are colonies or allies of Great Britain.

eleven On May 1940, Divisional Commissar Shabalin submitted a memorandum to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Mekhlis, in which he wrote with great concern about *"the need to carefully view the organization of units and formations of the Red Army from the point of view of readiness to lead them war in the Middle East theater.*

All this "Manilovism", sweet dreams about the "passes of Killio, Gilchit, Srinagor" on the way to the Indian Ocean and the liberation campaign against Jerusalem, crumbled to smithereens in May 1940. France and its allies were defeated within one month. The British Expeditionary Corps barely got away, leaving mountains of heavy weapons on the coastal sand of Dunkirk. The newborn Wehrmacht with dizzying speed turned into the most powerful army in the world.

<sup>1</sup> RGA of the Navy, f. R-1877, op. 1, d. 150, l. 2.

<sup>2</sup> RGVA, f. 29, op. 56, d. 92, l. 1-34.

Much of continental Western Europe came under Hitler's control. This stunning reality forced Stalin to urgently change the strategic plan of the war.

Quite recently (April 17, 1940), less than a month before the start of the German offensive in the West, speaking at a meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, Stalin expressed his concern about the passivity of the sluggishly fighting imperialists; *"They are fighting they are fighting there, but the war is somehow weak, or they are fighting, or playing cards. Suddenly they will take it and reconcile, which is not excluded.* Two months later, German troops paraded under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, and the very wise monkey faced the prospect of being face to face with an angry, blood-tasting tiger. But about carried. In the summer of 1940, Hitler for the first (but not the last) time helped Stalin to get out of an extremely difficult situation.

Instead of stopping in time and, in the cynical language of stock speculators, "taking profits," Hitler decided to finish off recalcitrant England. And then the scythe found a stone. On June 22 (yes, History sometimes makes strange jokes...) 1940, Soviet Ambassador I. Maisky reported from Londo to Moscow:

*"Now it can be said with complete certainty that the decision of the British Government, despite the surrender of France, to continue the war finds the general support of the population ... Greater Churchill's speeches played a role in this. Panic No. On the contrary, a wave of stubborn, cold British fury and determination to resist to the end ... "*

In August 1940, a large-scale air offensive against the British Isles began. However, despite the significant numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe, the blitzkrieg in the sky over London did not take place. Failed to strangle England and the noose of the sea



blockades, although the German submariners achieved great success, sending 300,000 tons of destroyed ships to the bottom of the sea every month. The war, which in June 1940 seemed already over, flared up with renewed vigor, spreading over a vast territory from the coast of northern Norway to the deserts of North Africa. Comrade Stalin was able to breathe a sigh of relief and proceed to the development of "Plan No. 2".

Plan number 2 is a plan for war with Germany. Not with Germany, but against Germany.

In contrast to "Plan No. 1", the content of which one can only guess from individual crumbs of information, "Plan No. 2" is known today in sufficient detail. In the first half of the 1990s, the following documents were declassified and published in a number of collections:

- Memorandum of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov "On the principles of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West and in the East", w / n, no later than August 16, 1940<sup>1</sup>.

- A document with a similar title, but already with a number (No. 103202) and the exact date of signing (September 18, 1940)<sup>2</sup>.

—Memorandum of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov No. 103313 (the document begins with the words "*I report for your approval the main conclusions from your instructions given on October 5 1940 when considering plans for a strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1941*", in connection with which it is usually referred to as the "refined October strategic deployment plan")<sup>3</sup>.

- Memorandum of the chief of staff of the Kyiv OVO by decision of the Military Council of the South-Western

<sup>1</sup> TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 239, l. 1-37.

<sup>2</sup> TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 239, l. 197-244.

<sup>3</sup> TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 242, l. 84 - 90.

front according to the deployment plan for 1940, w / n, no later than December 19401 .

- Excerpts from the report of the General Staff of the Red Army "On the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West and in the East", w / n, dated March 11, 1940.2 .

- Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the commander of the troops of the Western OVO on the development of a plan for the operational deployment of the district's troops, w / n, April 1941.3.

— Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies, n/n, not earlier May 15, 1941.4.

The documents describing the operational plans of the Soviet command should also include the materials of the January (1941) operational-strategic games held by the highest command staff of the Red Army. We are led to this conclusion not only by simple worldly logic, but also by an article published only in 1992 by Marshal A.M. indicates that *"in January*

*1941, when the proximity of the war was already felt quite distinctly, the main points of the operational plan were tested in a strategic war game with the participation of the highest command of the armed forces"*5.

Strictly speaking, there is enough information for reflection. Historians have at their disposal five variants of the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army and materials on the operational plans of the two most important fronts: the Southwestern and the Western.

<sup>1</sup> TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 239, l. 245-277.

<sup>2</sup> TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 241, l. 1-16.

<sup>3</sup> TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 237, l. 48-64.

<sup>4</sup> TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 237, l. 1-15.

<sup>5</sup> "Modern and recent history". 1992, No. 6. S. 5-8.

Within the framework of this article, it should be noted only

how many key points.

Firstly, there was an operational plan for the Great War (*"an operational plan for the war against Germany existed, and it was worked out not only in the General Staff, but also detailed by the commanders*

*troops and headquarters of the western border military districts of the Soviet Union"* - A.M. Vasilevsky). It is strange that this should be emphasized, but some propagandists, in their "diligence beyond reason", even went so far as to assert that the "naive and gullible" Stalin replaced the development of military operational plans by lovingly looking at Ribbentrop's signature on the notorious "Pact on non-aggression." Of course, there was a plan for a war with Germany, and many months of work on it went on without any regard for the Pact. In mentioning

the above strategic deployment plans

The Armed Forces of the USSR (i.e., starting from August 1940) England as a possible adversary of the USSR is no longer mentioned (!!!); Germany is invariably considered the main adversary, which supposedly could be supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland.

A careful comparison of the documents allows us to speculate about the deliberate (in order to hide the true plans of the country's top military-political leadership) misinformation of its own troops, which rose up to the level of commanders of military districts. The documents addressed to the command of the districts (or drawn up in the districts in accordance with the directives of the General Staff) coincide both in content and text with the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army and the general plan for the first offensive operations. But there is

one **important difference**.

The first lines of the "district documents" (a note by the chief of staff of the Kiev OVO dated December 1940 and the Directive for the development of a plan for the operational deployment of the Western OVO dated April 1941) contain the following phrase: "Non-aggression pacts between the USSR *and*

*Germany, between the USSR and Italy at the present time, it can be assumed, ensure a peaceful situation*

*on our western frontiers."* In the documents of the highest leadership (memorandums of the People's Commissar of Defense addressed to Stalin and Molotov), the notorious "Pact" is not mentioned even once! Further, in April 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR orients the commander of the troops of the Western Special Military District as follows

*"The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think to fall on the USSR in the near future. However, considering (the following is a list of various foreign policy events. - M.S.), it is necessary when developing a plan defense of the USSR, keep in mind not only such adversaries as Finland, Rumania, England, but also such possible adversaries as Germany, Italy and Japan".*

And this despite the fact that in the "Kremlin documents" Germany is unequivocally called the main enemy, and only Germany, and there is not a word about a possible war with England!

Secondly, all strategic deployment plans published so far are actually the same document, only slightly changing from one version to another. There is not only a semantic, but also a clear textual similarity of all planes. Without exception, all plans are **a plan for an offensive operation,**

**carried out outside state borders**

**THE USSR.** A strategic defensive operation on one's own territory was not even considered as **one of the possible scenarios** for the development of events in a future war! The entire toponymy of the theater of alleged hostilities is the names of Polish and Prussian cities and rivers. The depth of the offensive within the framework of solving the "first strategic task" is 250-300 km, the duration of the operation is 20-30 days.

Thirdly, only the August (1940) version

plan makes the choice of the direction of deployment of the main forces of the Red Army dependent on the probable plans of the enemy (*"assuming that the main attack of the Germans will be directed north of the mouth of the San River, it is necessary to have the main forces of the Red Army deployed north of Polesye"*). With a big stretch, this logic can also be called "planning a counterstrike." Nevertheless, the subsequent options establish the direction of the main attack solely from considerations of military-operational and political "conveniences" for the advancing Red Army. The assessment of the probable plans of the German command (delivering the main attack by the Germans to the north or south of the swamps of Polesye) changes several times, but this no longer affects the choice of the direction of the main attack of the Red Army. To be more specific: starting from September 1940, all variants of the operational plan provide for the deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the area of the so-called "Lvov salient" to strike in the general direction towards Krakow-Katowice. The authors of the documents justify the choice of just such a deployment scheme by purely offensive considerations: the enemy's lack of long-term defensive fortifications in this direction; the nature of the terrain, which makes it possible to realize the striking power of tank formations to a greater extent; the possibility of cutting off Germany from the raw materials (oil) and food resources of Southeast Europe already at the first stage of the war.

If the very concept of the operation is clear and discussion is possible only in terms of clarifying individual details, then it is impossible to even establish the approximate date for the start of the "liberation campaign" on the basis of declassified documents.

The hypothesis expressed by V. Suvorov and I. Bunich that Stalin intended to start the invasion of Europe at the moment when German troops landed on the British Isles does not find confirmation in known documents. No words, the hypothesis is beautiful and lo

logical, but for the historian, the "beauty of the idea" alone is not enough. Cannot be considered a confirmation of this hypothesis and the phrase available in the Memorandum of the Chief of Staff of the Kiev OVO (December 1940): *"an armed attack by Germany on the USSR is most likely in a situation where Germany is fighting England will be victorious and retain its economic and military dominance in the Balkans."*

Neither in Moscow nor in Kyiv were they going to wait passively for "Germany's armed attack on the USSR"; the offensive plan was to be implemented even before *"Germany in the fight against England will be the winner"*, but when exactly - about this in the Report there is not a word.

Big questions are raised by the Report of the General Staff of the Red Army dated March 11, 1941, which, contrary to all written and unwritten rules for the scientific publication of historical documents, was published in an extremely truncated form. In fact, only a detailed review of the alleged plans and grouping of the enemy has been declassified. Own plans of the Soviet command deliberately left out.

Interest in this document was fueled by none other than M.A. Gareev, who had the imprudence to declare that in the Report of March 11, 1941 (in that part of it that was not published), Vatutin's hand was inscribed on the phrase: "Offensive to start 12.6. " On the Internet forum of the Military Literature website, a certain comrade claimed that he held this document in his hands, that the archival form already contains 12 names of people who worked with the document, and that the indicated handwritten inscription on the back of one of the sheets really exists. However, none of these enigmatic "twelve initiates" published the full text of the Report of March 11, 1941.

Of course, nothing but bitter laughter through tears, such a "historiographical situation" can cause. The Russian state continues to successfully play hide-and-seek with independent historians. remembers

Xia, in the years of my childhood there was such a radio program:

"Guessing game, guessing game is an interesting game ..."

Let us return, however, to the published documents. They give some reason to assume that the mysterious inscription *"offensive to begin on June 12"* (if it exists in reality!) could in no way be connected with June 12, 1941. Most likely, it was about the summer of 1942. And that's why.

April 1941 came after March 11, 1941. Accordingly, the April (1941) Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense for the development of a plan for the operational deployment of the troops of the Western OVO had to take into account the decisions taken by Stalin on the Report of the military leadership of March 11. In accordance with this Directive, the troops of the Western OVO were to deliver crushing blows *"in the general direction of Sedlec, Radom*

*with the aim of completely encircling, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front, the Lublin grouping of the enemy ... Capture the Sedlec on the third day of the operation*

*and on the 5th day - crossings on the river. Wisla"*. The main striking force of the district (front) was to be five mechanized corps: 6 MK, 11 MK, 13 MK, 14 MK and 17 MK. Of these, by June 1941, only 6 MKs were almost completely equipped with military equipment and vehicles; two other mechanized corps (11th and 14th), according to the plans of the General Staff, completed their formation only at the beginning of 1942. As for the 13 MK and 17 MK, they were at an early stage of formation, and even by the end of 1941 their planned manning with tanks did not exceed 25-30%. Such a tank group could not launch the offensive planned by the Directive on June 12, 1941.

On the whole, the entire program launched in February 1941 for the formation of gigantic armored forces consisting of thirty mechanized corps of a thousand tanks each, the re-equipment of this monstrous armored horde with "tanks of new types", i.e. KV and T-34, could not be completed until the end of 1942 (if not later). Not a single reasonable person - and Stalin, no doubt, was

a sober-minded and extremely cautious man - would not have started such a grandiose "major overhaul" a few months before the Great War. It may very well be that there is a fair amount of truth in the endless incantations of Soviet historical propaganda ("Stalin hoped to delay the German attack until the summer of 1942"). True, the truth is bizarrely distorted. Stalin did not create the largest army in the world in order to guess with bated breath: "he will attack - he will not attack ...". Stalin led his own

stvennoe, active and offensive policy; he did not wait for Hitler's attack at all, but chose the optimal moment for delivering a crushing first blow. In March 1941, this moment, most likely, was not attributed to the summer of the 41st, but to the beginning of the summer ("June 12") 1942 or even 1943.

"There are two wills in the field," says an old Russian proverb. The dramatic development of the events of the world war did not allow Stalin to prepare thoroughly for the invasion of Europe, "with feeling, with sense, with alignment."

At some point in the spring of 1941, Stalin realized that It will not be possible to "put off" until the summer of next year, and it is possible to strike first only if the Red Army begins an offensive no later than September 1941. Thus, "Plan No. 2" died before it could be realized, and the top military-political leadership of the Soviet Union had to develop "Plan No. 3".

When did this sharp turn in Stalin's plans take place? Oddly enough, we can determine this point in time with an accuracy of one or two months (which, in the absence of direct documentary evidence, can be considered high accuracy). **Not earlier than 6 April and not later than 24 May 1941.**

April 6, 1941 is one of the most mysterious days in the history of World War II. Let us recall the main outline of events. On the night of March 26-27, a military coup took place in Belgrade, inspired by either the British or Soviet intelligence services. New



The government of General Simovich declared its intention to give a firm rebuff to German claims and turned to the Soviet Union for help.

On April 3 (i.e., only a week after the coup), the Yugoslav delegation was already negotiating in Moscow to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Stalin himself. Despite the fact that Germany, through Ambassador Schulenburg, brought to the attention of Molotov its opinion that *"the moment for concluding an agreement with Yugoslavia was chosen unsuccessfully and causes an undesirable impression"*, at 2.30 am on April 6, 1941, the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty was signed .

A few hours after its signing, Luftwaffe planes subjected Belgrade to a fierce bombardment, and German troops invaded the territory of Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union did nothing to help its new friend. On April 6, at about 4 pm Moscow time, Molotov received Schulenburg and, after listening to the official announcement of the Wehrmacht's invasion of Yugoslavia, limited himself to a melancholic remark: "It is extremely sad that, *despite*

*all efforts, the expansion of the war, thus, turned out to be inevitable ... "1*

What was it? Why was Stalin defiantly "teasing" Hitler, having no desire (and no practical possibility) to provide Yugoslavia with effective military assistance? It is known for certain that in Berlin this strange diplomatic demarche was received with extreme irritation. Later (June 22, 1941), it was the events of April 5-6 that were used in the German memorandum declaring war on the Soviet Union as the main evidence of the hostile policy pursued by the Soviet Union towards Germany ("with the conclusion of the Soviet- Yugoslav

*friendship treaty, which strengthened the rear of the Belgrade conspirators, the USSR joined the common Anglo-South*

1 USSR - Germany, 1939-1941 Collection of documents. Vilnius, "Mokslas", 1989. V.2. S. 156.

*Slavo-Greek front directed against Germany").*

April 6 is the last day about which you can  
it is safe to say that on this day the Soviet-ger  
Mansky relations were very tense and not friendly. Further,  
**the external** (let us also emphasize this word with three bold  
lines) outline of events changes dramatically. Moreover, it is  
changing in a purely one-sided manner - Moscow begins  
defiantly and obsessively to be friends with Berlin.

On April 13, 1941, a major event of world significance took  
place: the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan was  
signed in Moscow, an agreement that freed Stalin's hands for  
action in the West. On the same day, there was a small episode  
at the Moscow railway station, which, however, attracted the  
close attention of politicians and diplomats from all over the  
world. In the report, which the German Ambassador on the  
same day marked "Urgent! Secret! sent to Berlin, this strange  
episode was described as follows:

*"..Obviously unexpectedly for both the Japanese and the  
Russians, Stalin and Molotov suddenly appeared and greeted  
Matsuoka in an emphatically friendly manner and  
the Japanese who were present there and wished  
have a nice trip. Then Stalin loudly  
asked about me and, finding me, came up, hugged me by the  
shoulders and said: "We must remain friends, and  
You must now do everything for this!" Then  
Stalin turned to the acting German military attaché, Colonel  
Krebs, and, having first made sure that he was a German, said  
to him:  
"We will remain friends with you in any case."  
Stalin, no doubt, greeted Colonel Krebs and me in this way  
deliberately and thus consciously attracted the general  
attention of numerous  
the public that was there."*

The warm embraces at the door of the car were soon  
supplemented by other equally demonstrative actions.  
Embassies and diplomats were closed in Moscow

tic representations of countries defeated and occupied by the Wehrmacht. The embassy of the same Yugoslavia was no exception, on the friendship agreement with which, as they say, "the ink has not yet dried."

On the other hand, relations with Great Britain reached such a freezing point that on June 6, 1941, British Ambassador S. Cripps was recalled from Moscow to London "for consultations." In May 1941, the Soviet Union recognized with lightning speed the pro-German government of Iraq, which came to power through a military coup. All issues of economic cooperation were resolved in the most benevolent spirit towards Germany. The memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry dated May 15, 1941 noted:

*"Negotiations with the First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR were held in a very constructive spirit... I have the impression that we could present economic demands to Moscow, even going beyond the scope of the agreement of January 10, 1941...*

*raw materials stipulated by the contract are delivered by Russians punctually, despite the fact that it costs them great effort; contracts, especially with regard to grains are performed wonderfully ... "1*

The aged Count Schulenburg was completely fascinated by the embraces of the hospitable Moscow hosts (by the way, in 1944 the former German ambassador to the USSR was executed for participating in a conspiracy against Hitler, so his "naive gullibility" could not be as naive as it seems ). On May 24, 1941, in another donation to Berlin, he writes:

*"... The fact that this foreign policy, first of all, aimed at preventing a clash with Germany, is proved by the position taken by the Soviet government in recent weeks (emphasized by me. - M.S.), the tone of the Soviet press, which considers all events relating to Germany, not challenging*

1 USSR - Germany, 1939-1941 Collection of documents. Vilnius, "Mokslas", 1989. V.2. S. 164.

*objectionable form, and compliance with economic agreements ... "1*

On May 5, 1941, Stalin appointed himself Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, i.e. head of the government of the USSR. This event then surprised everyone - except, of course, the citizens of the Land of Soviets, who warmly and unanimously approved another wise decision. Everyone else was lost in conjecture. Later, in the autumn of 1941, S. Cripps wrote in his report to Foreign Minister E. Eden:

*"... things began to happen in the USSR that apparently had some special goals. Shortly after the May Day parade, a Decree on the appointment of Stalin to the post of prime minister, which, no doubt, was an act of enormous political significance. Everyone claimed that behind this step he hides some important goal, but no one is sure knew what that meant..."*

This mystery is great. It is hardly necessary to explain that even before May 5, 1941, Comrade Stalin, being just one of the many deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, had absolute power. And until May 5, 1941, Comrade Molotov, being the nominal Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, coordinated any step, any decision of the government with the will of Stalin. For many years, Stalin ruled the country, not feeling the need to formalize his actual status as the sole dictator. What changed at the beginning of May 1941?

On May 10, 1941, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the "List of issues to be considered at the meeting" (whom with whom is not indicated). Item 14 of the agenda reads as follows: *"On additional cost estimates for the period of mobilization and the first month of the war.* On May 12, 1941, the "List of Questions in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" was prepared. Item 7: *"On the work of the Civil Air Fleet (Civil Air Fleet) in wartime."*

The following document deserves special attention. June 4, 1941  
People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov

1 USSR - Germany, 1939-1941 Collection of documents. Vilnius, "Mokslas", 1989. V.2. S. 165.

sends a memorandum No. 1146 to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (that is, Stalin's deputy) N. Voznesensky. The document is classified as "top secret, of special importance." And this is indeed a document of particular importance for the historian - for the first time, absolutely specific dates appear next to the word "wartime" in it: *"I present at the same time a statement*

*the needs of the People's Commissariat of the Navy for mine and torpedo armament for wartime from 1.07.41 to 1.01.43. I ask for your instructions on increasing the allocated quantities of mine and torpedo weapons, considering that the need for them for the 2nd half of the year 1941 is 50% of the total need for the period up to 1.01.43"*<sup>1</sup>.

As you can see, the People's Commissar of the Navy plans to fight as early as next month. The operational plan for this great naval war has already been drawn up - otherwise N.G. Kuznetsov could not predict the specific distribution of the consumption of mine and torpedo weapons for each half of the year.

In May (not earlier than May 15, the exact date is not known) another version of the "Considerations on the Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" was drawn up. The May "Considerations" - completely repeating all the previous versions in terms of goals, tasks, directions of the main attacks, timing and lines - contain some new moment. Namely: *"Germany has the opportunity to warn us in*

*deployment and launch a surprise strike. In all other known variants of the strategic deployment plan, **there is no such phrase in content.***

Further, the developers of the plan insistently suggest *"neither in any case not to give the initiative of action to the German Command, to forestall the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it will be under development and not will still have time to organize the front and the interaction of the arms of the troops.*

<sup>1</sup> GARF f. R-8418, op. 25, d. 481, l. 32-33.

It is extremely important to emphasize that this is not at all about the "greater aggressiveness" of the May "Considerations" - all the previous options also did not offer anything other than a large-scale offensive operation outside the state borders of the USSR. As for the intention to get ahead of the enemy and "under no circumstances give him the initiative of action", it is only an elementary requirement of common sense. The essential novelty lies in the fact that in May 1941 the Soviet commando

is **no longer so sure that he will be able to do this**

**to do**, and therefore asks Stalin to immediately carry out all the necessary measures, *"without which it is impossible to deliver a sudden blow to the enemy both from the air and on the ground."*

On May 24, 1941, many events took place in Stalin's office.

an hour-long meeting, the participants of which, in addition to Stalin himself, were:

- Deputy Prime Minister and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs  
strange affairs Molotov;
- People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko;
- Chief of the General Staff Zhukov;
- Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff Vatutin;
  
- Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force Zhigarev;
  
- commanders of the troops of the five western border districts, members  
of the Military Councils and commanders of the Air Forces of these districts.

There were no other equally representative conferences of the top military-political leadership of the USSR either a few months before May 24 or after that date until the start of the war.

No less remarkable is the list of those persons who were not present at the Meeting on May 24, 1941. Not invited:

- Chairman of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR  
Marshal Voroshilov;

- Deputy People's Commissars of Defense: Marshals Boudin  
ny, Kulik, Shaposhnikov, General of the Army Meretskov;

- Head of the Main Directorate of Political

propaganda of the Red Army Zaporozhets;

- People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov;

- People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria;

- Secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov and Malenkov, who oversaw military issues along the party line and were members of the Main Military Council.

Here, in fact, is the whole "array of information". Nothing more is known to this day. Neither Soviet nor Russian official historiography uttered a word about the subject of discussion and the decisions taken on May 24. Not many participants in the Meeting who lived to see Stalin's death reported anything in their memoirs. Declassified already at the beginning of the 21st century, the Special Folders of the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for May 1941 (RGASPI, f.17, op. 162, d. 34-35) also do not contain even the slightest mention of this Meeting. And only Marshal Vasilevsky, in his article, which has lain *in* archival silence for almost 27 years, recalls: *"A few weeks before the attack on us by fascist Germany, unfortunately plans was transferred by the General Staff to the command and headquarters of the corresponding military districts."*

What conclusions can we draw from available scraps of information? On May 24, 1941, a meeting of the top military-political leadership of the country took place. The composition of the Conference participants is quite strange: there are no marshals occupying high and loud by the title of the position, but with there are lieutenant generals from the districts. If the usual "duty event" took place in Stalin's office, something like a discussion of the results of combat training of troops and plans for exercises for the summer period, then the composition of the participants would most likely be different. It remains to be assumed that memory did not fail Vasilevsky, and it was during the Meeting on May 24, 1941 with

the maintenance of top-secret operational plans was brought to the attention of the executors, i.e. commands of border military districts (future fronts).

If this is so, then the selection of participants in the Conference (only those who developed the last version of the operational plan of the war and who were to carry out this plan) and the strictest, impenetrable veil of secrecy that surrounded (and still surrounds) everything becomes completely understandable. , which is connected with the secret of the Meeting on May 24th.

If our assumption is correct and at the Meeting on May 24, 1941, the war plan approved by Stalin against Germany was brought to the attention of future front commanders, then the "range of possible dates"

the start of the operation is narrowed to almost two months

tsev: **from mid-July to the end of August 1941.**

Let us briefly explain this rather obvious conclusion. If in May 1941 the invasion of Europe was planned to begin in 1942 (and even more so in 1943), then on May 24, 1941, top-secret operational plans would not have been handed over to the command of the military districts. Too early. Dangerous - the possibility of information leakage increases dramatically. Yes, and it makes no sense - before the summer of 1942, the military-political situation could change many times over. And the very fact that the Meeting was held on May 24, and the policy of ostentatious "peacefulness" in relations with Germany that had clearly emerged since mid-April, and Stalin's official acceptance of the post of head of the government of the USSR, and, most importantly, the covert mobilization that began at the end of May and large-scale The redeployment of troops suggests that Stalin's Plan No. 3 envisaged an invasion of Europe as early as the summer of 1941.

It is not possible to indicate the exact specific date for the start of the strategic concentration of the Red Army troops. A beautiful metaphor proposed by V. Suvorov ("a lion in the savanna at first creeps up to its prey for a long time and silently and only at the last moment, with a deafening growl, rushes



on it in an open jump"), describes the situation of May-June 1941 in the best possible way. The strategic deployment of the Red Army took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented secrecy, in violation of many "generally accepted" rules. *"The total volume of transportation of military connections amounted to 939 railway echelons.*

*The protracted advance of troops and the late dates from the concentration were determined by camouflage measures and the maintenance of the peacetime regime of the railways,"* write the authors of the collective work "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" (compiled by a large group of military historians of the USSR in 1992) .

The phrase about the "prolongation of the advance of troops", and even with the **"preservation of the mode of operation of the railways along peacetime"** deserves special attention. For the multi-million armies of the first half of the 20th century, railways, trains and steam locomotives became the most important "arms of the army", largely predetermining the outcome of the main battles of the two world wars. Accordingly, all countries had developed in peacetime

plans for the transfer of railway traffic to the regime

"maximum military transport". Thus, at the stage of the strategic deployment of the Wehrmacht for the invasion of the USSR, the railways switched to the schedule of maximum military transportation from May 23rd. The regime of military transportation in the European part of the USSR was introduced (September 12, 1939) even at the stage of the strategic deployment of the Red Army before the war with Poland, which was dilapidated by the invasion of the Wehrmacht<sup>1</sup>. However, in June 1941, nothing of the kind was done!

According to the calculations contained in the pre-war plans of the Soviet command, it took from 8 days (for the Northern Front, i.e. Leningrad Military District) to 30 days (for the South-Western Front, t .e. Kiev Regional Military District). In fact, in the conditions of maintaining the mode of operation of railways

<sup>1</sup> Meltyukhov M.I. "Stalin's Missed Chance". M., Veche, 2000. S. 110.

peacetime, the regrouping of troops was not forced, but actually delayed. It was dragged on with a completely understandable goal frankly named in 1992 by a group of Soviet historians - to provide the maximum possible "camouflage measures". Talking more

easier - not to scare the "game" ahead of time.

The formations of the 16th Army and the 5th Mechanized Corps located in Transbaikalia and Mongolia were the first to advance. On May 22, 1941, the loading of the first parts into echelons began, which, taking into account the vast distance and the continuing schedule of work of peacetime railways, were supposed to arrive in Ukraine, in the Berdichev-Proskurov-Shepetovka region in the period from

June 17 **to July 10**. From May 13 to May 22, orders were received from the General Staff to begin advancing two more armies of the High Command reserve to the western border. The 22nd Army was advancing to the Velikiye Luki-Vitebsk region with a concentration deadline of **July 1-3**,

The 21st Army was concentrating in the Chernigov-Gomel-Konotop region **by July 2**. On May 29, a decision was made to form the 19th Army and deploy it in the Cherkasy-Bila Tserkva region **by July 7**. Not earlier than June 13, a decision was made to form, on the basis of the formations of the Orlovsky and Moscow Military Districts, another, the 20th Army, which was to concentrate at Smolensk **by July 3-5**.

*"The transfer of troops was planned with the calculation completion of the concentration in the areas planned operational plans, from June 1 to July 10, 1941.*

For this phrase alone, the authors of the collective monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" should have been awarded the medal "For Courage". In fact, this phrase means that when developing "operational plans", in particular - when drawing up a deployment schedule, the German invasion was not expected. The chronology is very simple. Troops that have completed their concentration by July 10 will complete operational deployment and prepare for battle not earlier than July 15-20. In order to conduct a strategic DEFENSIVE operation

it is already **hopelessly late** (which was mercilessly confirmed on the battlefields of the summer of 1941).

It would be naive to expect that Hitler - if he decides to attack the USSR in 1941 - will delay the beginning of the invasion until the second half of July. As is known today, according to the original plan of the German command, the invasion was to begin on May 15, after the final drying of the dirt roads of the European part of the USSR from the spring thaw. The Balkan campaign "mixed the cards" of Hitler and led to a delay in the attack on the USSR for as much as five weeks (it is no secret that, according to many military experts - and not only from among the "beaten Hitler generals" - this delay had a fatal effect on campaign results). To start an offensive in the second half of July would be complete madness - even in the absence of any resistance from the Red Army, the German infantry (and this is four-fifths of the invasion army) had to trudge to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line established in the Barbarossa plan, waist-deep in snow .. .

"Completion of concentration in the areas outlined by operational plans" in the first ten days of July means readiness to start a strategic OFFENSIVE operation **from July 15-20** . **This is the "lower limit" of the start date for the invasion of Europe** according to Stalin's "Plan No. 3". The upper limit is also not difficult to determine, based on an assessment of the natural and climatic conditions of the Eastern European theater of operations.

The main blow, as already noted above, was to be delivered in the direction of Lvov-Krakow, with the further development of the offensive on Katowice. The planned duration of the solution of the "first strategic task" was 25-30 days. But not everyone is at war.

is going according to plan, besides, the successful solution of the "first task" was to be followed by the next one. On the other hand, in southern Poland, in Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, autumn and even winter also happen - damp, slushy, with rains, fogs and sleet. For

actions of aviation and motorized troops, this is much worse than a "normal" Russian winter with severe frosts that turn all road directions into a "hard-surfaced road" and fetter lakes and rivers with an ice "bridge". Thus **the end**

**August - early September may be considered the deadline** after which it would be too risky to launch a large-scale offensive in southern Poland and the Balkans.

It is worth comparing the chronology of the strategic deployment of the Red Army with how the preparations for the invasion proceeded on the other side of the future front. In December 1940, Hitler informed his generals: "*Order*

*on the strategic deployment of the armed forces*

*against the Soviet Union I will give, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled start date*

*operations.*" This promise ("eight weeks") Hitler fulfilled - the day of the start of the operation (June 22, 1941) was finally set and brought to the attention of the Wehrmacht High Command on April 30, i.e. 52 days before the start of the operation.

Counting the same eight weeks from the date of the Conference on May 24th, we find ourselves on July 19th, a completely realistic date for the completion of all measures for the strategic deployment of the Red Army.

July-August 1941 and many of the captured commanders of the Red Army were named as the expected date for the start of the war. Of course, the circle of persons admitted to a military secret of such importance as the exact date of a surprise attack was extremely limited, therefore the testimony given below can only serve as a reflection of the general mood, the "common spirit" that soared in the Red Army in the summer of 1941. of the year.

Thus, the military doctor Kotlyarevsky, who was called up on May 30, 1941 for a 45-day "training camp" to the medical battalion of the 147th Infantry Division, reported that "on June 7, the medical personnel were confidentially informed that after 45 days of dismissal would not follow, *since how in the near future there will be a war with Germany.*

Captain Krasko, adjutant commander of the 661st regiment

200th Infantry Division, testified: *"Back in May 1941.*

*the opinion was expressed among the officers that the war would not begin after July 1.*

According to Major Koskov, commander of the 25th regiment 44th Infantry Division, *"judging by the scale and intensity of preparations for the war, the Russians would have attacked Germany in a maximum of 2-3 weeks "* (after June 22. - M.S.).

Colonel Gaevsky, commander of a regiment of the 29th Panzer Division (in the documents of the 29th TD there is no mention of a colonel with such a surname. - M.S.), testified: *"Among commanders talked a lot about the war between Germany and Russia. There was an opinion that the war would start around July 15th.*

Major Solovyov, chief of staff of the 445th regiment of the 140th rifle division: *"In principle, the conflict with Germany expected after harvesting, around the end of August - beginning of September. Hasty redeployment troops to the western border can be explained by the fact that The date of the attack has been moved back.*

Lieutenant Colonel Lyapin, chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 1st motorized rifle division, testified that *"a Soviet attack was expected in the autumn of 1941."*

Major General Malyshkin (before the war - senior lecturer, then head of the course at the Academy of the General Staff; chief of staff of the 19th Army of the Western Front, captured on October 11 in the Vyazma "cauldron"; one of Vlasov's main associates, hanged

August 1, 1946) stated that *"Russia would attack in the middle of August, using about 350-360 divisions"*<sup>1</sup>.

Testimony given in enemy captivity, and even people who actively collaborated with the occupiers raise understandable doubts. However, the ill-fated month of August, as the probable date for the start of the war, emerges in the most unexpected documents.

In January 1941, the General Staff held with the highest command staff of the Red Army two strategic

<sup>1</sup>Hoffman I. "Stalin's war of annihilation. Planning, implementation, Documents". M., AST-Astrel, 2006.S. 84-85.

sky war games. Marshal Timoshenko personally supervised the preparation and conduct of the Games, and the results were reported to Stalin. It is strange, but the course of the games was tied not to abstract numbers ("the first day of the operation", "the fifth day of the operation"...), but to certain August (!!!) dates.

In early June 1941, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov. June 15 M.M. Popov signed a report sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, in which he expressed concern about the insufficient, in his opinion, defense capability of the base in Khanko, and you made a number of specific proposals for strengthening it. The report ended with the following phrase: *"All these measures must be carried out no later than August 1, 1941 (emphasized by me. - M.S )"*<sup>1</sup>.

On June 17, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to *"conscript 3,700 reserve political workers to the army to complete the middle political staff. Call to produce from July 1 to August 1, 1941.*

On June 18, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks makes the following decision: *"to hand over to the People's Commissariat of Defense in June from the state reserves of 750 thousand pieces of automobile tires with a return to the UGMR [Department of State Mobilization Reserves] in September. Permit the People's Commissariat for Rubber Industry to stop from June 18 from loading automobile tires to all consumers, with the exception of people's commissariats and departments specified in Appendix 1, with transfer of underloads to the 4th quarter"*<sup>3</sup>.

This document does not contain the word "August" - but there is a clear understanding that in June - July the People's Commissariat of Defense will have an emergency, "peak" need for tires. It was decided to cover this need using emergency measures, and the "gap" formed in the reserves and supplies of civilian departments

1 RGVA, f. 25888, op. 3, d. 189, l. 59.

2 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 36, l. 10.

3 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 36, l. eleven.

replenish foam, starting from September - October. It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that the urgent need for tires was associated with the open mobilization planned for July-August, within the framework of which about 240 thousand cars were to be transferred from the national economy to the Red Army.

The archives of the Comintern contain a most interesting collection of documents - reports on the work done (in most cases subversive) by Finnish communists who crossed the front line in September 1941. Among others is the report of Comrade Reino V. Kosunen "On the Work of the Party Organizations in Helsinki and Kuopio." The report ends with the following self-critical

remark:

*"We, the members of the Party, were not at the level of international events at the time when the new war began. Two weeks before the start of the war between Germany - Soviet Union and Finland (so in the text. - M.S) I received a report from the party leadership on assessment of the situation, because I had to go on a party business trip to Korkila.*

*The report contained the following:*

*1. The war continues and spreads. This not lightning war.*

*2. No changes are expected in the position of Finland until autumn (emphasized by me. - M.S), thus, war is not expected yet.*

*We, therefore, did not prepare for war before the autumn new".*

The ability for self-criticism adorns a person - but in this case, Comrade Kosunen is unfair to himself and unnamed "members of the party." This party was controlled not from Helsinki, but from Moscow. The Finnish comrades could not work out any other "assessments of the situation" except those that came from the Moscow leadership (and they had no right to). And if the Finnish communists were preparing for a war that would start "not before

autumn", then this idea was prompted to them not by chance. It is no coincidence that the date of the alleged start of the war is named with some delay - the thoughtful misinformation of ordinary perpetrators is an important and generally accepted method of hiding true information ...

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Strictly speaking, on this brief review of Stalin's three plans can be considered complete. Detailed detailing and clarification of important details will become possible only with the expansion of the source base. On the other hand, the most important thing is already known for certain now - none of these plans was ever implemented.  
van.

In June 1941, the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces, which had just begun, was actually interrupted by the Nazi invasion. The troops that did not complete their mobilization, scattered over vast areas, did not have time to build either the planned offensive or improvised defensive groupings, were subjected to a crushing blow from the Wehrmacht and were actually defeated in parts. And only the huge size of these "units", colossal human resources (in the second half of 1941, 11,790 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army), cyclopean mountains of weapons accumulated in the prewar years, powerful, geographically inaccessible to German aviation the defense industry made it possible to avoid complete defeat.

There is, however, one more question, one more historical problem, which, without any exaggeration, deserves the name "mystery of June 1941." The problem lies in the fact that in the last days of peace (approximately from June 13 to 22, 1941) the top military-political leadership of the USSR **took actions (or**

**less astonishing inactions) totally out of proportion to the prevailing situation.** Or are we dealing with a manifestation of insanity, an attack of temporary insanity



comrade Stalin (which, by the way, is quite acceptable - history is full of examples of insane deeds of the powerful of this world), or in those days a certain "Plan of Stalin No.

What exactly did these "inadequate actions" consist of? viia and inaction"?

For Hitler, the moment of transition from the stage of covert "sneaking up" to the last decisive breakthrough arrived on **June 6–10, 1941**. These days, the loading of the Wehrmacht's tank and motorized divisions into the eastward railway echelons began (until that moment, infantry had accumulated near the western borders of the USSR, the gradually increasing concentration of which did not yet give grounds for unambiguous conclusions about purposes of the German command). On June 14-20, mechanized formations arrived at unloading stations 100-150 km from the border and moved in marching columns to the initial areas for the offensive.

A Wehrmacht tank division is an average of 200 tanks and more than 2,500 wheeled and tracked vehicles, transporters, tractors and armored cars. The marching column of a tank division is a rumbling "steel band" raising dust to the sky, several tens of kilometers long. And not one division went to the Soviet borders. So, on a narrow (approximately 35x35 km) strip of the "Suwalki ledge" (at the junction of the borders of East Prussia, Lithuania and Belarus) in the second decade of June, four tank units (20th, 7th, 12th, 19th) and three motorized (14th, 20th, 18th) divisions of the Wehrmacht. And this is in addition to the nine infantry (26th, 6th, 35th, 5th, 161st, 28th, 8th, 256th, 162nd).

On the same days, a large-scale redeployment of Luftwaffe air groups to border airfields took place. Thus, the two largest fighter squadrons (aviation divisions) of the 2nd Air Fleet (JG 53 and JG 51) flew to the airfields of occupied Poland on June 12–14 and 13–15, 1941, respectively.

airfields) were based four groups (regiments) of diving Junkers, five fighter air groups and two assault (ZG) groups equipped with two engined Me-110s. Soviet intelligence could not fail to notice such a concentration of enemy forces in a zone 30-50 km from the border. It was even harder to make a mistake

assessment of the task set by the German command in front of the troops concentrating on narrow patches protruding into Soviet territory at the junction of military districts / fronts.

According to sound logic, according to the fundamentals of military science and in accordance with many years of practical experience in such a situation, the military-political leadership of the USSR had to immediately take two interrelated decisions: reservists, withdraw hundreds of thousands of vehicles and tens of thousands of tractors from the national economy and put them at the disposal of the army, unpack the mobilization stocks of military equipment) and 2. start a cover operation to mobilize concentration and deployment.

It is these two decisions that constitute the concrete practical content of what is called in ordinary language "bringing the troops to a state of full combat readiness."

However, neither of these was done.

The Soviet Union, this extremely militarized totalitarian empire, which for many years was preparing for the Great War on a scale unthinkable for its neighbors, turned out to be the only one **among** the participants in the Second World War (meaning the large European states, and not the Latin American banana republics) that did not conduct a full-scale mobilization of the armed forces before the start of hostilities. Moreover, open mobilization in the USSR was not even started on the day the war began, but on the second day, June 23, 1941. This is an absolutely impossible, unbelievable situation. This was not the case anywhere:

Germany and Poland, France and Finland, Rumania, Italy and Belgium - all these countries began to mobilize a few days or even a few weeks before the start of the war. The only exception to the rule was the Soviet Union.

The mobilization activities of the first day of mobilization were scheduled by the hour. Each hour of delay gave the enemy additional advantages. Nevertheless, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR read:

*"On the basis of Article 49 of paragraph "L" of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Special Baltic, Western Special,*

*Kyiv special, Odessa, Kharkov, Orlovsky, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian.*

*Persons liable for military service are subject to mobilization after giving birth running from 1905 to 1918 inclusive.*

*Consider June 23, 1941 as the first day of mobilization of the year".*

This is the full text of the Decree. From start to finish. The announcement of mobilization from June 23 is valid for so incredible that the authors of many historical books, without much discussion, the date of the beginning of mobilization is called "natural and understandable to everyone" on June 22 ...

A remarkable detail is that Marshal Zhukov, who clearly understands the absurdity of the situation of NOT declaring mobilization on the day the war began, begins to invent (and this is extremely politely expressed) in his memoirs the following story:

*"...S.K. Tymoshenko called I.V. Stalin and asked permission to come to the Kremlin to report draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on mobilization and formation of the Headquarters of the High Command, as well as a number of other issues. I.V. Stalin replied that he was busy at a meeting of the Politburo and could only receive it at 9 o'clock (it is strange that in the early morning of June 22 it could be more important*

for the notorious "Politburo" than the report of the leadership of the armed forces? - M.S) ... *A short way from People's Commissariat to the Kremlin, People's Commissar's car and mine covered at extremely high speed. We were met by A.N. Poskrebyshev and immediately escorted him to the office I.V. Stalin...*"

How long could this trip "at extremely high speed" from one building in the center of Moscow to another take? If Zhukov's testimony had been true, then Poskrebyshev would have opened the door to the Boss's office for Timoshenko and Zhukov at about 9:20. It doesn't take more than 20 minutes to drive from house to house, present documents to the guards and run up the stairs. Alas, the Journal of Visits silently but firmly convicts Zhukov of a lie: both he and Marshal Timoshenko entered Stalin's office at 2 pm. At two o'clock in the afternoon. The cars "rushed" for five hours... In fact, the meeting of the military in Stalin's office began at 14.00, and at 16.00 Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kulik, Vatutin and Shaposhnikov left Stalin's office. The telegram announcing the mobilization was signed by the People's Commissar of Defense and handed over to the Central Telegraph of the Ministry of Communications at 4:40 pm. June 22, 1941

"Mobilization is war." The complex of mobilization measures is so large that it will not be possible to hide the mobilization that has begun from the enemy (in the case of the announcement of the Decree of the Presidium of the Armed Forces on the "secrecy" of mobilization, there is no need to say something). The announcement (or actual start) of mobilization can push the enemy to start hostilities. Such a threat is very real. It is for this reason that, without exception, in all plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR, as well as in the plans for the operational deployment of troops of military districts, it was envisaged that an operation to cover mobilization and concentration be carried out at the initial stage.

In the period from May 5 to May 14, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to the districts to develop a complete

valuable cover plans, and this work was completed at the end of May - beginning of June 1941. Cover plans existed, they were detailed to the level of armies, corps and divisions and were kept at headquarters in the famous "red packets". The matter remained small - the cover plans had to be taken out of the safe and put into action.

And this is where the big problem arises. In contrast to the sentry at the post (who not only has the right, but is also obliged to decide on the use of weapons on his own, without waiting for any guidance from above), not a single commander had the right to start a cover operation without a direct order from a superior commander. . At the "top of the pyramid", at the command level of the military districts / fronts, the cover plans ended with the following phrase: "*Plan*

*cover is put into effect upon receipt of a ciphered telegram signed by the people's commissar of defense USSR, member of the Main Military Council and chief of the General Staff with the following content: "Proceed to the implementation of the 1941 cover plan."*

But those four words **were never spoken**.

Instead of a short, prearranged phrase ("to put into action the cover plan"), in the late evening of June 21, 1941, Timoshenko and Zhukov (and, in fact, Stalin) sent a whole essay to the districts, which went down in history under the name "Directive No. 1" . Here is her full

text:

*"1. During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZanoBO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may start from provocative actions.*

*2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications. At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa*

*military districts to be in full combat readiness, meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.*

*I ORDER:*

*a) during the night of June 22, 1941, secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;*

*b) before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse on field airfields all aviation, including military, carefully disguise it;*

*c) put all units on combat readiness. Troops keep dispersed and disguised;*

*d) bring air defense into combat readiness without additional rise of assigned composition. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;*

*e) no other events are to be held without a special order."*

The discussion and analysis of the meaning of this text has been going on for more than half a century. Some argue that the main thing in the Directive is the requirement "not to succumb to provocations". Others reasonably object, pointing to the phrase "to meet a possible German strike." Still others rightly point to the obvious ambiguity of the Directive: how can one "meet the Germans' blow" without carrying out "any other measures" than dispersal and camouflage? How can the unmobilized, understaffed wartime troops be placed on "full combat readiness"? How, in the conditions of the most severe shortage of time, are the district commanders supposed to distinguish between "provocative actions" and "surprise German strikes"?

Until the very last minutes of peacetime, Moscow did not give a direct and clear order to put the cover plan into action.

In the testimony of the commander of the Western Front D.G. Pavlova (protocol of the first interrogation dated July 7 1941) the events of the night of June 22 are described as follows:

*"... At one in the morning on June 22 this year. On the orders of the people's commissar of defense, I was summoned to the headquarters of the front. Together with me, a member of the Military Council of*

*fire commissar Fominykh and chief of staff of the front, Major General Klimovskikh. The first question on the people's commissar asked the phone: "Well, how are you, calmly?" I replied that a very large movement German troops are observed on the right flank: according to the report of the commander of the 3rd Army, Kuznetsov, for a day and a half, German motorized mechanized columns were continuously moving into the Suwalki salient. According to his own report, in the Augustow-Sapotskin section, in many places from the Germans removed the wire fence*  
*niya.*

*The people's commissar replied to my report: "You be calm and don't panic, gather the headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations, call." This ended the conversation...*

So, in addition to hundreds of other reports that came to the General Staff of the Red Army, the commander of the troops of the border district reports that the enemy has removed the wire barriers and columns of tanks and motorized infantry are constantly moving towards the border. There is a connection between Minsk and Moscow, and it works steadily. Commissar's order - do not panic. At the same time, Tymoshenko suggests that on the morning of June 22 "something unpleasant may happen." Is it possible that the marshal and people's commissar of defense used these words to indicate a possible attack by a 3 million German army?

*"... At 3:30 a.m., the People's Commissar of Defense called me on the phone again and asked - what's new? I told him that now there is nothing new,  
I have established contact with the armies and the corresponding instructions given to the commanders ... "*

Once again, we note that the communications are working steadily, the commanders in Moscow, Minsk, Grodno, Bialystok and Kobrin do not sleep, on the other side of the border the order to attack was brought to the attention of three million soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht more than 12 hours ago (which

should have been recorded by Soviet military intelligence). But the people's commissar of defense stubbornly refuses to utter the four cherished words: "Introduce the cover plan." However, at 3 o'clock in the morning on June 22, such an order could have changed little ...

There are two descriptions of Comrade Stal's reaction to the news of the German invasion. Both of them belong to the same person - Marshal Zhukov. For many years, the following text was textbook-familiar:

*"... About three minutes later, he approached the device I. V. Stalin.*

*I reported the situation and asked for permission to start retaliatory hostilities.*

*I. V. Stalin is silent. I hear only his heavy breathing whine.*

*- Do you understand me?*

*Again silence.*

*- Will there be instructions? I insist.*

*Finally, as if waking up, I. V. Stalin asked:*

*- Where is the commissar?*

*- He speaks on HF with the Kiev district.*

*- Come with Tymoshenko to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev to call all the members of the Politburo.*

*At 4:30 am, S.K. and I Tymoshenko came to the Kremlin. All summoned members of the Politburo were already assembled. Me and the people's commissar were invited to the office. I. V. Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding in the hands of a pipe not stuffed with tobacco. We reported environment. I. V. Stalin said incredulously:*

*Isn't this a provocation of the German generals?*

*The Germans are bombing our cities in the Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics. What kind of provocation is this ... - answered S.K. Timoshenko.*

*- If you need to organize a provocation, - said*

*I. V. Stalin, then the German generals are bombing their own cities..." And, after a moment's thought, he continued: "Hitler probably doesn't know about it.*



*" We urgently need to call the German embassy," he turned to V.M. Molotov.*

*The embassy replied that Ambassador Count von Schulenburg asked to receive him for an urgent message.*

*V.M. was instructed to receive the ambassador. Molotov..."*

As soon as certain archival funds revealed their secrets in the early 1990s, numerous "mistakes" in this passage from Zhukov's "Memoirs and Reflections" became apparent. The meeting in Stalin's office did not start at 4.30, but at 5.45. By this time, Ambassador Schulenburg had already handed over to Molotov the official statement of the German government with a declaration of war, respectively, there was no need to "urgently call the German embassy". In Stalin's office (not counting the military), not all of the Politburo gathered, but exactly two of its members: Molotov and Beria. True, there was one more person there whom Zhukov did not mention and who, judging by his formal status, was not supposed to be present at a meeting of such a level and with such an agenda: Comrade Mekhlis, People's Commissar of State Control. Moreover, what is even more surprising, in the last 12 hours, Mekhlis ended up in Stalin's office twice - on the evening of June 21, he was present (participated?) in the discussion of "Directive No. 1" and left the office along with all the military men (Timoshenko, Zhukov, Budyonny ) at 22.20.

There is also a second version. Many years before writing his memoirs, on May 19, 1956, G.K. Zhukov compiled and submitted for approval to N.S. Khrushchev the draft of his report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The plenum, which was supposed to give a harsh assessment of the "cult of personality", never took place, and the text of Zhukov's unspoken speech lay in archival confinement for almost half a century. The description of the events of the morning of June 22, 1941 largely coincides with the memoir, but there are also several important differences:

*"... We are with comrade. S.K. Tymoshenko asked for permission order the troops to respond appropriately actions. Stalin, breathing heavily into the telephone*

*phone, for several minutes could do nothing to say, and answered repeated questions: "This is about a provocation of the German military. Do not open fire, so as not to unleash wider actions (emphasized by me. - M.S). Tell Poskrebyshev to call Beria, Molotov, Malenkov to the meeting by 5 o'clock, to come to you and Timoshenko. Stalin reaffirmed his idea of provoking the Germans when he arrived at the Central Committee. The message that the German troops on*

*a number of sections have already broken into our territory, did not convince him that the enemy had begun a real and pre-arranged war. Up to 6 hours 30 min. he did not give permission for retaliatory action and to open fire..."*

This version is much more accurate both in chronology and in terms of the named participants in the meeting (G. Malenkov, a member of the Main Military Council, was in Stalin's office on the morning of June 22, however, he appeared there only at 7.30). It should also be noted the important circumstance that Comrade Zhukov had to deliver his report at the Plenum in the presence of a living witness to the events - in the spring of 1956 Molotov was still a member of the Central Committee. This is an additional reason to believe in the greater plausibility of this version, according to which Stalin not only regarded what happened as a *"provocation of the German*

*military", but also expressly forbade retaliatory actions!*

The point in time at which the troops were allowed to return fire to fire is also almost exactly indicated. Directive No. 2 was sent to the western districts at 7.15. The composition of the len she was in the following expressions:

*"June 22, 1941 at 04:00 am German aviation without any reason made raids on our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them. At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border.*

*In connection with the unheard of impudence attack from*

*side of Germany on the Soviet Union WAY ORDERS:*

*1. Troops to collapse by all means and means on enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.*

*2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of his ground forces.*

*By powerful strikes of bomber and ground attack aircraft, destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groupings of its ground forces. troops. Air strikes should be carried out to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 km. Bomb Koenigsberg and Memel.*

*To the territory of Finland and Romania until special orders not to make raids.*

Neither in form nor in content Directive No. 2 absolutely does not correspond to the statutory norms for drawing up combat orders. There is a standard and it must be followed. This standard was set not by someone's literary tastes, but by Art. 90 of the Field Manual PU-39 (*"The first paragraph of the order gives a concise description of the actions and general grouping of the enemy .... The second paragraph indicates the tasks of the neighbors and borders with them. The third paragraph gives the formulation of the task of the formation and the decision of the commander giving the order ... In the subsequent paragraphs, particular tasks (immediate and subsequent) are set for subordinate formations ..."*).

From the standpoint of these statutory requirements, Directive No. 2 is nothing more than an emotional (if not to say hysterical) outcry. To collapse and destroy life is not a combat order. Where is the enemy? What are his powers? With what forces, in what grouping, is it necessary to "collapse"? In what directions?

At what frontiers? Why on earth the main task of the Air Force was to "bomb Koenigsberg and Memel" (Klaipėda)

du)? And since when did the combat order discuss the "unheard of arrogance of the enemy"?

The emotional excitement of Directive No. 2, completely out of place in the secret combat order, looks especially strange against the background of the detached-cold style and syllable of the Decree of the Presidium of the Armed Forces announcing mobilization.

In the text of the fateful Decree (and it actually determined the fate of millions of people) there is not even the slightest mention of the invasion of the German troops that has already taken place, of the perfidious attack of the enemy, of the sacred duty of the defenders of the Motherland...

The strange and mysterious events of the last pre-war days could not but attract the attention of historians and journalists. Hundreds of articles and books have already been written on this topic. The first in chronological order was put forward, stunning in its absurdity, the version that Comrade Stalin was not gullible, but super-trustful. Naive and stupid. A pupil of the Institute of Noble Maidens, blushing at the sight of naked horses in the street, could be considered a "genius of villainy" in comparison with this simple-minded fool. It turns out that Stalin was lovingly examining Ribbentrop's signature under the Non-Aggression Pact, instead of bringing the troops to "a state of complete readiness."

sti"...

Then this version was somewhat modified and "improved". No, our tyrant did not believe Ribbentrop, he simply lost his head and fell into prostration. For greater importance, an Israeli professor G. Gorodetsky was called (he, by the way, is not a repatriate from the former USSR, but a born Israeli), who, in a book with a delightful title: "Fatal self-deception. Stalin and the German attack" without a shadow of irony

wrote this:

*"Stalin simply refused to accept intelligence reports ... Stalin was clearly at a loss,  
but desperately did not want to part with his delusion ... Stalin, apparently, drove away any*

*thought of war, he lost the initiative and was practically paralyzed..."*

A little inferior to the "foreign consultant" and local personnel. One comrade wrote the following word for word: *"Expecting an early defeat in the event of war, and for himself personally - death, Stalin probably considered resistance useless, and therefore did not try threaten Hitler, nor prepare for battle in time ... In the early days of the war, he let go of the leadership, without taking part in any affairs at all ... "*

This version, amazing in its power of "fatal self-deception" (although in this case, most likely, one should speak not about the self-deception of the authors, but about the purposeful deception of others) version could not survive the first meeting with the array of documents and facts that was discovered in the first half of the 90s. Today there is no longer the slightest doubt that in the spring of 1941 Stalin was not at all paralyzed, confused and frightened to the point of insanity. Not only did he not "drive away any thought of war," but he prepared for it with the utmost effort. Beginning in the second ten days of June, in an atmosphere of the deepest secrecy, measures began to be carried out that cannot be interpreted otherwise than as preparations for war. Toward a war that should begin not in some "foreseeable future", but **in the very next few days and hours.**

The most significant fact is the creation of front-line departments and their deployment to field command posts. In peacetime, fronts within the Red Army were never created (the Far Eastern Front deployed since the late 1930s can serve as

times as an example of the "exception confirming the rights lo" - the border with Japanese-occupied China continuously flared up with either large or small armed conflicts). And, on the contrary, front departments were created before each "liberation campaign" (September 11, 1939 - six days before the invasion of Poland, January 7, 1940 - after the "triumphal march to Helsinki" turned into a real

war, June 9, 1940 - nineteen days before the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina). The formation of active fronts on the basis of district troops, the withdrawal of front headquarters from district centers (Riga, Minsk, Kiev, Odessa) to field command posts, which began on June 19, 1941, is direct preparation for an imminent and inevitable war.

Other decisions and actions are no less indicative.

view of the Soviet command, clearly evidence

about intense preparations for military operations, which should begin in the very next few days. For example, here are the orders and orders issued by the command of the Baltic Special Military districts:

Order No. 0052 of 15 June 1941

*"... The installation of anti-tank mines and barbed wire in front of the front edge of the fortified cook the strips in such a way that during three hours later, the minefield was laid ... Start laying barbed wire immediately ...*

*From the first hour of hostilities (hereinafter, it is emphasized by me. - M.S.) organize the protection of your rear, and to immediately detain all persons who inspire suspicion and quickly establish their identity ... Airplanes at airfields should be dispersed and camouflaged in forests, bushes, preventing formation in*

*line, while maintaining full readiness for*

*departure. Disperse the parks of tank units and artillery, disperse them in the forests, carefully disguise them, while maintaining the ability to assemble on alarm at the established time ... The commander of the army, the commander of the corps and division*

*calendar plan for the execution of the order, which must be fully completed by June 25 this year. g."1.*

<sup>1</sup> "Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War" No. 34. M., Military Publishing, 1953. S. 11-12.

## Order No. 00229 of June 18, 1941

*"... To the head of the air defense zone to  
by the end of June 19, 1941, bring to full. combat readiness of the entire  
air defense of the district ...  
By July 1, 1941, complete the construction of command  
posts, starting from the battery commander to the commander  
of the brigade area (air defense) ... Not later than in the morning  
On June 20, 1941, at the front and army command posts, throw out teams  
with the necessary equipment  
to organize communication centers on them ... Outline and prepare teams  
of signalmen who should be  
ready by the morning of June 20, 1941, by order of the formation  
commanders, to take control of the  
communication centers ... Determine on the site of each army  
points for organizing field depots of anti-tank  
mines, explosives and anti-personnel  
barriers. The said property shall be concentrated in  
organized warehouses by 21.6.41... Create mobile mine and anti-tank  
combat units on the Tel Šiai, Šiauliai, Kaunas and Kalvary directions. For  
this purpose, to have stocks of anti*

*tank min, carried by road.*

*The readiness of the detachments 21.6.41 The plan for the destruction of  
bridges to approve the military councils of the armies. Deadline June 21,  
1941*

*transfer them 50% each to the 3rd and 12th mechanized  
corps. Completion date 21.6.41"<sup>1</sup>*

On the same day, June 18, the commander of the 12th mechanized corps mentioned above, Major General Shestopalov, issued order No. 0033. The order was topped with the highest secrecy stamp ("of special importance, top secret"), which is a rarity for corps-level documents. Order No. 0033 begins with the following words: "Upon receipt of this order, bring to

*combat readiness of all parts. Units to be put on alert in accordance with  
the lifting plans*

<sup>1</sup> "Collection of military documents of the Great Patriotic War"

No. 34. M., Military Publishing House, 1953. S. 22-25.

*on combat alert, on the alarm itself, do not announce ...*

*Take with you only what is necessary for life and battle.*

Next comes the instruction to begin at 2300 on June 18 the advance to the areas of concentration, and all the final points of the routes are in dense forests<sup>1</sup>.

Strictly speaking, there is nothing surprising in these and other similar documents. Of course, in the last peaceful days of June 1941, Stalin did not drive "thoughts about war", but at the maximum pace completed the last preparations for the start of the war.

Surprisingly, only

that this has to be proved as a kind of "sensational discovery".

Something else is incredible and almost inexplicable: literally 1-2 days before the actual start of the war, events began to occur in the troops of the western border districts that are difficult to explain.

characterize otherwise than as **a deliberate reduction combat readiness!**

Facts of this kind are scattered mainly in memoirs and therefore can cause a certain distrust. Nevertheless, one can no longer ignore the numerous testimonies of the participants in the events. There are numerous reports of cases of cancellation of previously issued orders to increase combat readiness, the unexpected announcement of days off, and the recall of anti-aircraft artillery of border units to rear firing ranges. The "big theatrical evening" that took place on June 21, 1941, also deserves attention. It is known that the command of the Western OVO spent the evening of June 21 in the Minsk House of Officers, on the stage of which the comedy "Wedding in Malinovka" was playing. Everyone who wrote about this was loudly indignant at the "short-sighted carelessness" of the district commander. However, even the most cursory review of memoirs allows you to make sure that on the evening of June 21, not only General of the Army Pavlov went on a "cult trip".

<sup>1</sup> "Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War" No. 33. M., Military Publishing, 1952. S. 23-24.



*"... On Saturday, June 21, 1941, a brigade of artists headed by famous Belarusian composer Lyuban. Not so often we were spoiled with their attention by the figures of those atral art, therefore the House of the Red Army was crowded..."*

*"... On Saturday, June 21, 1941, as usual, an evening took place in the garrison House of the Red Army. A Red Army song and dance ensemble arrived from the district. After the concert, according to the hospitable army tradition, the corps commander, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, and I*

*invited members of the ensemble to dinner. Home I*

*returned only at three o'clock in the morning ... "*

*"... On June 21, the deputy commander of the 98th long-range bomber aviation regiment for political affairs, battalion commissar Vasily Yegorovich Molodtsov, invited me to the Shatalovo airfield, where in the local House The Red Army was supposed to host an evening of amateur art performances ... "*

*"... On the evening of June 21, the whole family was at the theater. Together with us in the box was the head of the political affairs of the army, also with his family ... "*

*".... I have one nice suggestion: at seven o'clock on the open stage of the House of the Red Army there will be a performance of the artists of the Belarusian theater of operetta - let's see ...*

*"With pleasure," I agreed. — I hope performance of the Minsk operetta will be no worse than concert of Moscow pop artists in Brest, on who went Shlykov with Rozhkov ... "*

Army General S.P. Ivanov (in the first days of the war - head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 13th Army of the Western Front) in his memoirs gives a very interesting explanation for such actions of the Soviet command

niya:

*"...Stalin sought by the very state and behavior of the troops of the border districts to make Git*

*Leru that calmness reigns here, if not carelessness (a strange, however, desire for someone who is preparing for defense. - M.S.). And it was done that called, in its most natural form. For example, anti-aircraft units were at the training camp ... As a result, we, instead of skillful disinformation actions to mislead the aggressor regarding the combat readiness of our troops, actually reduced it to an extremely low degree ... "*

The mysterious events of the last pre-war days can, in my opinion, be explained, linked into a certain logical chain within the framework of the next version. I'll make a reservation right away - I don't have direct documentary evidence of this version (and it's hard to believe that they will ever be found). Nevertheless, this hypothesis deserves discussion, if only because it makes it possible to rationally explain many of the outwardly contradictory and improbable facts listed above.

So, suppose that the word "provocation", which is repeated in every way both in Zhukov's memoirs and in Stalin's orders, did not appear at all by accident. And it was no coincidence that People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko warned the commander of the Western Front, D. Pavlov, that *"this morning, maybe something something unpleasant will happen, but look, no don't go for a provocation."* Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov knew exactly what. on Sunday, June 22, 1941, *"the attack may begin with provocative actions."* They knew because they themselves prepared this attack and this provocation.

Hitler's secret plans were never on Stalin's desk, but the actual redeployment of German troops was monitored by Soviet agents, aviation and radio intelligence in sufficient detail. Based on this information, quite realistic estimates of the probable plans of the enemy were built. In June 1941, Soviet intelligence recorded the beginning of the operational

deployment of Wehrmacht strike groups at the borders

THE USSR. The correct conclusions were drawn from this fact - Hitler was preparing an invasion that would take place in the summer of 1941, in the very next weeks or even days. A fatal mistake was made only **in determining the time that the German command would need to complete the concentration of troops**, and, accordingly, in setting the date for the possible start of the invasion.

Change the overall strategic intent of the initial Stalin did not begin operations of the war. He had been preparing his "blitzkrieg" for so long, so persistently, so carefully that he really did not want to break the plan of the war, which was to begin with a devastating surprise blow to the enemy. Stalin really "driven away every thought" - but not the thought of war (he didn't think about anything else), but that Hitler at the very last moment would be able to get ahead of him. So after

long and, one might assume, painful

Miy, after numerous meetings with the military leadership (in June 41, Zhukov and Timoshenko were in Stalin's office seven times: on the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 18th, On the 21st (moreover, on other days the military came to Stalin twice and the discussion dragged on for four hours), it was decided once again to change the date for the start of the operation in the direction of approaching. It was probably supposed to start the offensive of the Red Army in the last days of June 1941. Within the framework of this plan (let's call it "plan No. 4"), Monday, June 23, 1941, was set as the day for the start of open mobilization.

The decision to start an open general mobilization on Monday was quite logical. In the Soviet Union, the workplace was the center of life. Factory. Exactly there

concentrated "draft contingents", namely

there, on the morning of June 23, 1941, "spontaneous rallies" of workers were to be held, at which a pre-prepared Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces on the announcement of mobilization would be announced. Precisely because the text of the Decree was prepared in advance, it did not contain a single

the clearest references to the Hitlerite invasion and the actual outbreak of the war.

But Comrade Stalin was wise, and he understood that the Decree of the Presidium alone would not be enough. Especially after two years of Stalinist propaganda explaining to the working people that to call for a *"war for the destruction of Hitlerism, covered*

*false flag of the struggle for democracy"* (V. Molotov's speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939) can only be enemies of the people, vile hirelings of the Anglo-American warmongers. Of course, Stalin did not doubt for a second the obedience of the people he had brought up, but obedience alone was not enough for such a thing that he had planned. What was needed was "noble fury", burning hearts. Simply put, it was necessary to organize and carry out a large-scale bloody provocation.

The staging of a German air strike on a Soviet city (cities) was chosen as the specific content of such a provocation. The Sunday, June 22, 1941, preceding the day the mobilization began, was the best suited for the implementation of the plan. To obtain the maximum possible number of victims among the civilian population, the bombing on Sunday afternoon was the best option: a warm sunny day off, people slept off after a hard week of work and went out into the streets, gardens and squares, take a walk with their children... Technical there were opportunities for staging: back in 1940, two Dornier-215 bombers, two Junkers-88s and five multi-purpose Me 110s were purchased in Germany, not to mention the fact that at an altitude of 5-6 km no one, except for highly qualified specialists, would have recognized the silhouettes of aircraft.

Comrade Stalin had firm ideas about the exact forms in which the "invariably peaceful foreign policy" of the Soviet Union should manifest itself. These ideas he put into practice with the inexorable persistence of The Terminator. Everything should

to be "correct". The Soviet Union could not attack Finland. The Red Army was supposed to stop the provocations of the White Finnish military, which treacherously fired on Soviet territory in the area of the village of Mainila. In June 1941, a war of an immeasurably larger scale was to be launched, respectively, and the next "pre-war provocation" should have been much more noticeable and bloody.

It is extremely important to note that the first part, the first step of the Great Dramatization took place in reality. This is not a hypothesis. It is a fact. On June 13, 1941, the famous TASS Report was compiled and published on June 14. Yes, yes, the same:

*"... TASS declares that, according to the USSR, Germany just as steadfastly observes the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, the rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are without any basis ... The USSR, as it is follows from his peace policy, observed and intends to comply with the terms of the Soviet-German pact on non-aggression, which is why the rumors that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are false and provocative. .."*

This first stage was inevitably followed by a second stage: the mock bombing of Soviet cities by German aircraft. In response to the world's favorite TASS statement - bombs on a sunny Sunday. Treacherous and vile murder of peaceful Soviet citizens. The corpses of murdered women and children in the fresh greenery of parks and squares. The snow-white dove of peace on one side, the black crows on the other. And only after all this - general mobilization. "Get up, huge country, get up for a mortal battle!"

Rough? Too deliberate? Yes, but it was precisely this "style and cut" that Comrade Stalin loved. Roughly, awkwardly, slovenly "stitched" provocations. During the open "Moscow Trials" of 1936, the accused confessed

met in secret meetings with long-dead people, which "meetings" allegedly took place in long-demolished hotels. The Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "Mr. Kuusinen", who has been living in Moscow since 1918, was declared the head of the "People's Government of Democratic Finland". *"Jewelry accuracy of the hippopotamus"* (A.I. Solzhenitsyn). And nothing. During spontaneous meetings, the working people ardently approved and fully supported...

The hypothesis of a provocative staging scheduled for June 22 not only corresponds to the general style of Stalin's "liberations", but also allows you to immediately explain several of the most "inexplicable" facts on the eve of the war.

First of all, it becomes clear those actions on demonstrations of complacency and carelessness that took place on June 20-21. For a greater propaganda effect, the provocations of the bombs were supposed to fall on a Soviet city in a peaceful, outwardly completely calm environment. In combat units - a day off. The command enjoys high theatrical art, the privates run Komsomol cross-country races and compete in volleyball skills. We are peaceful people, and our armored train is rusting on a siding... In addition to the propaganda effect, the lowering of combat readiness and the endless spells "do not succumb to provocations" also had a completely practical meaning: the provocative bombardment had to take place successfully and not a single return shot was fired at the adjacent territory should not have sounded.

The unexpected appearance of Mekhlis in Stalin's office on the evening of June 21st and early morning of June 22nd becomes understandable - starting from 1924, this man was next to Stalin, acting as a specially trusted guarantor for secret and dirty affairs.

Finally, Stalin's reaction to the announcement of the beginning of the war becomes psychologically understandable (or, to be quite precise, to the announcement of the German bombing strikes that began at dawn on June 22).

Stalin was shocked, stunned and almost speechless - how could it be otherwise? It was impossible to believe in such an incredible coincidence. It's the same as during a duel to get a bullet into the opponent's bullet! It couldn't be, because it could never be...

Mark Twain once said, *"Truth is stranger than thought, because fiction has to stay within the bounds of the probable, but truth does n't."* The above version of the events of June 1941 is improbable enough to eventually turn out to be true.

*Vladimir Beshanov*

## MYTH OF NOT READINESS

During my youth, there was nothing in history more boring than the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. In any of its variants, the infinitely wise party collective leadership stood at the forefront, which for some reason was associated with the Brezhnev-Suslov Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU buried under kilograms of orders. In the background shone with marshal and heroic stars a cohort of infallible Soviet generals educated by the Party, relying "on the only scientific theory

knowledge - Marxist-Leninist methodology" and thanks to this, they mastered to perfection the heights of operational art, in principle inaccessible to the "reactionary" bourgeois commanders, who did not master the above method. Further, the mass heroic workers of the front and rear came out in solidarity, tens and hundreds laying down on embrasures, throwing themselves under the tracks of tanks, ramming something all the time, spending "days and nights at open-hearth furnaces", and all as one wholeheartedly devoted to the defense of the conquests. ny socialism. Somewhere in the back, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with his "cult" was breaking out of the scenery, convexly visible, no matter how hard they tried to putty left him.

Closing another volume of endlessly monotonous "memoirs" and "reflections", I enthusiastically plunged into ancient history: the deeds of Cyrus the Great, Miltiades, Cimon, or one of the twelve Caesars - that's where passions boiled and the real Che

love life.



Until fifteen years ago Viktor Suvorov threw a cobblestone of his Ledo cola.

Suvorov stirred up the stagnant swamp of the history of the Great Patriotic War to the very bottom, at the same time precisely by placing the integers in an absurd position generations of Soviet historians. He swung at the "holy", declaring that, exposed by congresses and plenums, but no less beloved comrade I.V. Stalin, with his characteristic thoroughness, himself prepared a treacherous attack on Germany, but Hitler, as a true revolutionary, was the first to strike the enemy in the skull. Just.

It would seem that this assumption is so heretical? What does it contradict?

The ideology of the classics of Bolshevism, who proclaimed any war against the "backward states", any neighbor they did not like justified and just?

To the moral principles of Comrade Stalin, who did not recognize any morality, except that which "contributes to the cause of the revolution"?

The peace-loving policy of the USSR? It was then that the whole "friendship" with Hitler was destroyed, demanding from him the right to occupy / liberate the territories of Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Black Sea straits.

Suvorov's publications launched an unprecedented discussion in our society. How many authors, thanks to him, have made a name for themselves by writing Anti-Icebreakers and Anti-Suvorovs, how many dissertations have been defended, even novels have been written, how many copies have been broken!

Like any author who is carried away by his idea, there are facts in Suvorov's argument that may seem far-fetched, the other part of the arguments can be interpreted in two ways. But if he is right, all the arguments fall "in color", as they fit into the table of D.I. Mendeleev predicted elements. Moreover, we must not forget that the "Icebreaker" was written at a time when most of our citizens considered all German self-propelled guns "Ferdinands", and fighters - not

Messerschmitts, it was absolutely unrealistic to find a reference book on German or Soviet military equipment. But now, thanks to Suvorov, we have learned so much about wheeled-tracked and other tanks. For our sake, in order to somehow counter the "defector Rezun", they declassified the purely secret indexation assigned to peaceful Soviet "steam locomotives" and "seeders" with vertical takeoff. Now anyone can make sure that there was no freeway tank, and all the talk about it is "a big lie of a little man." Where did these enlighteners hide before? Were they waiting for the next party resolution on historical science?

When Army General I.A. Pliev lied to Soviet readers about what nonsense Lend-Lease equipment he had to fight with - extremely unreliable "English Sherman tanks", which were a "mass grave for four", no one rushed to explain that the American Sherman with the crew out of five people was one of the best and most reliable tanks of the Second World War, no one accused the pacifier of Novochoerkassk of military illiteracy. Of course, he was a "big man", he himself did not write or read his memoirs, he lost countless tanks, unless you remember all types, they will take, what good, the whole general's memory.

Suvorov clearly answered the questions that it was pointless to ask our "luminaries": anyway, you get a stupid answer. For example, why did the Germans end up near Moscow? And this is Iosif Vissarionovich, "the greatest leader and commander", specially lured them there, - General P.A. explained. Zhilin, who deservedly headed the Institute of Military History, - within the framework of Stalin's doctrine of the counteroffensive, in order to more accurately "ruin" the best forces of the German army. And near Stalingrad, too, "brilliantly lured" - echoed

A.M. Samsonov did not fail, he became an academician. Again, no one said that from these theories a mile away smells of venality and servility - how not to understand

"the time was like that." However, for court lyso dishes, who consider it their sacred duty to teach us "patriotism", it has always been suitable.

So many archival documents were published in order to refute Suvorov and put an end to the "global lie" that, as they say, you could not even dream of the previous forty years. For this alone I am ready to take off my hat to Vladimir Bogdanovich, if I ever wore one.

And, most importantly, all the Anti-Icebreakers, which tell about Stalin's panic fear of German aggression or disassemble the device of various tanks and aircraft to the screws, essentially did not refute anything. Let's say there were no "motorway tanks". Is it their business?

Development of the Red Army in 1939-1941 was actually a covert mobilization deployment that was to lead to the creation of a wartime army of 8.9 million people.

Most of the planned forces had already been formed or were completing their formation by the summer of 1941.

The first echelon, which included 114 divisions, fortified areas on the new border, 85% of the air defense forces, airborne troops, over 75% of the air force and 34 artillery regiments of the RKG, was supposed to complete mobilization within 2-6 hours from the moment mobilization was announced. The main part of the troops deployed on the 10th-15th day, the full mobilization of the armed forces was envisaged on the 15th-30th day. The main task of the Soviet divisions near the border was to cover the concentration and deployment of their troops and prepare them for going on the offensive.

On March 8, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars was adopted, according to which it was planned to carry out covert mobilization of 903.8 thousand military personnel in the reserve under the guise of training camps. This measure made it possible to call up 805.2 thousand people by the beginning of June.

In the spring of 1941, the Wehrmacht turned south, to the Balkans and the Mediterranean, carried out a landing operation

to Crete - a rehearsal for the landing on the British Isles, demonstrated training in Operation Sea Lion.

In April, the covert strategic deployment of the Red Army began, which was supposed to constitute the final stage of preparations for war.

It was precisely from April, when the Wehrmacht was engaged in the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece and did not threaten the country of the victorious proletariat in any way, that Stalin began to fear "provocations" in a panic. Prior to this, our military had completely "succumbed" to them, not fearing any "complications". For example, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov says: "In late February and early March, German aircraft again violated Soviet airspace several times. They flew with amazing audacity, no longer concealing the fact that they were photographing our military installations ... I suggested to the Main Naval Staff that the fleets be instructed to open fire on violators without any warning. Such a directive was transmitted on March 3, 1941. On March 17 and 18, German planes were fired several times over Libava ...

... now rereading the reports from the fleets, I find reports among them, and in particular from the commander of the Northern Fleet A.G. Golovko that anti-aircraft batteries open fire on German aircraft flying over our bases. By the way, **Stalin, having learned about my**

**at his disposal, did not object**, so that in fact these days a war was already going on in the fleets in the air: anti-aircraft gunners drove off German planes with fire, and our pilots fought them on their outdated "seagulls" ... It's stupid to persuasion a bandit, when he breaks into your house.

After one such incident, I was summoned to see Stalin. In the office, besides him, Beria was sitting, and I immediately understood where the wind was blowing from. I was asked on what basis I gave the order to open fire on the intruder aircraft. I tried to explain, but Stalin cut me off. I was severely reprimanded and ordered to cancel the order immediately.

On April 1, the Main Naval Staff **gave a new directive**

**Tivu:** "Do not open fire, but send out your own destroyers to land the enemy on airfields."

From April 1941, a full-scale process began concentration in the western districts allocated for war with Germany 247 divisions (81.5% of the available forces of the Red Army). After the reservists were mobilized and brought up to full strength, they would have numbered over 6 million people, about 70,000 guns and mortars, over 15,000 tanks and 12,000 aircraft. On April 12, four armies formed from troops from the inner districts began to advance to the western border, and three more armies were being prepared to advance, which were to complete their concentration by July 10. These armies, comprising 77 divisions, constituted the second strategic echelon. On June 12-16, the General Staff ordered the headquarters of the western districts to begin, under the guise of exercises, the secret advancement of the second echelons of the covering armies and reserves of the districts, which were to occupy concentration areas 20-80 km from the border by July 1.

It is clear that these preparations were surrounded by the veil of the strictest secrecy and supported by a powerful disinformation campaign. For example, it follows from the diaries of F. Halder that the Germans did not reveal the presence in the Bialystok ledge of a Soviet shock group (10th Army) consisting of two rifle, one cavalry and two mechanized corps - almost 1500 tanks. But what can I say, if the presence of Russian tanks T-34 and KV, adopted for service in 1939, participating in the war with Finland, turned out to be a surprise for the Germans.

The camouflage regime even extended to the Comintern, which was refused permission to publish an appeal by May 1, 1941, with a detailed analysis of the international situation on the grounds that this "could show our cards to the enemy." In general, in April-June, the Soviet leadership conducted such a cautious external

politics, which gave a number of authors a reason to talk about policy of appeasing Germany. Say, Stalin

afraid of Hitler. Even cooler: "Stalin knew that in the spring and summer of 1941 the army was not ready for war ... The unpreparedness of the army for war was the reason for Stalin's desire to delay the start of the war. In the end, he convinced himself that there would be no war in 1941."

Here is an oddity: Stalin was afraid to "provoke" German attack and at the same time advanced 77 divisions of the second strategic echelon to the west, in direct violation of secret agreements, he ordered the formation of the 238th rifle division, "staffed with personnel of Polish nationality and persons who know the Polish language and are in the service of the Red Army." For what purpose? For the parade in "liberated" Warsaw? Is this not a "provocation"?

Why would Stalin be afraid? He had all the information about the forces of the Wehrmacht and the possibilities of German industry. He had numbers in front of him. He knew that Soviet military equipment was significantly surpasses the German quantitatively and is not inferior to it qualitatively. He believed that, in terms of combat training, the Red Army men and their commanders would not yield to the German soldiers and officers there. He was going to attack suddenly, at the most favorable moment, with huge forces. He understood perfectly well that in the event of the USSR going against Germany, he would inevitably get England and the United States as allies. He quite logically argued that the fall on the Soviet Union was a suicidal idea that Hitler would never go for. Only one thing could not occur to the "leader of all peoples" - that Hitler did not consider him a serious opponent, as well as the "invincible and legendary" Red Army, and was going to defeat the USSR in four weeks. When he got used to playing his games with the whining "old Bolsheviks", breaking all barriers with his will, dealing with obsequious nonentities, Joseph Vissario novice made a mistake in the psychoanalysis of the German Fuhrer. Adolf had his own logic, he had his own plans, the "spirit of Ilyich" on Stalin's forehead did not tremble him, as N.I. Bukharin.

How could Stalin know about the "unpreparedness of the army"? Quite the opposite.

According to Admiral N.G. Kuznetsova: "I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was. Knowing exactly the number of the newest aircraft stationed on his orders at the border airfields, he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm signal, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy.

At a reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941, the leader confidently stated: "For the time being, we were conducting a line of defense - until we re-equipped our army, did not supply the army with modern means of struggle. And now, to when we reconstructed our army, sated those nothing for modern combat, when we have become strong - now we must move from defense to offensive. In carrying out the defense of our country, we must act aggressively. From defense to a policy of offensive action... The war against Germany will inevitably develop into a victorious people's liberation war.

The Soviet leadership explained the victories of the German army in Europe by the weakness of the opponents, German impudence and numerical superiority. With the Red Army, such a number will not work: "Everything new that has been introduced into operational art and tactics by the German army is not so difficult and is now accepted and studied by its opponents, just as the armament of the German army is not news. On the basis of boasting and self-satisfaction, Germany's military thought is no longer advancing as before. The German army lost its taste for further improvement of military equipment. If at the beginning of the war Germany possessed the latest military equipment, now ... Germany's military-technical advantage is gradually decreasing. That is, from the point of view of Comrade Stalin, the Wehrmacht was nothing special.

By mid-May, the final plan for the future war was ready.

This document directly formulated the idea that the Red Army should "preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches." Thus, the main idea of Soviet military planning was that the Red Army, under the cover of troops deployed on the border of the western districts, would complete the concentration of forces intended for war in the theater of operations and go over to a sudden decisive offensive.

Since Soviet intelligence failed to obtain any documents on the Barbarossa plan, the war conceived by Stalin was not a preventive one. The "greatest strategist of all time" did not believe in the German attack on the Soviet Union and believed that "to wage a big war with us, the Germans, firstly, need oil, and they must first conquer it, and, secondly, they it is necessary to liquidate the Western Front, land in England or make peace with her. From this, it was concluded that Hitler would move the Wehrmacht either to the Middle East or to the British Isles, but would not risk a protracted and hopeless war for him with the "great and mighty", having England in the rear.

In general, it can be seen that the Soviet plans lacked any connection between the actions of the Red Army and the possible actions of the enemy. From here, the scenario of the beginning of the war emerges: under the cover of the troops of the western districts, the Red Army is concentrating and deploying in the Western theater of operations, simultaneously conducting private offensive operations. The completion of the concentration serves as a signal for a transition to a general offensive along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians, with the main attack on southern Poland.

German troops in Soviet plans are indicated  
the term "concentrating", and therefore, initiati



The beginning of the war will come entirely from the Soviet side, which is the first to begin and complete the deployment of troops in the theater. The transition to the offensive was tied not to the situation on the border, but to the moment of concentration of the assigned forces - this is the 20th day of the start

la deployment.

The troops were tasked with striking at the German army, for which it followed "the first strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army troops was to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line, and reach the Ostrolenka front, the Narew River by the 30th day of the operation , Lowicz, Lodz, Kretzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The next strategic goal is to have an offensive from the Katowice region in a northern or northwestern direction with the aim of defeating the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and capturing the territory of South, Poland and East Prussia. The immediate task is to defeat the German army east of the river. Vistula and in the Krakow direction, go to the river. Narew, Vistula and capture the Katowice area ... "To ensure a powerful first strike, the main forces were planned to be deployed in eighteen armies of the first echelon, which included most of the mobile formations. In the rear they deployed seven armies of the second strategic echelon, and behind them - three more armies of the third strategic echelon. The role of shock mobile groupings was to be played by 29 mechanized corps, 1031 tanks each, the formation of which began in June 1940.

By the summer of 1941, the Armed Forces of the USSR were the largest army in the world. By the beginning of the war, there were 5774.2 thousand people in them, of which 4605.3 thousand were in the ground forces, 475.7 in the Air Force, 353.8 in the Navy, 167.6 in the border troops, and in the internal troops of the NKVD. - 171.9 thousand people. The ground forces had 303 divisions, 16 airborne and 3 rifle brigades. The troops had 117,581 guns and mortars, 24,488 aircraft and 25,886 tanks. In the first

half of 1941, the Soviet industry produced 100% of tanks and 87% of the latest types of combat aircraft, having completed the transition to the production of these models only. The annual increase in military production in 1938-1940. amounted to 39%, three times higher than the growth of all industrial output in the country.

In a word, Stalin solved the first of the most important tasks: he turned the USSR into a "base for the further development of the world revolution."

On May 20, the "all-Union headman" Kalinin declared: "The capitalist world is full of blatant abominations that can only be destroyed by the red-hot iron of holy war." The military psychosis was inflated in the country, the lured troubadours languished with impatience: "When will Comrade Stalin send us into battle?" In the public mind, an idea was formed about the war as a relatively safe and unconditional

but a heroic occupation, confidence was laid,  
that the war will start when we want and end,  
when we want it.

On May 27, an order was issued to create field front  
command posts.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership knew about the concentration of German troops near the borders of the Soviet Union, but, apparently, this did not bother him too much. Stalin, and together with him Timoshenko and Zhukov, who were initiated into the Big Plan, almost until June 22, believed in the defensive nature of German measures and continued to prepare an offensive operation.

For example, in the summary of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Special District of June 5, 1941, the build-up of German troops near the border was noted. But the conclusions emphasized that the reinforcement of the grouping takes place "mainly by artillery and aviation units", while at the same time the Germans "force the preparation of the theater by building defensive structures, installing anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns directly on the state border line

tsy, strengthening the protection of the state border by field units, repairing and expanding roads, bridges, delivering ammunition, fuel, organizing air defense measures. It was also said that "anti-war sentiments in the German army are taking on ever broader dimensions." Such reports received by the General Staff should rather create the belief that the Wehrmacht is preparing for defense

against a possible Soviet invasion, but he is not going to attack the USSR in the near future.

On June 18, Stalin was given a report from agents from Germany about the deployment of German fighters and the significance of the future heads of the occupied Russian lands. Blinded by the breathtaking prospects, the Liberator of Europe issued a resolution:

"May

you send your source to..."

The "Kremlin Highlander" had no doubt that the Red Army was stronger than the Wehrmacht and that Hitler should be afraid. To be afraid and, quite naturally, to take defensive measures against a Soviet invasion. Marshal Zhukov writes in one of the versions of his immortal memoirs: "I remember how once, in response to my dock

the fact that the Germans strengthened their air, intelligence and military intelligence, I.V. Stalin said: "They are afraid of us." Stalin himself was afraid of one thing - to frighten off the "beast", and was preoccupied with only one thing - to keep the secret until the last moment, not to reveal his secrets ahead of time.

plans.

The German command at that time was concerned about similar problems. So, Goebbels on June 18 (coincidentally, on the same day when the historic obscene resolution was imposed) wrote in his diary: "We observe absolute restraint in all matters relating to Russia ... We must not allow ourselves to be provoked now". And no one concludes that Hitler was afraid. Everyone understands that this is a disguise by the aggressor of his vile intentions.

From June 14 to June 19, the command of the border districts was instructed to withdraw front and army

control to field command posts. Soviet preparations were entering the final stage.

By June 22, 1941, the grouping of Soviet troops of the first echelon in the west totaled 3,088.2 thousand people, 57,041 guns and mortars, 13,924 tanks, and 8,974 aircraft. In addition, there were 1,769 aircraft in the aviation of fleets and flotillas. By this time, 16 divisions had already arrived from the second echelon - 10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 mechanized divisions, in which there were 201.7 thousand people, 2746 guns and mortars and 1763 tanks.

In the western military districts, 64 fighter, 50 bomber, 7 reconnaissance and 9 attack air regiments were concentrated, in which there were 7133 aircraft. In addition, there were 4 long-range bomber corps and 1 long-range bomber division - a total of 1339 aircraft. From April 10

began the transition to a new system of air organization rational rear. In April, five airborne corps were formed in the western districts. On June 12, the Directorate of Airborne Troops was created. At the same time, the rear and hospital units were being deployed. In stationary warehouses and bases

inventories continued to accumulate.

Until the day "M" remained one and a half to two weeks.

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One can endlessly debate whether Stalin was going to attack first. Both supporters and opponents of this version give many arguments, which which actually prove almost nothing and neither which is not refuted. The dispute stalled due to lack of documents. The Russian archives continue to keep the secrets of the lost empire, the secrets of Comrade Stalin. Although the very fact that the operational plans of the Red Army for 1941 have not been found so far is suggestive.

In any case, our defensive measures

they don't make an impression. For example, from the works of the former chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Western OVO, General L.M. Sandalova follows that no defense was built in the border areas and they were not going to defend themselves: "whoever dared to ask questions about the defense in the Brest direction was considered an alarmist." Not only in Brest. Neither the district nor the army plans for covering the creation of rear front and army defense lines provided. Specifically, the troops of the 4th Army were preparing to force the Bug and advance to the Vistula. In March-April, the army headquarters participated in the district operational map game. In the course of it, a front-line offensive operation on Byala Podlaska was practiced. Preparation went on in stages in all command units. On June 21, a headquarters exercise of the 28th Rifle Corps was held on the topic: "The offensive of the rifle corps with overcoming the river barrier", and a new exercise was planned for June 22: "Overcoming the second strip of the fortified area". This is a "cover army", so she was going to "cover".

The Soviet cover plans initially did not provide for opposition to the concentration of troops by the enemy. Thus, the full deployment of the troops of the border districts in the cover zones took up to 15 days according to the plans. Moreover, in the event of an enemy attack, the troops of the first echelon would obviously not have time to occupy their defense lines on the border. Again Sandalov: "The mutual location of the fortified areas and the areas of deployment of troops did not provide in case of outside

a sudden attack by the enemy in a timely manner

fortifications not only by field troops, but also by special ur units. Thus, for example, in the zone of the 4th Army, the term for the occupation of the Brest fortified region was determined by the district for one rifle division - 30 hours, for another - 9 hours, for Urov units - 0.5-1.5 hours. On training alerts, it turned out that these terms were underestimated.

Thus, the Soviet General Staff proceeded from tacos

of the beginning of the war and the situation that has arisen, in which it will be possible to advance to the border without interference from the potential enemy, occupy the designated cover zones, prepare to repel falls, and mobilize: "A feature of all army cover plans was the lack of an assessment of possible enemy actions, first of all, the option of a sudden offensive by superior enemy forces. The essence of a tactical maneuver was that it was necessary to quickly assemble and make a march to the border. It was assumed that time would be given in the areas of concentration for the final preparation for battle.

Only under the influence of a series of alarm signals a few hours before the German attack did Stalin decide to give the troops the famous Directive No. 1 - "do not succumb to provocations." From the point of view of increasing combat readiness in anticipation of enemy aggression, the document is completely stupid. But Stalin's hesitations can be understood: literally two or three weeks remained before the start of the "Thunderstorm", perhaps, indeed, the German generals were trying to open the grouping of Soviet troops by some kind of "reconnaissance in force". I really didn't want to show my cards.

Therefore, instead of a directive to bring the troops of the western districts into full combat readiness in case of war, Stalin ordered a short directive with a decree  
niami that the attack may begin with a provocative  
actions. He still hoped that he would be able to start diplomatic negotiations and, under their cover, complete the concentration of forces for the offensive. But here, indeed, "history took little time." Mobilization was not envisaged by the directive.

Marshal Baghramyan, reporting that the reception of the first directive at the headquarters of the KOVO lasted about two hours, explains:

"The reader may ask, but it would not be easier, in order to save time, to send a short conditional signal from the General Staff, accepting which

The command of the district could have ordered the troops just as briefly: to put "KOVO-41" into action (as we called the plan for covering the state border). All this would take no more than 15-20 minutes. Apparently, in Moscow they did not dare to do this.

That's just the point, the signal "KOVO-41" should have been followed by very specific actions that had nothing to do with repelling aggression. While there was hope - what if Hitler was bluffing, warnings were sent to the troops like "do nothing" and "do not cross the border."

The reason is that, having invested all the talent of the organizer and all his strength into the Thunderstorm plan, Stalin had no other plans. The Soviet General Staff did not plan any defensive operations. There were no plans for defense, "red packets", special "short" signals for this case in the troops. A sudden attack by the enemy with large forces was not considered even theoretically, which means that there were no thought-out decisions on this score.

At the first stage of the Great War, no offensive missions were assigned to the fleet, and the People's Commissar of the Navy, instead of misleading directives, simply announced to the fleets "Readiness No. 1". This was enough for the sailors to meet the war prepared: they knew what had to be done in this case, and they did it. Neither Stalin nor Zhdanov, who was in charge of the fleet, nor Timoshenko and Zhukov could prevent Kuznetsov from fulfilling his direct functional duties.

And one more question. And if Hitler had not attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, what would Comrade Stalin have done? Would you order the divisions of the Urals, North Caucasus, Moscow and other districts to load into echelons and go back to winter quarters? It can be simplified even more. If the Wehrmacht had made a jump across the English Channel and invaded England, would the Soviet Union have observed the friendship treaty with Germany in such a situation? A positive answer draws

Stalin in the role of a naive and gullible simpleton, which is simply impossible to imagine.

None of Suvorov's critics has been able to consistently explain the logic of the actions of the Soviet leadership in the spring of 1941, the essence of the formidable movement of the giant Soviet military machine to the West, the beauty of Stalin's plan, which was realized in full accordance with the Marxist-Leninist "methodology" .

And so the voyage of the Icebreaker continues.



*Dmitry Khmelnitsky*  
ARTICLES AND  
LETTERS VICTOR SUVOROV, SOVIET  
HISTORY AND SOVIET PEOPLE

The significance of the key books in Suvorov's historical series, *The Icebreaker* and *M-Day*, goes far beyond the scope of military history proper. Although it is quite natural that a key discovery for the history of the USSR was made by a military historian - after all, Stalin's main goals were military ones. But precisely because the Stalinist USSR was a militarized state that existed for the solution of exclusively military tasks, Suvorov's concept provided the key to understanding the entire Soviet history. She is logical and not against

vehemently glued together in many respects still mosaic and a vague picture of Stalinist culture and the Stalinist state.

Here is one example from a field close to me - history architecture.

In April 1941, the journal "Architecture of the USSR" publishes the materials of an architectural competition in which all the leading architects of the USSR took part. Theme - "Building for the panorama "Storm of Perekop". A giant panorama (130 x 18 m) dedicated to the victory of the Red Army in 1920 was painted by a group of artists from 1934 to 1941. It was the last major architectural competition before the start of the Soviet-German war.

It is difficult to explain, based only on the history of architecture, why it was precisely in the spring of 1941 that Stalin took it into his head to take the most titled Soviet architects with such a strange task - a monument in

honor of the half-forgotten victory of the Red Army in the Civil War.

Maybe this is, of course, pure coincidence, but I don't think so. Stalin did nothing at all by accident. If, indeed, an attack on Germany was being prepared for the summer of 1941, then spring is the time to start developing the architectural symbols of the future victories of the Red Army. How timely, also in the spring of 1941, to compose songs that were supposed to inspire the soldiers of the Red Army for these victories. Songs like "Holy War" ordered just then.

And the temple in honor of the storming of Perekop could be re-dedicated a bit later to the storming of Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Madrid without the slightest problem... And it was built anywhere.

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Discussions around the books of Viktor Suvorov only you look at discussions about Suvorov. In fact, these are discussions about Stalin. In them, in a concentrated form, the main and unresolved question of the entire Soviet history was revealed - what did Stalin achieve by breaking and crippling the country and people, building a personal, unique and unlike anything system of power? What was the purpose of everything that happened during his reign?

There are only two possible answers, even theoretically. One is extremely flattering for the Soviet past. The second is extremely annoying.

The first answer is familiar to us. Several generations of Soviet people learned it literally from kindergarten. It reads: The USSR has always consistently fought for peace. Stalin sought to prevent a world war. The 1939 pact was a saving grace for the USSR, and the occupation, with the consent of Hitler, of the territories of several European countries was a forced defensive step. Stalin did not prepare for an attack on Germany in 1941, he prepared for defense, and it was for this purpose that he brought the entire Red Army to the border.

But the army, which was preparing only to defend its country, for some reason could not defend itself and died in the summer of 1941 as a result of the insidious aggression of Germ

research institutions

The second answer was given for the first time in full form in his books by Viktor Suvorov. It sounds like this: Stalin consciously, from the very first moment of coming to sole power in the late 1920s, began to prepare the conquest of Europe. His goal was to militarize the country, provoke a world war, enter it at the most convenient moment and remain in the end the only winner. The war provocation succeeded in 1939. The Soviet attack on Europe was supposed to culminate in the summer of 1941, but Stalin misjudged the timing and allowed Hitler to attack first.

Sometimes there is a third option - Stalin did not think about anything at all, he did not prepare for defense or attack, he had no plans, and the troops moved back and forth without any purpose. But it makes no sense to seriously consider the option of Stalin the idiot.

Many people take part in scientific disputes around Stalin's policy on both sides, but the name of Viktor Suvorov still remains at the center of the controversy. It is impossible to bypass it, although Suvorov himself practically does not participate in direct discussions. Viktor Suvorov was the first to formulate the problem, dotted the "i" and provided a lot of evidence that his concept of Stalinist history was right. And he put his opponents before the need not only to refute his arguments in favor of the version of "Stalin the aggressor", but also to consistently argue the alternative version - the thesis of "Stalin the peacemaker".

In total, by 2005, about two dozen books had been published in Russia challenging Viktor Suvorov. Most of them are directed against him personally. These are reproaches of the "traitor Rezun", the authors of which, even with a big stretch, cannot be considered as debaters in a scientific dispute. Attempts to refute

Suvorov's conception by more or less correct methods has not yet led to anything.

The situation turned out to be extremely uncomfortable for his opponents. Practically all coherent "anti-Suvorov" activity was reduced to an unsuccessful contest of minor and tertiary details of his books, stuffed full of arguments. The main counterarguments, that is, evidence that Stalin did NOT prepare an attack on Europe in general and on Germany in particular in 1941, but, on the contrary, prepared a defense, were not presented. And they don't seem to exist in nature.

So far, no one has dared to build a consistent defense of an alternative version of Soviet history. To do this, it would be necessary to prove that Stalin not only did not, in principle, prepare for the conquest of Europe, but also that his foreign, domestic, economic and cultural policies had some other, as yet unknown goals. Today we know enough about Stalin to say with a high degree of certainty that such a version is unprovable.

There remains the Suvorov version of the development of the Soviet history, but a lot of things prevent him from agreeing with him.

First of all, this means a revision - "revision" - of the established and canonized by post-war political correctness views on the history of the Second World War. In the part that deals with the role of the Soviet Union. The change in the status of the Stalinist USSR from "victim and liberator" to the status of "executioner and aggressor" is difficult even for people who do not feel sympathy for Stalinism. Even if they are specialists in the history of the USSR. And even more so if they are Soviet specialists in the military history of the USSR.

However, even in the West, say in Germany, the scientific establishment reacts extremely irritably to Suvorov's books. The reason for the irritation is directly opposite to the motives of the Russian "anti-revisionists". The latter defend the noble reputation of the USSR in World War II.

German explorers (not all, but very many)

they are afraid of the unexpected whitewashing of Hitler's reputation. The logic here is simple, but absurd. If Suvorov is right and Hitler preempted Stalin's attack by only a few weeks, then the attack was preemptive and justified. So Hitler was right.

There is not a single word justifying Hitler in Suvorov's books. Hitler's motives, his morals and his policies could not possibly depend on whether Stalin was going to attack him or not. In any case, it is impossible to suspect Hitler of sympathy for the USSR. The compulsion - "prevention" - of Germany's attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941, and not at another, more convenient time for this, can in no way justify Hitler.

In a strange way, it turns out that the reputation of Hitler, who had already unleashed the Second World War together with Stalin, attacked many European countries and established the Nazi regime in half of Europe, depends on whether he attacked his ally in aggression preemptively, preempting his strike, or a hundred because he really wanted it.

However, Stalin's reputation depends very much on the answer to the question whether Hitler's attack was "preemptive" or not. In the first case, Stalin is an aggressor, although not quite accomplished, in the second - practically a completely innocent victim.

The intensity of emotions, which greatly interferes with scientific research, turns the discussion around Viktor Suvorov's theory into a permanent public scandal.

In the discussions of Russian historians about the causes and There is one curious moment in the nature of the Second World War. Both parties operate with secondary or indirect materials. There are no key archival documents. More precisely, it is considered that, as it were, no.

In the book of M.I. Meltyukhov "Stalin's Lost Chance", published in 2000 - the most fundamental study on the prehistory of the Second World War, in the chapter "Soviet military planning in 1940-1941." out of 122 references, only seven are to documents from archives

(Russian State Military Archive and RGASPI). This is all that was available to the researcher. Meltyukhov writes: "... A comprehensive study of all of these materials, which together constituted the Soviet operational plan, which ensured the organized deployment and entry into combat operations of the Red Army in accordance with the goals and objectives of the first strategic operations, still remains, unfortunately, unrealizable. For the time being, we are forced to confine ourselves to considering the available texts of four memorandums addressed to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, containing the main ideas of military plans..."<sup>1</sup>.

In the published journal of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office, one can easily find out that from January 2 to June 21, 1941, Zhukov (he was appointed chief of the General Staff on January 13, 1941) visited Stalin's Kremlin office 33 times. On average every 5 days. Only in June - 10 times. There is not the slightest information about what they were doing there. Although one can easily guess what exactly the military

planning.

Meltyukhov: "... In the specific military preparations of the USSR, a key place was occupied by the activities of the General Staff in military planning, which, unfortunately, still contains a significant number of "blank spots", which is associated with the preservation of the secrecy of the relevant documents of 1939-1941. Today, domestic historiography has a fairly complete picture of the development of military planning documents at the strategic level, but their content, as well as their connection with planning at the level of military districts, are still poorly understood"<sup>2</sup>.

In other words, it is well known where exactly all the documents relating to pre-war military planning are located. It is easy to figure out the people to whom these documents are available, who can admire them

<sup>1</sup> M. Meltyukhov. Stalin's missed chance. M., 2000. S. 371.

<sup>2</sup> M. Meltyukhov. Stalin's missed chance. S. 370.

at least every day. These are employees of the archive of the General Staff and the Presidential Archive, the former archive of the Politburo. Well, their bosses. That is, the main opponents of the Suvorov concept. And other scientists as a whole already guess how the development of these documents took place, but do not know anything about their content ...

It turns out that literally tons of papers that are inaccessible for research are lying somewhere very close by - key documents, the publication of which would instantly clarify the situation and answer all questions. And the discussions unfold only around a few, accidentally dropped out of folders and out of context. At the same time, there are people who, on duty, are perfectly aware of everything - the keepers of secret archives. But they do not participate in discussions. Or maybe they do, but they keep their information a secret.

It is obvious that state-owned Russian military historians cannot derive any benefit from the possession of the secrets of the archives of the General Staff, otherwise everything would have been declassified long ago. The only benefit is hiding scientific information so that it does not  
were able to take advantage of their opponents.

It is much easier for supporters of Suvorov's concept. Orders of the General Staff and decisions of the Politburo can be  
hide in the archives, but the real processes that captured  
the whole country as a result of the execution of secret orders  
call, it is impossible to hide. This makes it possible, even without  
secret archives, to quite reliably reconstruct the secret meaning of  
Stalin's policy and the same orders that are not available for study.

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Discussions about what Stalin's pre-war plans were automatically turn out to be discussions around the concept of Viktor Suvorov. This often gives rise to the illusion that Suvorov is the only defender of his idea. However, Suvorov from the very beginning was not

alone. His concept was supported by quite a lot of very serious historians, both Russian and foreign. It's just that this support was expressed, as a rule, in purely scientific publications that did not have a wide audience. Moreover, it was often expressed not in the form of direct agreement with Suvorov personally, but in the form of independent scientific research, the results of which coincided with Suvorov's conclusions. It can be said that on a purely scientific level, Suvorov's concept has already won a complete victory. The argumentation of his main opponents - Generals Makhmud Gareev and Yuri Gorkov, Colonel A. Mertsalov and L. Mertsalova, Gabriel Gorodetsky, etc. - was refuted not only and not so much by Viktor Suvorov himself, but by the works of Mikhail Meltyukhov, Vladimir Nevezhin, Tatiana Bushueva, Vladimir Danilov, Vladimir Doroshenko, Irina Pavlova and many others.

Now it can be stated with a very high degree of certainty that there is no scientific alternative to Suvorov's idea that Stalin was preparing aggression against Germany and Europe, since there is not the slightest evidence that the USSR in 1939-1941 was preparing for defense, and Stalin's foreign policy plans were defensive in nature. There is also no clear alternative to the assumption that the preparation of an aggressive war against the West was the main goal of Stalin during the entire period of his rule and predetermined the entire domestic and foreign policy of the USSR.

Among the historians who actually supported Suvorov's concept, one of the most important places belongs to Mikhail Meltyukhov, Doctor of Historical Sciences. Firstly, he is the author of the fundamental work on the preparation of the USSR for the Second World War "Stalin's Lost Chance". Secondly, he cannot be suspected of both personal sympathy for Viktor Suvorov and the fact that he shares Suvorov's political views. Preparations for an attack on Europe, which Suvorov



considers it a crime, Meltyukhov perceives it as a perfectly reasonable step.

The more important is the coincidence of the conclusions of Suvorov and Meltyukhov regarding the nature of Stalin's preparations for the world war.

In 1996, Mikhail Meltyukhov published in the collection "Soviet historiography", edited by Academician Y. Afanasiev, the article "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov" Icebreaker "1. The article is interesting not only for its balanced view of the work of Suvorov himself, but also for its harsh assessment of the speeches of his Russian critics - Y. Gorkov, M. Gareev and others. Here is how Meltyukhov assessed the main theses of Suvorov's book against the background of the then state of affairs in Russian historiography:

"The main idea of V. Suvorov is that the main goal of the foreign policy of the Bolshevik leadership was the implementation of the "world revolution". To achieve it, a clear plan was developed to prepare for a world war that would destroy Europe, facilitating its "Sovietization". For the same purpose, a colossal military-industrial complex was created in the Soviet Union and powerful armaments were built up.

female forces.

In addition, Moscow needed a political leader whom it could use to start a war in Europe. Hitler became such a politician, according to Suvorov, created and brought to power with the help of Stalin.

Using the expansionist aspirations of Germany, the Soviet leadership in every possible way contributed to the aggravation of the international situation in Europe and the outbreak of war. The author of The Icebreaker claims that the Communists "through Hitler's hands ... unleashed a war in Europe and were preparing a surprise attack on Hitler himself in order to seize the Europe he had destroyed." From this

1M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book by V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography", Moscow, 1996, p. 488-521.

V. Suvorov's general conclusion that the Soviet Union is the main culprit and instigator of World War II also follows. <...>

"Suvorov's version of Hitler - the "Icebreaker of the Revolution", who will undermine the capitalist system and be crushed by the Red Army at the right time, is new for Russian historiography. But the materials on the assessment by the Soviet leadership of the events of the Second World War in 1939-1941, available to historians, allow us to speak of its certain fruitfulness. It is hardly worth denying that the Soviet leadership really tried to use any collision

between the great powers to carry out a "revolution" in Europe, considering England and France as their main opponents. And yet, the meaning of the Soviet position was not to start a war on their own (this could lead to the formation of a united anti-Soviet front), but to use such a war in their own interests. In addition, England and France also hoped to use Hitler to destroy the USSR, which was rightly pointed out by A.D. Orlov, and the United States intended to take advantage of the war in Europe to expand its influence. In other words, V. Suvorov's approach is just as tendentious as the approach of some domestic scientists who see only the intrigues of "Western imperialists" in the entire pre-war situation. <...>

"The version of V. Suvorov about the Soviet-German division of Poland and Soviet territorial seizures in Eastern Europe in order to create a future springboard for an attack on Germany has also become the property of Russian historiography. Official historiography continues to support the version that the German attack on Poland and its rapid defeat disturbed the USSR and forced it to start military preparations and bring the Red Army into the territory of its western neighbor. Among the supporters of this version is very popular

1M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book by V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography", Moscow, 1996, p. 488-489.

the idea of the anti-German background of the Soviet actions in Poland<sup>1</sup>. A number of authors, on the contrary, note that the actions of the Soviet leadership in relation to Poland were predetermined by the agreement with Germany on the division of spheres of interest in Eastern Europe and the Stalinist policy of territorial seizures. Hence the conclusion is drawn that on September 17, 1939, the Soviet Union violated its treaties with Poland and committed aggression against it. As a result of the agreement on September 28, 1939, the USSR and Germany divided Poland and Poland disappeared from the political map of the world, and consequently, the Versailles system in Eastern Europe collapsed"<sup>2</sup>. <...>

"V. Suvorov's arguments about the offensive nature of the Soviet military doctrine, based on the work of Soviet military leaders of the 1920s and 1930s<sup>3</sup>, in general are comparable with those ideas that have already been expressed in the domestic literature. As a rule, it is pointed out that the main idea of the Soviet military doctrine was defense and a quick transition to a counteroffensive to defeat the aggressor<sup>4</sup>. True, familiarization with the then military scientific developments does not confirm this opinion<sup>5</sup>. The literature also provides

<sup>1</sup>See: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. T. 1. S. 395-404; History of the Second World War. T. 3. S. 345-355; History of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1986. T. 1. S. 391-392, 420-425; Rozanov G.L. Stalin - Hitler: 1939-1941 M., 1991. S. 110-116; Orlov A. S. USSR - Germany: August 1939 - June 1941. M., 1991. S. 5, 8-1; Parsadanova VS "Polish" policy of the USSR in September 1939 - June 1940 // International relations and countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe at the beginning of World War II (September 1939 - August 1940). M., 1990. S. 53-66; Volkov S.V., Emelyanov Yu.V. Decree. op. pp. 150-160; A n t about with I to A.V. Liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus // Military History Journal. 1989. No. 9. S. 52.

<sup>2</sup>See: Orlov A.S. Decree. op. pp. 14-15; Berezhkov V. M. Stalin's miscalculation // International life. 1989. No. 8. S. 19; Semiryaga M.I. Decree. op. S. 84; Rozanov G.L. Decree. op. pp. 112-113; Lebedeva N.S. Katyn: a crime against humanity. M., 1994. S. 9-34.

<sup>3</sup>M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book by V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography", Moscow, 1996, p.492.

<sup>4</sup> Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 55-64.

<sup>5</sup>See: A n f i l o v V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. pp. 80-86; Gorkov Yu.A. Was Stalin preparing a preemptive strike against Hitler in 1941 // New and recent history. 1993. No. 3. S. 34-37.

materials showing that

In addition to the problem of the initial period of the war, they were dominated by the idea of a sudden preemptive strike against the enemy, excluding the passive expectation of his actions<sup>1</sup>. <...> Contrary to the content of the military-theoretical developments of that time, the point of view of the purely defensive military doctrine of the Red Army prevails in Russian historiography. Only a few authors note that the defensive nature of the military doctrine did not prevent the preparation of offensive operations by the troops, which, judging by the data cited in the literature, prevailed<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, the question remains aside: why is a clearly offensive military doctrine persistently called "defensive" in the literature? At the same time, in historiography, a number of authors consider it a mistake that the offensive character was inherent in the military doctrine<sup>3</sup>. However, even recognizing the offensive orientation of the combat training of the Red Army, the authors note that the Soviet

military doctrine did not contain aggressive aspirations

nii<sup>4</sup>. The fact that the Red Army was repeatedly used on the orders of the Soviet leadership against the neighbors of the USSR allows one to be skeptical about such statements.

In addition, it should not be forgotten that a military doctrine cannot contain aggressive aspirations, since these questions are not considered at all in it. Aggressive is the foreign policy of the state, and the military doctrine reflects the preparation of the Armed Forces for war, the methods of its

1 See: A n f i l o v V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. pp. 75-76.

2 See: Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. T. 2, part 1. S. 56-57; Orlov A.S. So who started the war? // Army. 1993. No. 8. S. 17; Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. M., 1991. S. 51-58.

3 See: Isaev S.I., Ramanichev N.M., Chevela P.P. Soviet Union on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. M., 1990. S. 30-31; Babin A.I. Eve and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. M., 1991. S. 56; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. S. 56; Projector D.M. Fascism: the path of aggression and death. M., 1989. S. 306-307; Pavlenko N.G. There was a war. M., 1994. S. 40-72.

4 See: Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. S. 37; O r l o v A.S. USSR - Germany. S. 17.

reference. <...> Therefore, the attempts of some critics to accuse V. Suvorov of "mixing premeditated aggression with offensive maneuvering"<sup>1</sup> look completely unsubstantiated, since they pass over in silence the question of the goals of "maneuvering"<sup>2</sup>. <...>

"V. Suvorov's discussions about the state of engineering training in the theater of military operations (TVD) on the eve of the war<sup>3</sup> are unusual for domestic literature, in which these issues have been poorly studied. The construction of fortified areas (UR) on the new border is described in the most detail, which remained unfinished, since it was a long and expensive process and, according to some authors, a miscalculation, since they

weapons along the border line did not allow the creation of the supply line and was carried out in fact in full view of the enemy<sup>4</sup>. Such placement of the SD was approved by Moscow, although in the event of a sudden attack by the enemy, the troops still did not have time to occupy them<sup>5</sup>. The literature indicates that these structures were intended for both defense and offensive, and the SD on the old border, contrary to the widespread version of their destruction, were only disarmed and mothballed<sup>6</sup>. While highlighting the issues of airfield construction in the border districts, which was carried out too close to the border, and noting the unpreparedness of bridges on the border rivers for an explosion, Russian historiography does not offer any serious explanation.

1 See: Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". S. 294; See also: Its bogus thought. 1993. No. 6. S. 51.

2 M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography". Moscow, 1996, p. 496-497.

3 See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 73-105.

4 See: Anfilov V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. pp. 76-78; Kirshin Yu.Ya., Ramanichev N.M. On the eve of June 22, 1941 // Modern and recent history. 1991. No. 3. S. 8-10; Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. pp. 98-107; Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". pp. 281-283; And with a - ev S.I., Ramanichev N.M., Chevela P.P. Decree. op. pp. 47-48; Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. M., 1989. S. 38-41.

5 See: Sandalov L.M. First days of the war. M., 1989. S. 7-10, 34.

6 See: Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. pp. 98-107; 1941 - lessons and you water / Ed. V.P. Nelasova. M., 1992. S. 32-34, 206-207.

to all these facts. Therefore, the version of V. Suvorov has certain grounds and requires further study”<sup>2</sup>. <...>

V. Suvorov's thesis about the offensive preparation of the Red Army<sup>3</sup> is not very popular in Russian historiography.

The general opinion on this issue is that the soldiers were trained hard, but only in the summer of 1940 did military training move to a higher level in connection with the appointment of a new people's commissar for defense. The literature is dominated by vague statements about the insufficient training of the troops<sup>4</sup>. Only a few authors consider the problem of combat training on the basis of specific historical material, which confirms the general conclusion about a sharp increase in combat training since the summer of 1940, and shows its content by type of troops in the border districts. Analyzing the data on the combat training of the troops of the western border districts, which was predominantly offensive in nature, A.G. Khorkov comes to the conclusion that, although the individual training of the fighter was low, in general, the troops were not badly prepared for offensive operations. At the same time, the researcher notes the weak development of the interaction of the combat arms on the battlefield<sup>5</sup>.

1 See: Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. S. 34, 225-227; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. pp. 34-37, 198-199; Semidetko V.A. The origins of the defeat in Belarus // Military History Journal. 1989. No. 4. S. 27; Sandalov L.M. Decree. op. pp. 46-47; Military history magazine. 1989. No. 3. S. 68-69; Vladimirovsky A.V. Decree. op. S. 56.

2 M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography". Moscow, 1996, p. 497-498.

3 See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 105-136.

4 See: Anfilov V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. pp. 67-70; Samsonov A.M. World War II: 1939-1945. M., 1990. S. 118; Party life. 1991. No. 12. S. 29; Kirshin Yu.Ya., Ramanichev N.M. Decree. op. S. 11; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. S. 139-141; Projector D.M. Decree. op. pp. 301-304; Isaev S.I., Ramanichev N.M., Chervelap P.P. Decree. op. pp. 32-50; Meltyukhov M.I. June 22, 1941: figures testify // History of the USSR. 1991. No. 3. S. 26-27; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. pp. 45-47.

5 See: Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. pp. 51-85; See also: Sandalov L.M. Decree. op. pp. 38-42; Kozhevnikov M.N. The command and headquarters of the Air Force of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1985. S. 26-31; Zakharov M.V. General Staff in the prewar years. M., 1989. S. 269.

Most critics of "Icebreaker" did not specifically consider this issue, limiting themselves to general phrases about the insufficient level of training of troops or V. Suvorov's increase in the combat and technical capabilities of the Red Army<sup>1</sup>. V. Anfilov, referring to the "Act on the Admission of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR" of 1940, tries to substantiate the opinion that the Red Army is backward and cannot carry out offensive operations. However, in the afterword to the publication of the document, its tendentious and biased nature is pointed out and it is noted that "the Soviet Armed Forces, even at that time, were modern, in many respects they were not inferior to the armies of most capitalist states"<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, Yu.N. Afanasiev and A.S. Orlov believe that the training of the Soviet troops was offensive<sup>3</sup>. E. Krokmal, in fact, agrees with V. Suvorov on this issue, pointing out that the troops were not ready for the offensive, but the sailors were successfully advancing<sup>4</sup>. V. Suvorov's conclusion that the protection of the state border by the Soviet troops was supposed to be carried out by the transition of the covering armies to the offensive<sup>5</sup> has no analogue in Russian historiography. True, contrary to the opinion of V. Suvorov's critics, these ideas do not belong to him, but to A.I. Egorov and M.N. Tukhachevsky, in whose works 1932-1934. they are substantiated in detail<sup>6</sup>. In a number of works and other domestic

<sup>1</sup>See: Yu.S. Solnyshkov. Regarding the article by Colonel General Yu.A. Gorkova // New and recent history. 1994. No. 1. S. 240; Free thought. 1993. No. 6. S. 52; Danilov V. Did the General Staff of the Red Army prepare a preemptive strike against Germany? // Today. 1993. September 28; Sokolov B. How did the Second World War begin? // Independent newspaper. December 31, 1993.

<sup>2</sup> Russian newspaper. 1993. July 10; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 1. S. 193-209, 214.

<sup>3</sup>See: Afanasiev Yu. Decree. op.; Orlov A.S. Decree. op. P. 10.

<sup>4</sup> See: E. Krokmal, op. S. 36.

<sup>5</sup>See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 136-165.

<sup>6</sup>See: Egorov A. I. Tactics and operational art at a new stage // Military History Journal. 1963. No. 10; Tukhachevsk and M.N. Selected Early Works. M, 1964. T. 2. S. 212-221.

It was shown by many historians that the ideas of these military leaders were not only not forgotten, but, on the contrary, by 1941 they were put into practice<sup>1</sup>. This conclusion is also confirmed by works that provide information on the direction of combat training and military planning in border districts that do not contradict the new view of this problem"<sup>2,3</sup> <...>

"What do critics oppose to the thesis of V. Suvorov? YES. Volkogonov claims that in all the documents everything was aimed at defense, but he does not give specific examples<sup>4</sup>. Yu.A. Gorkov uses materials from the period of the end of 1940 to refute V. Suvorov's allegations. Not only does the author quote only certain phrases of these extensive documents, it follows from his examples, in particular, that the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO) received an order to prepare

offensive, and the armies of the district were ordered to prepare only defense. Yu.A. Gorkov is not embarrassed that such propositions are devoid of any logic.

V.B. also writes about the defensive tasks of the covering armies. Makovsky, and as proof he quotes one (!) phrase from the extensive directive of the General Staff to the KOVO command of May 5, 1941<sup>6</sup>. However, it is known that on April 10, 1941, Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Major General A.M. Vasilevsky drew up a directive for the development of an operational plan

1 See: Filippov A. On the readiness of the Red Army for war in June 1941 // Military Bulletin of the APN. 1992. No. 9. S. 6-8; Melyukhov M.I. Disputes around 1941: The experience of critical reflection on one discussion // Patriotic history. 1994. No. 3. S. 1214.

2 See: Military Historical Journal. 1993. No. 6. S. 10-16; No. 7, pp. 14-21; No. 8, pp. 28-35; Petrov B.N. Decree. op. pp. 10-17; Gurov A.A. Combat actions of Soviet troops in the South-Western direction in the initial period of the war // Military History Journal. 1988. No. 7. S. 32-37; Semidetko V.A. Decree. op. pp. 22-31; Vladimirovsky A.V. Decree op. pp. 8-57.

3 M. Melyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography". Moscow, 1996, pp. 498-499.

4 See: Volkogonov D.A. This version has already been refuted by historians.

5 See: Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. S. 33.

6 See: Makovsky V.B. Decree. op. S. 52.



deployment of troops in border districts. Unfortunately, B.N. Petrov cites from this directive the tasks of only the Western Special Military District, which, together with the Southwestern Front, was supposed to, advancing on Sedlec-Radom, "to defeat the enemy's Lublin-Radom grouping. The immediate task is to capture Sedlec, Lukov (so in the document. - M.N.) and capture the crossings across the river. Vistula ... Develop a plan for the first operation of the 13th and 4th armies and a plan for the defense of the 3rd and 10th armies.

Such materials at least cast doubt on the assertion of Russian historiography about the purely defensive intentions of the covering armies"2. <...>

"Discussing the Soviet plan for the war with Germany, V. Suvorov concludes that the Red Army was to strike the main blow against Romania<sup>3</sup>. In domestic literature, the content of Soviet military plans is presented according to the established scheme: the plans were developed in response to the growth of the German threat and provided for repelling an enemy attack, delivering retaliatory counterattacks and a general offensive to defeat the enemy<sup>4</sup>. However, new documentary materials and studies of recent years significantly correct such approaches. First of all, it became known that Soviet military planning for military operations against Germany began in October 1939 and continued until mid-May.

<sup>1</sup> Petrov B.N. Decree. op. S. 12.

<sup>2</sup> M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography". Moscow, 1996, p. 500.

<sup>3</sup> See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 148-152.

<sup>4</sup> See: Anfilov V.A. Decree. op. pp. 80-86; Sandalov L.M. Decree. op. pp. 22-37; Zakharov M.V. Decree. op. pp. 213-225; Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. pp. 85-130; Kirin M.M. Decree. op. pp. 12-13; Perechnev Yu.G. On some problems of preparing the country and the Armed Forces to repel fascist aggression // Military History Journal. 1988. No. 4. S. 46-47; Medvedev N.E. Artillery of the RVGK in the first period of the war // Military History Journal. 1987. No. 11. S. 82; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. pp. 132-136; Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. pp. 29-39; Makovsky V.B. Decree. op. pp. 51-58; Kirshin Yu.Ya., Ramanichev N.M. Decree. op. pp. 12-15.

1941<sup>1</sup>. Published materials and works by a number of authors show that the main content of Soviet military planning was a surprise attack on Germany at the right moment.

"A.S. Orlov shares the opinion of V. Suvorov that the main blow of the Soviet troops should be directed towards the Black Sea straits<sup>3</sup>. The remaining critics of the Icebreaker, contrary to the facts, try to deny the existence of any plans that would confirm Stalin's intention to attack Germany at a certain moment<sup>4</sup>. It is recognized in the literature that the latest version of the Soviet military plan

looked at delivering a sudden blow to the enemy.

Most authors claim that such a plan was rejected by Stalin, although there are no materials containing data on his opinion on this issue<sup>5</sup>. But information about the procedure for considering such documents by the Soviet leadership, reported by A.M. Vasilevsky, make it completely clear: Stalin gave all instructions orally.

A. Afanasiev believes that the troops did not have any offensive plans, since during the war they would have been captured and published by the Germans<sup>6</sup>. However, Yu.A. Gorkov claims that "a few weeks before the attack of fascist Germany ... all the documents

<sup>1</sup>See: Zakharov M.V. Decree. op. S. 213; Projector D.M. Decree op. pp. 307-312; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. S. 133; Isaev S.I., Ramanichev N.M., Chevela P.P. Decree. op. pp. 50-58; Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. pp. 31-39.

<sup>2</sup> See: Petrov B.N. Decree. op. pp. 10-17; Kiselev V.I. Decree op. pp. 14-17; Meltyukhov M.I. Disputes around 1941, pp. 4-22; Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. pp. 29-45; Isaev S.I., Ramanichev N.M., Chevela P.P. Decree. op. pp. 55-56; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. S. 136.

<sup>3</sup> M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography". Moscow, 1996, p. 501.

<sup>4</sup> See: Volkogonov D.A. This version has already been refuted by historians; Orlov A.S. So who started the war? S. 18; Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". pp. 130-138, 284-289.

<sup>5</sup> See: Isaev S.I., Ramanichev N.M., Chevela P.P. Decree. op. pp. 55-59; pp. 36-39; Afanasiev A. Decree. op.; Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". pp. 294-297.

<sup>6</sup> See: Afanasyev A. Decree Op.

mentation on district plans was transferred from the General Staff to the commands and headquarters of the districts"1. True, there is evidence in the literature that this documentation was not transmitted not only to the headquarters of the armies, but even to the headquarters of the districts, and all orders were given orally2. Thus, the version of A.V. Afa Nasiev and the opinion of M.A. Gareev that there were no approved strategic deployment plans for a preemptive strike both at the General Staff and at the headquarters of the districts3. Yu.A. Gorkov insists on the need to search for documents confirming the existence of a decision to start a war on the part of the Soviet political leadership and government4. However, it is not entirely clear what kind of document he wants to discover. <...>

"One of the most informative passages in V. Suvorov's book is his discussion of the concentration and deployment of Red Army units on the eve of the war6. The fact that such measures were taken was from

known before, but only now specific data on the timing, place and composition of the concentrated troops. The concentration began in February, and the advance of troops from the internal districts in April 1941.7. The composition of the second echelon armies, the dates and places of their concentration in the Western theater of operations have now been specified in the literature, and materials have been cited that make it possible to clarify the planned grouping of troops. Judging by them, the 20th and 21st armies were supposed to be used in the first echelon of the troops of the Southwestern Front, although later

1 See: Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. S. 39.

2 See, for example: Kazakov M.I. Above the map of past battles. M., 1971. S. 64-65; Galician KH Years of severe trials. M., 1973. S. 24-25; Military history magazine. 1989. No. 5. S. 51.

3 See: Gareev M.A. Decree. op. S. 202.

4 See: Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. S. 37.

5 M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography". Moscow, 1996, p. 501-502.

6 See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 186-233.

7 See: 1941 - lessons and conclusions. pp. 80-86.

they operated in the central sector of the Soviet-German front in the Smolensk-Gomel regions. Data are given on the concentration of troops of border districts closer to the border, which began on June 12-16, 1941. All this refutes the widespread opinion that the regrouping of troops in the border districts was prohibited by Moscow, and Stalin, despite the insistent requests of the military leadership, refused to allow the redeployment of troops and in every possible way hindered the implementation of such measures<sup>3</sup>. Unfortunately, these problems are still poorly developed in the literature.

The question of the purpose of such a concentration, which V. Suvorov rightly considers it the main<sup>4</sup>, has not received serious coverage in Russian historiography. The current version—the strengthening of the covering troops on the eve of the German invasion—runs into the assertions of a number of authors that Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attack before it defeated England, trusted Hitler<sup>5</sup>, and is thereby refuted. According to some authors, these measures were aimed

1 See: Gurov A.A. Decree. op. S. 32; Vladimirovsky A.V. Decree op. pp. 50-52; Zakharov M.V. Decree. op. pp. 258-262; Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. pp. 167-168; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. pp. 80-88, 214-223.

2 See: Petrov B.N. Decree. op. pp. 12-13; Semidetko V.A. Decree. op. S. 31; Kisel' V.N. Decree. op. pp. 14-15; Anfilov V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. pp. 96-97; Vladimirovsky A.V. Decree. op. pp. 50-52; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. pp. 125-128; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. pp. 84-86; Filippov A. Decree. op. C. 4.

3 See: Yakushevsky A.S. The surprise factor in the German attack on the USSR // History of the USSR. 1991. No. 3. S. 22; Rechenin Yu.G. Decree. op. S. 49; Danilov V.D. Soviet High Command on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War // New and Newest History. 1988. No. 6. S. 18-19; Samsonov A.M. Decree. op. pp. 112-118; Anfilov V.A. Decree op. pp. 94-97; Isaev S.I., Ramanichev N.M., 4th hosted by P.P. Decree. op. pp. 48-58; Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. op. S. 36; Gareniev M.A. Decree. op. S. 202; Communist. 1988. No. 9. S. 88-94.

4 See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 259-260.

5 See: Orlov A.S. So who started the war? S. 19; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. S. 60; Imsoid T.T. There was a war ahead // Military Historical Journal. 1991. No. 5. S. 5-6; Anfilov V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. S. 82; Samsonov A.M. Decree. op. S. 116; Yakushevsky A.S. Surprise factor... S. 13-14.

on the implementation of the Soviet plan of attack on Germany<sup>1</sup>, which immediately eliminates all the contradictions that exist in the literature and makes clear the actions

view of the Soviet military-political leadership.

Critics of V. Suvorov are trying to prove that the troop movements were a response to the growth of the German threat. This, however, does not prevent them from admitting that Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attack. V.A. Anfilov generally denies the fact of the movement of troops to the border, although data on this are given in his books<sup>3</sup>. M.A. Gareev denies Stalin's permission for the concentration of troops near the border and their deployment, leaving aside the explanation of the reasons for all these measures<sup>4</sup>. In other words, instead of studying the problems, the old official scheme, which does not explain anything, is reproduced again.

V. Suvorov's version of the significance of the TASS Statement of June 13, 1941<sup>5</sup> is very curious, especially since materials about the disinformation of Berlin by Moscow have now become known, which opened a new topic in the study of the eve of the war<sup>6</sup>. In the literature, this document is traditionally regarded as an invitation to Germany for negotiations or simply a diplomatic demarche of the USSR<sup>7</sup>,

1 See: Petrov B.N. Decree. op. pp. 12-13; Kiselev V.I. Decree. op. pp. 14-16; Meltyukhov M.I. Disputes around 1941; Hoffman J. Preparation of the Soviet Union for an offensive war: 1941 // Domestic History. 1993. No. 4. S. 19-31; National history. 1994. No. 3. S. 4-22.

2 See: Orlov A.S. So who started the war? S. 18; Free thought. 1993. No. 6. S. 52; Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". pp. 283-284, 287.

3 See: Anfilov V.A. Decree. op. pp. 94-101; See also: Red star. 519. 1993. February 20.

4 See: Gareev M.A. Decree. op. S. 202.

5 See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 193-266.

6 See: V i s h l e in O.V. Was there opposition to Stalin's "German policy" in the USSR on the eve of June 22, 1941 // Novaya i neishaya istoriya. 1994. No. 4-5. pp. 242-253.

7 See: V i s h l e in O.V. Why did I.V. Stalin in 1941 // New and recent history. 1992. No. 2. S. 78-79; Orlov A.S. USSR - Germany. pp. 55-56; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. S. 122; Berezhkov V.M. Decree. op. S. 27; In about I to about in BK Decree. op. S. 17; N e k r i c h A.M. 1941. June 22. M., 1965. S. 142; Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". S. 317.

but the critics of the "Icebreaker" did not pay him due attention mania.

The problems associated with the repression of the command staff, mentioned by the author of "Icebreaker"<sup>1</sup>, are considered quite widely in Russian historiography. Among the critics of V. Suvorov, M. Sergomasov most clearly formulated the opinion about the collapse of the Red Army through repressions: "With whom, one wonders, was Stalin going to conquer Europe?"<sup>2</sup>, forgetting in the heat of controversy about those who won the war"<sup>3</sup>. <...>

"V. Suvorov's arguments about the NKVD troops on the eve of the war<sup>4</sup> are not reflected in Russian historiography. The literature mainly studies issues related to the activities of the border troops on the eve of the war, which is considered from the point of view of the effectiveness of border protection. Only a few works provide separate materials on the strengthening of the border troops and their preparation for war. In general, today there is a fairly complete picture that reveals the organization of border protection, the number of border troops, their actions to protect the border, and measures to strengthen it on the eve of the war<sup>5</sup>. At the same time, questions remain unanswered about the plans to use the border troops at the beginning of the war, there is no convincing explanation for those measures to strengthen the border troops that go beyond defensive ones, almost nothing is known about the number, deployment and tasks of the NKVD troops on the territory of the western border districts. The reasoning of the author of "Icebreaker" on the reasons for Stalin's occupation of the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on his speech on May 5, 1941, and on treason

<sup>1</sup> See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 240-245.

<sup>2</sup> Sergomasov M. Decree. op. pp. 119-120.

<sup>3</sup> M. Melyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", in the collection "Soviet historiography". Moscow, 1996, p. 502-503.

<sup>4</sup> See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 64-72.

<sup>5</sup> See: Chugunov A.I. The border on the eve of the war. M., 1985. S. 86-173; Belyaev V.I. Strengthening the protection of the western border of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War // Military History Journal. 1988. No. 5. S. 50-55; Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. pp. 131-152.

the direction of propaganda<sup>1</sup> had no analogues in Russian historiography. A.S. Orlov believes: Stalin took this post in order to pacify Germany and delay the war,<sup>2</sup> which is not at all confirmed by the actions of the Soviet leadership at that time. A brief transcript of Stalin's speech on May 5 has now been published<sup>3</sup>, and studies of the turn in propaganda have begun with the works

V.A. Nevezhin and M.I. Meltyukhov<sup>4</sup>, whose materials generally confirm the opinion of V. Suvorov. V. Suvorov's point of view is interesting, explaining the failure of Soviet intelligence in determining Germany's intentions in 1941<sup>5</sup>. Domestic historiography is limited to only general phrases about the successful work of intelligence, and the non-use of the data obtained by it is explained by the fact that Stalin believed in an agreement with Germany. There is a version that intelligence could not convince Stalin of an imminent German attack<sup>6</sup>. At the same time, the opinion was expressed that the disclosure of offensive intentions

1 See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 166-188.

2 See: Orlov A.S. So who started the war? S. 20.

3 Stalin I.V. Speech at the Grand Kremlin Palace, May 5, 1941// Cinema Art. 1990. No. 5. S. 10-16.

4 See: Nevezhin V.A. The idea of an offensive war in Soviet propaganda in 1939-1941. // Teaching history at school. 1994. No. 5. S. 8-19; He is. Metamorphoses of Soviet propaganda in 1939-1941. // Questions of history. 1994. No. 8. S. 164-171; Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? Sat. Art. M. 1995. S. 122-167; Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 and an apology for the offensive war // Patriotic history. 1995. No. 2, pp. 54-69; Meltyukhov M.I. Ideological documents of May-June 1941 on the events of the Second World War // Ibid. pp. 70-85.

5 See: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. pp. 303-314.

6 See: Anfilov V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. pp. 88-94; Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. pp. 137-148; Prorok D.M. Decree. op. pp. 312-314; Samsonov A.M. Decree. op. S. 118; Volkov F.D. The rise and fall of Stalin. M., 1992. S. 178-188; Iva Shutin P.I. Reported accurately // Military History Journal. 1990. No. 5. S. 55-59; Khorkov A.G. Decree. op. pp. 131-152; I'm calling D.T. Decree. op. pp. 4-14; Kiselev V.N. Decree. op. pp. 15-16; Voroshilov V.A., Gorlov S.A. Fascist aggression: what diplomats reported // Military History Journal. 1991. No. 6. S. 13-23; Yakushevsky A.S. Surprise factor... S. 3-16; Pavlenko N.G. Decree. op. pp. 227-235; Pavlov A.G. Soviet military intelligence on the eve of the Great Patriotic War // New and recent history. 1995. No. 1. S. 46-60; Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". pp. 139-145, 298-299.

Germany was not a priority for intelligence activities<sup>1</sup>. To date, there are numerous materials testifying that the plans of Germany were known to the Soviet intelligence. Many historians in their works condemned Stalin, who neglected intelligence data. Only V.M. Kulish raised the question: why was Stalin wrong if he knew all this?<sup>2</sup> The author of *The Icebreaker* offered his own answer, but it requires further study of the topic. Critics of V. Suvorov rejected his version, not offering any in return<sup>3</sup> <...>

"In the military-historical literature, the revision of the official version has just begun, and the appearance of the *"Icebreaker"* by V. Suvorov, who proposed a new concept, served as an impetus for its acceleration. At the same time, the course of the discussion related to the book indicates that Russian historiography is not yet ready for a radical change in established approaches"<sup>4</sup>.

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In an extensive article "The Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 1939-1941: The Rise of a Great Power", published in 2006, Mikhail Meltyukhov formulated the main ideas of his book *"Stalin's Lost Chance"*. Here are a few excerpts from it, demonstrating the closeness of the results of Meltyukhov's own research to the conclusions and ideas of Viktor Suvorov:

"First of all, you should get rid of the inspired

1 See: Pranovich A. The state of combat readiness of the operational and tactical intelligence of the Red Army on the eve of the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR in June 1941 (critical analysis) // *Military Bulletin of the APN*. 1992. No. 2-3. pp. 1-15.

2 See: *History and Stalinism*. pp. 324-328.

3 M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov *"Icebreaker"*", in the collection *"Soviet historiography"*. Moscow, 1996, p. 504-505.

4 M. Meltyukhov. "Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov *"Icebreaker"*", in the collection *"Soviet historiography"*. Moscow, 1996, p. 509.



Veteran propaganda of a completely fantastic idea about a certain pathological peacefulness of the USSR, thanks to which a rather original picture has developed in historiography. While all other states in their international policy were guided by their own interests, the Soviet Union was engaged only in demonstrating its peacefulness and fighting for peace. In principle, of course, it was recognized that the USSR also had its own interests, but usually they were spoken about so vaguely that it was almost impossible to understand the motives of Soviet foreign policy.

“In the summer of 1941, there was an opportunity for the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack on Germany, which was fettered by the war with England, and to obtain at least the benevolent neutrality of London and Washington. Correctly noting the growing crisis in Soviet-German relations, the Soviet leadership believed that there was still time before the final break, both for diplomatic maneuvers and for the completion of military preparations. Unfortunately, failing to correctly assess the threat of a German attack and fearing an Anglo-German compromise, Stalin delayed for at least a month the completion of military preparations for an attack on Germany, which, as we now know, was the only chance to thwart the German invasion. Probably, this decision “is one of the main historical miscalculations of Stalin”<sup>2</sup>, who missed the opportunity to defeat the most powerful European power and, having reached the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, eliminate the age-old Western threat to our country. As a result, the German leadership was able to begin on June 22, 1941, the implementation of the Barbarossa plan and the Soviet Union under

1M. Meltyukhov. “The Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 1939-1941: The Rise of a Great Power”, in the collection Pravda Viktor Suvorov, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Sakharov A.N. War and Soviet diplomacy: 1939-1945// Voprosy istorii. 1995. - No. 7. S. 38.

It took 3 years to wage war on its territory, which led to colossal human and material losses.

Thus, both Germany and the USSR carefully prepared for war, and from the beginning of 1941 this process entered its final stage, which made the start of the Soviet-German war inevitable precisely in 1941, no matter who initiated it. Initially, the Wehrmacht intended to complete military preparations by May 16, and the Red Army by June 12, 1941. Then Berlin postponed the attack, postponing it to June 22, a month later, Moscow did the same, setting a new tentative date - July 15 1941. As is now known, both sides in their calculations proceeded from the fact that the war would start on their own initiative"<sup>1</sup>.

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In 1995, the journal "Otechestvennaya istoriya" No. 3 published an article by Colonel, Candidate of Historical Sciences Vladimir Danilov "Stalin's strategy for starting the war: plans and reality"<sup>2</sup>. The reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 Danilov sees in the same thing as Viktor Suvorov - the Red Army was preparing not for defense, but for a powerful preemptive strike against Germany.

"Let us turn to the language of figures and facts characterizing the beginning of the war.

By mid-July 1941, out of 170 Soviet divisions that took the first blow from the German military machine, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. Troops suffered especially severe losses.

1 M. Meltyukhov. "The Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 1939-1941: the rise of a great power", in the collection "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov", pp. 99-100.

2 V. Danilov. "Stalin's Strategy for Starting the War: Plans and Reality". Domestic History, No. 3, 1995.

Western Front. Of the total number of divisions destroyed on the Soviet-German front, 24 were part of this front. The remaining 20 divisions of this front also found themselves in a catastrophic situation. They have lost from 50 to 90% in manpower and resources.

During the first three weeks of the war, the Red Army lost a huge amount of military equipment and weapons. In divisions alone (excluding reinforcements and combat support), losses amounted to about 6,500 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, more than 3,000 antitank defense guns, about 12,000 mortars, and about 6,000 tanks. The Air Force during this time lost 3468 aircraft, including a significant number of new designs. By noon on June 22, during the bombing of Soviet airfields, the Germans had destroyed 1,200 aircraft, of which more than 800 were on the ground. The losses of the Soviet Navy were:

1 leader, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines, 5 minesweepers, 5 torpedo boats, a number of other ships and transports.

By the end of 1941, the Red Army had lost practically the entire first strategic echelon, the best trained cadre troops. POW only

nymi, as it is now established, the losses during this time amounted to about 3.9 million people. By July 10, German troops advanced deep into Soviet territory: in the main, Western direction - 450-600 km at a rate of advance of 25-35 km per day, in the North-West direction - 450-500 km at a rate of 25-30 km per day, in the South-West direction - by 300-350 km at a rate of 16-20 km per day. For comparison

nia: the losses of the Wehrmacht during this period amounted to about 40% of the tanks of the original composition, of which 20% were combat losses; 900 aircraft; in the Baltic - 4 minelayers, 2 torpedo boats and 1 hunter. Personal As part of the Wehrmacht losses, according to German data, amounted to about 100 thousand people killed, wounded and missing 27. Such losses of the Germans, although they significantly exceeded their losses in previous battles

in Western Europe, were in no way comparable to the losses of the Soviet troops.

In connection with all that has been said, a legitimate question arises: what is the reason for the tragedy of June 22? Among many factors, "mistakes" and "miscalculations" of the Soviet military-political leadership are usually named. But on closer examination, some of them turn out not to be naive delusions at all, but the result of well-thought-out measures with the aim of preparing a preemptive strike and subsequent offensive operations against Germany. This strategic plan was the subject of the principle of operational formation of the troops of the first strategic echelon. In fact, the war had to be started under conditions

a powerful surprise blow from the enemy disorganized defensive actions. In addition, the troops, almost everywhere, were taken by surprise by us.

Another fact. The General Staff, taking into account the main attack on the enemy in the South-Western direction, planned to concentrate here a grouping of troops, which was one and a half times larger than the grouping of enemy troops. And the tasks assigned to the front in this direction pursued offensive, not defensive goals. Consequently, not from the mythical expectations of the main attack of the enemy, but based on our calculations for success in the Ukrainian direction, the corresponding grouping of troops was concentrated here. The enemy, on the other hand, dealt the main blow in the Western, Belorussian direction, where our General Staff intended to conduct mainly active defensive operations.

As already noted, for the General Staff of the Red Army there was no secret of the German plan of attack on the USSR - the Barbarossa plan. 10 days after the approval of this plan by Hitler, i.e. On December 28, 1940, its main provisions were in the hands of Soviet military intelligence. And this means that the Soviet High Command had information about the German

some plans for inflicting the main blow on the Soviet troops north of the Pripyat marshes, as well as an offensive with especially strong tank wedges from the Warsaw area and north of it with the tasks of defeating the Russian forces in Belarus, etc. Why did the Soviet General Staff concentrate rather strong groupings of troops in the Bialystok and Lvov ledges? You don't have to be a strategist to answer this question. Even a cursory glance at the configuration of the Soviet-German border (future front line) shows the possibility of using the Bialystok and Lvov salients to deliver promising concentric strikes against the Germans here. The General Staff could not fail to use such a chance. But, as has been known since the Battle of Cannae (216 BC), an alluring ledge can, under certain conditions, turn into a devouring cauldron. It was in such boilers that the troops of the Red Army ended up. The triumph of the German command became at the same time the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers.

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Suvorov's unconditional supporter is  
Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Felshtinsky:

"The unconditional merit of V. Suvorov lies in the fact that he named the date of Stalin's decision to start hostilities against Germany: August 19, 1939 - the day the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed. This may seem paradoxical, but this is the only way to explain all of Stalin's subsequent behavior, to which V. Suvorov devotes his books.

There are no riddles in terms of Hitler's position. It can be argued that he made the fundamental decision to break with Stalin during Molotov's visit to Berlin at the end of 1940. Molotov then demanded from the Germans consent to the Soviet occupation of Romania,

1B. D a n i l o v. "Stalin's Strategy for Starting the War: Plans and Reality". Domestic History, No. 3, 1995.

Bulgaria, Finland and the Straits. Hitler responded with a decisive refusal and signed a directive to attack the USSR.

Just before the war, in the fiscal year 1938/39, Germany was spending 15% of its national income on armaments, the same amount as England. Hitler did not want to arm himself at the expense of the welfare of the German people. In addition, this could lead to a drop in his popularity.

In the Soviet Union, 26.4% of all budget appropriations were officially spent on defense spending in the first three years of the Third Five-Year Plan, and in 1940 this percentage was 32.6%. And in 1941, it was planned to spend 43.4% of budget appropriations on defense.

These dry figures lead us to the conclusion that the Soviet government was preparing for war.

"To study the problems of the initial period of World War II, V. Suvorov did more than all of Soviet and Western historiography. He found answers to many questions that have tormented us for decades. He explained a lot, and he explained, no doubt, correctly. His contribution is inestimable."

"In conclusion, a few words about another date set by V. Suvorov: July 6, 1941, "M Day". The arguments given by the author in favor of this date are very serious. And yet, here, apparently, we cannot do without additional information, which is not yet available. Maybe the archives that are currently inaccessible will help us. Perhaps the minutes of the Politburo meeting on June 21, 1941, will become known. As a historian, I am inclined to believe that V. Suvorov is right. If it turns out that "Day M" was scheduled for July 13 or 20, this, in the end, will not be so important. V. Suvorov opened for us a whole layer of our history. This is his greatest merit. In his footsteps, I'm sure others will now follow

<sup>1</sup> Yuri Felshtinsky. "Reading the books "Icebreaker" and "M Day" by Viktor Suvorov", Vestnik No. 26 (207), December 22, 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

gie - correcting, supplementing and clarifying. They will be second, third... tenth. Viktor Suvorov was the first.

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Irina Pavlova, Doctor of Historical Sciences, is the author of the exceptionally interesting and important book *The Mechanism of Power and the Construction of Stalinist Socialism*, published in Novosibirsk in 2001. In the chapter "Searching for the Truth on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War," Pavlova writes: "Relative peace among Russian military historians was destroyed by the publication in Russian of books by V. Suvorov (V. Rezun), who questioned the fact that in the USSR there had never no one doubted. (His book *The Icebreaker* is subtitled *Who Started World War II?*) Through his books, he sought to prove that the main culprit and main instigator of World War II was the Soviet Union. Using a metaphorical turn, he named the day of the actual entry of the USSR into the war - August 19, 1939. V. Suvorov managed to calculate that on this day a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee took place, which decided to start a secret mobilization. "Many historians," he writes, "think that at first Stalin decided to sign peace with Hitler, and then he decided to prepare a surprise attack on Germany. But the facts revealed and confirmed to me that there were no two different solutions. Signing peace with Germany and finally deciding on the inevitable invasion of Germany is one decision, these are two parts of a single plan. And further: "Therefore, I consider August 19 the turn of the war, after which, in any case, the Second World War should have taken place. And if Hitler had not started it on September 1, 1939, Stalin would have had to look for another opportunity or even another

<sup>1</sup>Yuri Felshtinsky. "Reading the books "Icebreaker" and "M Day" by Viktor Suvorov", *Vestnik* No. 26 (207), December 22, 1998.

a performer who would push Europe and the whole world into war. This is the essence of my little discovery.

V. Suvorov did not focus on one year 1939, but considered all the main events up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941, linking them into a single logical whole: "The secret mobilization was to end with an attack on Germany and Romania on July 6 1941... The secret mobilization was aimed at preparing aggression. Nothing was done to defend the country. The secret mobilization was so colossal that it was not possible to hide it. Hitler had only one and last chance - to save himself with a preemptive strike. And on June 22, 1941, Hitler - for two weeks - preempted Stalin.

The publication of Suvorov's books divided historians into two unequal groups. Overwhelming majority - historians with experience and names who in their writings "sanctified" the pro-Stalinist concept of war. Working for many years under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, they could not accept even that half truth about the war, which became the property of official publicity. This is evidenced by the failed attempt to prepare a new 10-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people." But even those military historians who (for example, A.N. Mertsalov and L.A. Mertsalova) sharply criticize Stalin and Stalinism for the unpreparedness of the Soviet troops for the outbreak of war, for incompetence and arbitrariness, immorality and cruelty<sup>3</sup>, turned out to be unprepared to calmly discuss the concept of V. Suvorov.

This can only be explained by the fact that the Suvorov the concept not only broke the established historiographical tradition, but also dealt a blow to personal feelings and ideas about the war. Moreover, many

131. <sup>1</sup> V. Suvorov. Icebreaker. M., 1992. He is the same. Day M. M. 1994, p. 130,

<sup>2</sup> V. Suvorov. Day M, p. 249.

<sup>3</sup> Mertsalov A.N., Mertsalova L.A. Stalinism and war. From unread pages of history (1930-1990). M., 1994.



some military historians, like A.N. Mertsalov, were themselves its participants. This is not just rejection, but also unwillingness to understand. The books of V. Suvorov, in their opinion, do not deserve detailed reviews of military historians, because "with the help of" icebreakers "there is a market review of the most important moments of national and world history", "a shadow is cast on real historical facts that have long been scientific point of view has been irreproachably (! — I.P.) established by world historiography"<sup>1</sup>.

As the influence of V. Suvorov's books on the public consciousness spread in Russia, their denial also intensified. From silence, these historians moved on to swearing and implausible accusations. They branded him as "not a historian, not a memoirist, a traitor, an agent of foreign intelligence services." It turns out that his books "are written by different people, rather by groups of people", V. Suvorov's participation "is found only in separate literary devices, jargon, interjections"<sup>2</sup>.

.... Unlike his venerable opponents, V. Suvorov understood, although he did not specifically study, the mechanism of power of the Stalinist regime, the basic principle of Stalin's activity in politics - if possible, did not leave

lay documents, leave no traces, surround the truth with "battalions" of lies"<sup>3</sup>.

"In Soviet times, historians not only did not have access to secret materials of party and state bodies, but were also brought up on strict adherence to the principles of party membership and a class approach. This presupposed following the interpretation of events, which was laid down in the sources themselves. As a result, the works of historians reproduced the ideological

<sup>1</sup> Mertsalov A.N., Mertsalova L.A. "The Unpredictable Past or Deliberate Lies?", Svobodnaya Mysl, 1993, no. 6, p. 50-51.

<sup>2</sup> Mertsalov A.N., Mertsalova L.A. Between two extremes mi, or Who built the "Icebreaker" // Military History Journal. 1994. No. 5. S. 83.

<sup>3</sup> Irina Pavlova. The mechanism of power and the construction of Stalinist socialism. Novosibirsk, 2001, p. 352-355

gia and logic of the document. The main difficulty in overcoming the Soviet historiographic was to learn how to reveal inheritance the true meaning of events that in their own way reflected the remaining documents of the Soviet era - secret and unclassified. We must pay tribute to V. Suvorov, who showed himself in the book "Icebreaker" as an intelligence historian who managed to reveal the main secret of Soviet military policy and history. He did this, relying mainly on published Soviet sources, which he compared, rethought, cleared of ideological masking and labeling"<sup>1</sup>.

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In 1995, in Moscow, the Progress Academy publishing house published a book by the Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, *The Myth of the Icebreaker*. It was published in Moscow, but was printed in Berlin, and in a very large circulation. I found out about this by accident, it just turned out that I lived then directly opposite the Berlin printing house that was fulfilling the order, and in a casual conversation, the employees of the printing house told about it. If in the mid-1990s a Moscow publishing house orders the printing of a certain book in Berlin, it means that it has a lot of money for this book. And it is easy to guess the source of this money. Gorodetsky's book was advertised as the scientific achievement of a foreign historian who managed to do what the Russians were unable to do. Gorodetsky was invited to Moscow to work in closed archives and was given all sorts of official support. The calculation is simple - in Russia, traditionally, they believe more foreigners who say something beneficial to the authorities than their own official scientists, since their training and dependence on the authorities are obviously obvious.

Gorodetsky probably did not understand such subtleties and

<sup>1</sup> Irina Pavlova. *The mechanism of power and the construction of Stalinist socialism*. Novosibirsk, 2001, p.356.

sincerely believed that the circulation of his book, as well as the exceptionally respectful treatment he received in Moscow, was explained by reverence for his scientific weight and erudition. This can be seen from the almost anecdotal answer of Gorodets whom to the question of whether after the publication of the book in Moscow, opponents appeared among Russian historians or in nyh.

Gorodetsky: "The presentation of my book took place in Moscow. I must say that it was something monumental. She simply did not leave the television screen and from the pages of newspapers. Both historians and the military all repeated the same thing: "You did for us what we could not do. Very, very strong." The question that was repeated all the time: "Why exactly did the Israeli decide on this - a person from the outside?" In all this I sensed a very strong element of self-criticism on their part. I expected, of course, critical statements from professionals, but there was no criticism. At the presentation there was one person associated with Suvorov, Boris Sokolov. So, 99 percent of those present literally jumped on him. Here you have the difference in the moods that prevail on the street, and in the moods of those people who have the necessary knowledge.

Gorodetsky's book remains to this day the most scientific in form and respectable attempt to refute Suvorov. Especially against the background of junk crafts of all kinds of anonymous people with an obvious KGB lining.

Gorodetsky's book seemed to me blatantly unqualified. It's not even that Gorodetsky, of course, could not refute Suvorov, he practically does not try to do it there. Gorodetsky understands Soviet history very poorly in general, does not distinguish between the psychology and motives of the actions of the Stalinist government, which controlled political events,

1 Zeev Bar-Sella, Tatiana Shraiman. "Anti-Icebreaker". "Vesti", 02.03 - 08.03, 1995. P. 4.

does not even get into the few documents that leads.

In the Israeli Russian-language newspaper Vesti in March 1995, an interview with Gabriel Gorodetkim and a damning commentary on the interview and the book by the famous Israeli historian Zeev Bar-Sella appeared. Here are a few key excerpts from Bar-Sella's article:

"Stalin himself explained the failures of the first period of the war simply - surprise! Hitler, insidiously abusing trust, treacherously attacked the peaceful Soviet Union. And the only worker-peasant state in the world, of course, was not ready for war. More precisely, Hitler mobilized his army, but the Red Army did not have time to mobilize. Simple and clear.

Only one question arises - the non-mobilized Red Army in the very first months of the war loses more than 4 million people as prisoners alone! Where did they come from, these soldiers, if there was no mobilization? Indeed, after June 22, it was physically impossible to mobilize and drive this mass to the front - in such a short time and with the known state of the Russian roads - it was physically impossible. So, then, the mobilization was carried out in advance? Does that mean there was no surprise? And did Stalin prepare the country for war? And judging by the number of prisoners, the number captured by the enemy ammunition - 25 thousand wagons, the number of tanks lost in battles and abandoned, many thousands of aircraft, guns - tens of thousands, - Stalin prepared the country for war ?! Then what's the matter? Why did everything turn out this way and not otherwise?

In 1988, Viktor Suvorov, an employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate who fled to the West, gave the answer to this question. And this answer is monstrous, not climbing into any framework. But an answer that leaves no room for any questions. Stalin was neither blind nor stupid. He was a criminal. And the blame for the outbreak of the Second World War on him is no less than on Hitler. Yes, Hitler wanted war and September 1

1939 it began. But he was able to start it only because Stalin helped him. The Soviet leader himself helped Hitler not out of altruism and not out of stupidity, but because he himself wanted to seize Germany, and Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and Romania, and Finland, and France, and Italy, and England. .. And Stalin mobilized his army and prepared it for an attack on Europe, namely for an attack, and not for defense. And then the mass of non-surprises and riddles gets its explanation and solution to the riddle. And if someone, says Suvorov, thinks that Europe would have been easier and better under Stalin than under Hitler, then that's something to look at. By that time, Stalin had destroyed, starved to death and driven into camps already a quarter of the population of his own country. To believe that he would have reacted differently to Europeans for any reason would be at least imprudent.

In 1992, V. Suvorov's book "Icebreaker" came to an end in Russia. And, of course, it provoked a strong reaction. Some tended to believe him, while others (according to the number of printed responses - the majority) objected vehemently. And Suvorov, meanwhile, released the second part - "M Day", in which he cited new data that fully confirms the conclusions of the first book. And then came Gabriel Gorodetsky and gave Suvorov a detailed rebuff.

Let me make a reservation right off the bat - I in no way aim to defend or apologia for Suvorov's concept. It is up to military historians to defend or refute such concepts.

And here with G. Gorodetsky we are in an equal position. Therefore, we will consider the methods of argumentation and polemics presented in the book "The Myth of the Icebreaker".

As already mentioned, Suvorov believes that Stalin planned an attack on the German army. Gorodetsky's rebuttal: "The German intelligence documents cited later in this book clearly show that the deployment of Soviet troops was defensive in nature and did not pose any danger to the Wehrmacht" (p. 10). On page 29 (when

note 8) states: "See. Nast, ed., p. 115-119". Those. on these pages it is promised to quote the relevant arguments of the German intelligence, which utterly shatter Suvorov's conjectures. We open the book on the indicated pages - the section "Germany and preventive war" - we find: not a single document of German intelligence is cited, there is not a single reference to at least some document of German intelligence. What is there? There is a remark that "even Paulus, who would have been glad to present such data at Nuremberg, reluctantly admitted that "any facts that testified to the preparation of the Soviet Union for an attack did not come into our field of view" (p. 117).

I, unlike Gorodetsky, do not know what should have pleased or saddened the former field marshal, but I know for certain that long before the Nuremberg trials (in 1943) Paulus was captured by the Soviets, joined the leadership of the anti-Hitler committee "Freedom". Germany, was in captivity at the time of the Nuremberg trials and remained in captivity for many years after the trial. If Gorodetsky considers the testimony of such a witness (not backed up by any document) as evidence, it is his will.

However, as Gorodetsky notes, all the other German generals at the same trial in Nuremberg were firmly convinced that the Wehrmacht was expecting an attack by the Red Army. But Gorodetsky dealt with these unnecessary testimonies without difficulty—"the favorable conditions of the Cold War." Then he coolly notes: "However, archival materials testify that German intelligence did not provide such information at all" (pp. 116-117). References to these "archival materials" are not given. And where do they come from, these links, if all the materials of the Design Bureau (Wehrmacht High Command) are in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Podolsk, Moscow Region) and have never been issued to any Western historian. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, "preventive war is completely alien to

idea in the Soviet military arsenal. If someone is ready to consider this statement by Gorodetsky as an argument - his will.

One of the central places in Suvorov's system of evidence is the problem of the strange inattention of the Soviet command to the construction of defensive structures along the new (after September 1939) western border. Suvorov devotes 20 pages of his book to an examination of this oddity (together with the no less striking destruction of the old defensive "Stalin Line" - one line is not yet there, and the second is already being destroyed!) Suvorov devotes 20 pages of his book, citing data from memoirists and official publications. And he comes to the conclusion: Stalin did not think about defense, but about attack. The new line of defensive structures was not intended for any defense, but was actually not too

carefully crafted layout.

What does Gorodetsky oppose to Suvorov's arguments? First, he notes, "the archives are full of documents concerning the construction of fortified areas on the new frontiers" (p. 283). Excellent - bring at least one. Doesn't lead. Where does the information about what is complete come from? The source of both this and the fact that "the work was in full swing and were only interrupted by the German invasion" are two Soviet magazine publications in 1988 with a total of 6 pages; this means that Gorodetsky himself did not see any archives and cannot judge what is actually there or what is not. But he wants to believe Soviet publications. And he believes.<...>

In an interview, G. Gorodetsky cites the most interesting judgments about the Comintern. First, he reports that he looked through all the Comintern archives.

The Comintern, the Third Communist International, existed from 1919 to 1943. And now take the trouble to imagine how much paper the Cominternites wrote over in 24 years of hard work! In addition, the Comintern worked in sections, and even admitting that the language of the documents was German, American or Palestinian

While the Russian section is available to G. Gorodetsky, I do not dare to assert that he understands the materials of the Japanese and Chinese sections just as freely. Most likely, Gorodetsky simply does not imagine either the specifics or the scope of the work of the Comintern, or, accordingly, the volume of documentary material. But this is by the way. From

of all documents there is a link to only one - not published diary of Georgy Dimitrov. From reading this diary, Gorodetsky confidently concludes that Stalin wanted to dissolve the Comintern. And with the dissolved Comintern, there can be no talk of any revolutionary war - that means Suvorov is all around

not right.

The ability to read and understand what is written are as different from each other as to look and see. And Stalin told Dimitrov the following: "... the Communist Party should be made completely independent, and not sections of K.I. They must turn into national communist parties, under various names - the workers' party, the Marxist party, and so on. The name doesn't matter. It is important that they infiltrate their own people and concentrate on their own special tasks" (p. 183). What is it about? And the point is that the national communist parties, which have long since compromised themselves as agents of Moscow, must infiltrate (pay attention to the term "infiltrate"! ) into the political life of their countries. What is it for? And just so that when seizing a particular country, the Red Army does not look like an occupier. The example of Finland is obvious - the old Moscow prisoner Otto Kuusinen announced in Sestroretsk the creation of the Democratic Republic of Finland and called on the help of the Soviet Union. Kuusinen had to be made chairman of the DRF after the general secretary of the Finnish Communist Party refused such an offer. That is why, on the eve of a future war, communist parties supposedly independent of the Comintern were needed in all countries subject to capture. Only and everything.

In an interview, Gorodetsky assures that in his hands



the protocols of that same meeting of the Politburo were also dropped, at which Stalin sharply rejected the plans of Zhukov and Timoshenko to inflict a preemptive strike on the German army, and Timoshenko even threatened to be shot. If this is true, Suvorov will have a hard time. Is it true? It depends on the source, and the source here is not the protocol of the Politburo meeting, but a note handed over to Gorodetsky by Lev Bezymensky, signed by the general

N. Pashchenko, who was told about this meeting by Timoshenko (p. 341). When the note was drawn up, what and when Timoshenko told, whether he told at all - everything is in question. It is only necessary to remember that both Chief of Staff Zhukov and People's Commissar for Defense Timoshenko shared responsibility for the catastrophe of the start of the war with Stalin, and after Stalin's death they had to make excuses. But be that as it may, Gorodetsky either does not clearly remember what he wrote in his book, or does not understand well what a document is. It would take a long time to enumerate all the incongruities of this essay—there is enough material, 350 pages. But let us dwell on only one reasoning of Gorodetsky - regarding Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies ("academicians of the Red Army", as the leader called them) on May 5, 1940. There are several versions of this speech. Gorodetsky thinks for a long time how to reconcile these versions, and in the end he comes to a stunning conclusion - Stalin, it turns out, in one day

gave three speeches to three different groups of graduates. For my part, I can give a little background: there was only one speech, but it consisted of two parts. The first part was published immediately, and the second - secret - never. The second part contained those very famous words that "Our policy of peace and security is at the same time a policy of preparing for war. There is no defense without attack. It is necessary to educate the army in the spirit of the offensive. We must prepare for war." And I know about it from one of those present

shih "academicians" - my father.

But the idea of three different speeches is not enough for Gorodetsky -

it seems to him that he grabbed Suvorov by the hand. In an interview, he says so - falsification, from the word "counteroffensive" Suvorov throws out parts of the word "counter", and it turns out "offensive"!

And here is how he puts this thought into practice in the book (p. 293): "... the reader should pay attention to the fact that Stalin repeats the word "offensive" several times, meaning a counterstrike, i.e. opposite of "attack", which would mean a war started on one's own initiative".

For a person who knows Russian, there are riddles here no: an "offensive" is an offensive, a "counter-offensive" is a counter-offensive, but an "attack" is not an offensive. They attack us (Hitler Germany, for example), but we—we don't attack anyone, we attack.

So it is not necessary, not knowing the Russian language, to talk about the Russian language. Even if you really want to.

Gorodetsky - Suvorov is not a rival. He is no one's rival. He writes about the war without having a military education, about archives without reading... What made him take up this disastrous task? Firstly, of course, it's nice - those same Soviet colleagues who used to turn their backs to him are now turning in a different place. Documents are given. And if they don't want to give it, they say that there aren't any at all. And how can you not believe them? ("There is no reason not to trust Dmitry Volkogonov, who (...) certifies that (...) there were no documents testifying to Stalin's belligerent intentions towards Germany" - p. 18). Secondly, of course, Gorodetsky also has his own interest - it is not convenient for a Russian historian to defend Stalin, but for an Israeli Jew - just right. And who he is is not important. Especially if the board is your own.

"Suvorov chose the intellectual body of the Beloemig rants to start a crusade against..." (p. 7)

"During the Cold War, it was customary to proceed from the fact that Stalin consistently pursued an ideological policy aimed at inciting

war ... Suvorov, of course, studied (...) the course of Marxism Ma-Leninism, and all the more surprising is the false interpretation his interpretation of the basic Marxist propositions"... (p. 61)

"Suvorov (...) brandishes the bogey of communism (...); this method was used by historians of the Cold War period, frightening the West..." (p. 19)

Only in the eternally frozen soil of socialist Israel could, perhaps, such a relic still be preserved.

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If in purely scientific discussions Suvorov's concept has unambiguously survived and has no serious alternatives, then the social position of Suvorov himself and his ideas looks much worse. Only a relatively small part of post-Soviet society is ready either to agree with him or even seriously, without excitement and outbursts of hatred, to consider her ideas. The point here is not in Suvorov, but in the chaos that the

Soviet power in the minds of the Soviet population.

In addition, the fate of the author of the concept, a fugitive Soviet intelligence officer, also did not leave the participants in the disputes indifferent. For some he is a hero, for others he is a traitor, a man who has betrayed his oath, a renegade. It often seems to his opponents that by personally compromising Suvorov, one can undermine the credibility of his historical research. That a scandalous idea, expressed by a lone traitor, against whom both the public and the scientific world took up arms, by definition, cannot but be a curiosity. Thus, the fate of the historical concept and the fate of its author in the public mind turned out to be closely connected and are often perceived as equally exotic.

In public discussions, the scientific weight of arguments plays almost no role. The ideological side plays a key role. Purely Soviet thesis that

1 Zeev Bar-Sell a. Permafrost. "Vesti", 02.03 - 08.03, 1995. S. 8-9.

that the Soviet people endured unimaginable misfortunes and catastrophes just to save the world from fascism still sits deep in the subconscious of the former Soviet population. This thesis is for many the only remaining moral justification for their whole life and the basis of self-respect. Consciousness resists with all its might the thought that everything was wrong. That the life of Soviet people who survived the Stalin era has no moral justification at all. That it remains only to be ashamed of her, as the Germans of fourteen years of Nazi Germany are ashamed

sky board.

Suvorov does not write this directly, but it is impossible to draw any other conclusion from his conception of Soviet history. And those who want to protect their past and their dignity at any cost are always much more than those who want to voluntarily discuss their possible responsibility for complicity in crimes. Behind the public outrage over Suvorov's books lies a completely natural instinct of moral self-preservation. Sometimes such outrage takes the form of quasi-scientific publications, but the nature of the argument instantly reveals their real motives.

A typical example of such an approach is one of the first responses to Suvorov's books — an article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Aron Chernyak "Through the Eyes of a Participant and a Historian", published in 1994 in No. 93 of the Israeli journal *Twenty Two*, shortly after the publication of two the first books of Suvorov in Russian. Professor Chernyak is a specialist in the history of artillery and the military industry, a front-line soldier who went through the entire war from beginning to end. The logic and methodology of Chernyak's argument is typical of many discussions that have been troubling the post-Soviet public for more than 10 years.

Chernyak categorically disagrees with Suvorov, considers his theory unproven and unscientific, and the books themselves are a model of mystification. And the first thing that revolts Chernyak is the terminology of Suvorov, who considers the "Great Patriotic War" only an episodic

home of World War II, aggressively launched by the USSR in 1939.

Chernyak writes: "... if the author says that he is destroying the "memory of a just war", "liberation war", then what is it in the eyes of Suvorov? It is understandable - unjust, non-liberating, predatory. But then a sacramental, perhaps the most important question arises: who then are the tens of millions who died at the fronts, in the rear, in fascist concentration camps - what should we call them now? Defenders of their homeland or invaders? Heroes or criminals?.. What kind of war of conquest that begins with a very protracted defensive period? How does an invader defend himself against a defending enemy?.. Suvorov's reasoning about the nature of the Great Patriotic War is an example of moral absurdity, and they make his books deeply immoral - it is impossible to get away from this conclusion.

Stop, what does Suvorov have to do with it? Was it the first time Suvorov told us that the USSR started the Second World War simultaneously with the Third Reich by attacking Poland, Finland and the Baltic states, and that this was preceded by a pact that divided the whole world into spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR? That the USSR forcibly installed communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe it occupied and maintained their existence with the help of the Soviet Army, periodically staging armed interventions, until 1990? If Professor Chernyak heard about this not for the first time, then his arguments about the immorality of Suvorov's books are pure demagoguery.

The appeal to morality immediately turns the discussion from scientific to ideological and highlights the main problem created by Suvorov's books for several generations of Soviet people at once.

Memories of the noble role of the Soviet people in the World War are the only bright spot in the history of

<sup>1</sup> Chernyak Aron. Through the Eyes of a Participant and a Historian, Twenty Two, 93/1994, p. 211-223.

rii of the USSR. For the only time in 70 years, the Soviet people were allowed to resist the enemy and hate him. Before and after the war, the loss of population also numbered in the millions, but it was necessary to love the murderers in the person of the organs and the party. And here for the first time there was a real, not invented enemy, alien and cruel, hatred for which did not need to be crushed in oneself. The bright idea of victory over fascism indirectly justified everything - all the losses, military, pre-war and post-war, slave labor, poverty, the Gulag. Therefore, it turned out to be psychologically much more difficult to abandon it than to say goodbye to the communist ideology itself.

Suvorov's theory—whether it be proven—deprives the masses of people of the moral justification for the hardships of their own lives. If he is right, then they are not the saviors of the world from fascism, but the aggressors. The fact that by that time the Soviet people had already been an aggressor in relation to Poland, Finland and the Baltic states is usually not in the minds postponed.

A rhetorical question - who were the Soviet people in the war, defenders or invaders? - meaningless. They were successively both.

One could ask a more reasonable question: were they anti-fascists? Anti-fascism is determined not just by the position in the fight, it is a way of thinking, the rejection of state regimes of the fascist type. That is, anti-fascism is a struggle for democracy, and not vice versa. The Red Army was Stalinist and therefore, by definition, could not be anti-fascist. The political goals of the Soviet government, and consequently of the Red Army, were criminal, regardless of whether it attacked, defended itself, or peacefully waited for the right moment. The goal was to establish a communist regime by force where it could be reached. It invaded Poland and the Baltic states, defended itself from Germany, crushed resistance in Eastern European countries, suppressed the uprising in Hungary by the same army, literally the same people.

Chernyak's next claim to Suvorov is a method

prelogical. He believes that since Suvorov himself declared that he hardly used archival materials, but mostly open Soviet materials, his books are unscientific. As proof, he lists several well-known foreign publications about the Second World War that Suvorov did not use.

This argument makes sense only if it has been possible to prove that the materials used by the author are insufficient to prove his theory, and the critic himself knows archival materials that contradict this theory.

We see nothing of the kind here. Chernyak simply does not notice the bulk of the facts cited, and he also does not cite his own sources. His reasoning is habitually general in nature and, as a rule, has already been cited, analyzed and refuted by Suvorov in his books, which Chernyak also seems to not

notice.

The archives of the General Staff - the only place where Suvorov could find written evidence of his theory - is inaccessible to him and his supporters. However, his opponents can only find arguments in their favor there. They can, but for some reason they don't find it, although the archives themselves are practically in their hands.

Of course, Suvorov cannot present Stalin's or Zhukov's own manual orders for the preparation of aggression, but he analyzes the process of preparation itself. And it turns out it's not difficult at all. The process is evident, and the evidence abounds. Just the main block of Suvorov's argumentation - the key evidence of the preparation of the Red Army for an attack on Germany in the spring of 1941 - his opponents do not try to dispute.

They cling to trifles, and, as a rule, are very unsuccessful. For example, Chernyak believes that if a plan for an attack on Germany existed, then "... commanders of divisions, corps, armies and fronts, as well as commanders of fleets and heads of the military industry ... would have to know about this plan in detail , take

mother actively involved in the preparation, otherwise the plan would have been doomed to failure. Hence the conclusion: it is impossible to keep the plan for unleashing the Second World War secret; so there was no such plan.

Very unconvincing. First, why on earth would commanders at all levels be required to know an absolutely secret strategic plan in every detail? It's like telling reporters about him.

Only a few main developers, headed by Stalin, Zhukov and Shaposhnikov, could have been completely devoted to the plan of attack on Germany. The plan was communicated to the lower commanders in the form of specific orders for redeployment, etc. Nevertheless, it was clear to many by the nature of these orders that it was not at all about exercises. Suvorov cites many examples of how, when they allegedly went on maneuvers in the spring and summer of 1941, the officers guessed that a war was coming. And certainly not defensive. I will allow myself to repeat only one quote, the words of Lieutenant General Telegin: "Since it was assumed that the war would be fought on enemy territory, the warehouses with mobilization stocks of weapons, property and ammunition that were located within the district in the prewar period were relocated to the border military districts".

It is amusing and characteristic that, judging by the words of Chernyak quoted above about the "plan to unleash the Second World War", he considers the German attack on the USSR, and not Germany and the USSR on Poland, to be the beginning of the Second World War. For a Soviet historian this is natural, for a normal historian it is strange.

Professor Chernyak devotes very little space to criticism of Suvorov's specific arguments, and it is somehow strange. Here Suvorov writes that before the war, Soviet tank building was mainly focused on the production of light high-speed BT tanks. It was an aggressor tank, designed for rapid breakthroughs along good roads, which were then only in Germ



Chernyak objects: "... this goal could be achieved with one condition: if no one shoots at the BT. The maximum thickness of its armor was 20 mm, that is, it was penetrated by a heavy machine gun. But if, according to an authoritative critic, BT was not suitable for breakthroughs behind enemy lines, then all the more so for defense, here armor is even more important. Why was he even released?

The same with aviation. Suvorov cites a mass of convincing facts that, before the war, emphasis was placed on offensive bomber aviation, which turned out to be all concentrated at the very borders with Germany, which is reasonable only in the offensive and suicidal in defense. He describes the gigantic scale of the training of military pilots in the two years before the war. There were so many of them that they were no longer awarded officer ranks, and the terms of training were reduced from three years to nine, six, and even four months. That is, they released half-educated people who could only take off, bomb themselves and return to the airfield. They were not taught to conduct air battles, since the Soviet military doctrine assumed that enemy aircraft would be suppressed at the beginning of the war at airfields.

The critic is surprised by the last fact, but objects like this: "... most of the aircraft were outdated. From 1939 to June 22, 1941, the army received 17,745 aircraft, but of them new types ... - about 20 percent. Possibly, but what types? Suvorov right or not? Not

It's clear.

Suvorov writes about the formation in the USSR before the war with Germany of 10 airborne corps, which is clear evidence of aggressive military plans. Chernyak objects: "Such corps could serve

live as a means of deterring the attacked enemy.

Why hold back in this way? By the way, Suvorov also writes about the transformation of the surviving landing units into ordinary infantry units after the German attack. Again Suvorov is more logical.

It is completely unclear what gave Professor Chernyak

the right to declare with such confidence at the end of the article that Suvorov's books "... do not withstand qualified criticism" and are "a model of mystification." He failed to prove it. As, however, and no one else.

It is not necessary to be an expert in the field to judge the integrity of a scientific discussion. I have a favorite book, Transcript of the meeting of the August session of VASKhNIL in 1949. This is when the USSR did away with genetics for a long time. The party then said its word only on the last day of the meeting. And for the first three days, the "Mendelists-Morganists" fought with might and main with the Lysenkoites. And one didn't have to be a biologist to determine who was conscientious and who was not just by the nature of the arguments and the methodology of the dispute. Who appeals to science, and who defends a "politically correct concept". Here the situation is similar.

The inferiority of the position of such critics of Suvorov is not only in the weakness of counterarguments, but also in the absence of an alternative concept.

Let us suppose that Suvorov is wrong and that Stalin did not intend to attack Germany in July 1941. Then three options are possible:

1. Stalin was going to attack later, for example in 1942.
2. Stalin was not going to attack at all and was preparing only for defense.
3. Stalin believed Hitler and did not prepare for defense, let alone attack, but dealt with other problems.

Suvorov analyzed the first version in detail in Ledo kole" and reasonably rejected.

Evidence that Stalin was preoccupied with defensive measures in 1941 has not yet been found. Apparently, they do not exist in nature. The version about Stalin's complete disinterest in military problems can not be considered as a demon.

meaning.

The last two versions in different combinations are on our

have been staunchly inspired for the past thirty years. They were convenient because they explained the catastrophe of 1941 in a politically painless way. But they relied mainly on the belief of the Soviet people in the truth of the printed word. This effect worked surprisingly long. But now, when Suvorov created and argued his concept, his opponents also needed arguments. It turned out that not only were there no counterarguments, but there was no counterconcept itself.

That is, there is no answer to the question, what was Stalin actually doing in the prewar period, if not preparing an attack on Hitler and Europe? None. Instead, there is a furious clinging to minor details and fragments of the former ideology.

Professor Chernyak gritted his teeth admits the theoretical possibility of an attack by Stalin on Hitler someday, but at the same time does not claim that preparations were made for this. He also does not claim that it was not carried out. He claims that the USSR was not ready for war because of the repressions against the military at the end of the thirties. A familiar argument, but unconvincing: if the repressions did not prevent Stalin from winning the war after the terrible defeat of 1941, then they would not have prevented him from winning under much more favorable conditions - with a surprise attack on Germany.

What were Stalin's real plans and what the USSR was preparing for in the late thirties—for war, for defense, or for nothing—Professor Chernyak does not explain this. Which does not prevent him from declaring with confidence: "... Suvorov did not understand the main thing in Stalin: not the true interests of the country, but animal fear for his power led him. Stalin knew history well and was very afraid of Hitler: he understood that it was deadly dangerous to start an unprepared war with him ... "

Suvorov did not assert that Stalin was guided by the "genuine interests of the country". On the contrary, he argued the opposite: Stalin was always guided only by his own cannibalistic interests. Something else is interesting - where did the myth of the pathological

Stalin's fear of Hitler, the fear that prevented him from even organizing a defense? There is no historical evidence for this.

Chernyak's article is a typical example of pseudo-scientific, but essentially ideological, purely Soviet criticism of Suvorov's books. Material of this type can be found in abundance in the press, and even more on the Internet. As editor of the history section of a major newspaper, I received them in bales. As a rule, the authors of such articles are people of the older generation, military or post-war, often with scientific degrees. They are driven not by scientific interest, but by offended patriotism.  
feeling.

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The writer Georgy Vladimov, himself the author of remarkable books, including those about the war, came out very sharply against Suvorov's books. Vladimov published in the newspaper "Moscow News" (No. 5, 1999) an article "Was that war Patriotic?". The writer was irritated not so much by Suvorov himself as by the support he received from others. In particular, the historian Yuri Kagramanov, who, in a long article on Soviet foreign policy thinking published in the journal Kontinent<sup>1</sup>, used Suvorov's conclusions about the aggressive motives for the USSR's entry into World War II as undoubted and proven. Vladimov considers Suvorov's theory a curiosity and refutes it on two newspaper pages. The job is pretty dangerous.

In order to refute Suvorov, one must either prove that his information is incorrect, or that the analysis is incorrect. And in any case, evidence should be given that in 1941 the USSR was preparing not for aggression, but for defense. Vladimov touches only on some of Suvorov's conclusions, far from being the key ones. Let's look at the arguments.

<sup>1</sup> Yuri Kagramanov. "... And scatter its fruits", "Kontinent" No. 97, 1998.

To Suvorov's rather minor remark about that, in preparation for the defense, it was not worth moving into 1940 Neman, it is better to defend behind a water barrier, Vladimov answers: formally yes, but there are exceptions. And he tells for a long time how the Soviet troops defended themselves near Stalingrad, having the Volga behind them, and won. All.

Those who have not read Suvorov remain convinced that this episode with the Neman was his only argument. Suvorov's picture of multi-stage preparations for an attack drawn in two books by Suvorov - a gigantic concentration of manpower, tanks and military airfields right on the border, preparation of bridgeheads for an attack on the Romanian oil fields and part of Poland occupied by the Germans, the urgent formation of airborne corps, redeployment to at the border zone of military warehouses, etc. and so on. - Vladimov simply does not respond. As if he didn't read it.

The construction of light BT tanks before the war, which could drop their tracks and race on wheels along the highways that were then available only in Western Europe (according to Suvorov - proof of aggressive intentions), Vladimov explains simply - "monkey". Say, these tanks were invented by an American, and "we licked from him, adopted and tender care for European asphalt." A rather strange and offensive reproach for idiocy for Soviet engineers and specialists from the General Staff. For some reason, Suvorov's critics from among the indignant public most often unsuccessfully cling to these ill-fated motorway tanks. The argument, of course, is curious and convincing, but not at all the key one.

Vladimov does not consider long-range bomber aviation to be an offensive weapon and gives an example when the Soviet troops retreated at the beginning of the war, and the bombers that broke through were suddenly bombed in Berlin. Indeed, there was such a heroic incident that had no significance for the defense. Proper use of long-range scorers

the boxes were demonstrated at the end of the war by the Americans and the British, having demolished many German cities from the face of the earth.

Vladimov believes that weapons, in principle, are not divided into offensive and defensive ones: "in essence, any weapon is universal - and therefore indifferent to Suvorov's version." Of course, you can crack nuts with a microscope, but this is hardly a sign of the universality of the microscope. The logic is defiantly unprofessional.

Vladimov considers the gigantic superiority of the USSR in aircraft to be an insignificant factor and does not speak of the aggressiveness of Soviet intentions: "If a German pilot shoots down 352 aircraft during the war, and our most successful three times hero - 62, will we compare who has more of them, who has them? better?" Of course, we will, unless we decide that Stalin deliberately planned the mass destruction of aircraft during the defense.

Like many other critics of Suvorov, Vladimov for some reason considers the absence of an official order to prepare an attack on Germany as proof of Stalin's non-aggressive intentions. The lack of documents confirming the preparation of the country for defense, however, does not bother criticism. And Vladimov does not even mention the arguments in favor of a massive preparation for an attack, which Suvorov cites in abundance.

Vladimov argues that Stalin, even if he wanted to, could not have attacked Germany before 1945. Why? Because of the terror in the army in 1938! Suvorov devoted a whole book to this problem, not a single argument from which Vladimov mentions or refutes.

Vladimov repeats the old Soviet thesis that the war with "sparsely populated Finland" showed the weakness of the Red Army, without explaining in any way why Suvorov was wrong in arguing the opposite. It is difficult to call such criticism criticism.

The most interesting thing about Vladimov's article is his assessment of pre-war Soviet poems and songs. He purely refuses them militancy and aggressiveness:

"... We do not want an inch of foreign land, but we will not give up our own inch." What does Katyusha ask for her "si"

golden eagle? "Let him protect his native land." And what is breathing in our propellers? "Tranquility of our borders". How is our armor? "The armor is strong and our tanks are fast," so "we will protect the labor of factories and the labor of collective farm arable land." If a threat is heard, then it is "if new wars pour into our calm region" - well, then we "sing a battle song", and then it is of a defensive nature: "we will stand with our chest for our Motherland". This is not how a nation is prepared for an invasion of a foreign land."

Alas, that's how they do it. In vain, Vladimov believes that if they were preparing for aggression, they would call in songs: "let's seize foreign territory and enslave neighboring peoples." Again - unfounded suspicion of Stalin in idiocy. It was also an obvious propagandist principle - in order to stir up aggression, one must call for defense. Both in songs and in re

chah.

On September 17, 1939, on the day of the attack on Poland, Molotov called on Soviet soldiers to protect their half-brothers, Western Ukrainians and Belarusians. When Bessarabia was taken from Romania in the forties, they defended the Moldavian brothers suffering under the foreign yoke. They also only defended themselves from aggressive Finland. The songs and lyrics worked great. A year and a half after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the USSR managed to attack all its European neighbors and occupy territories with a population of 23 million people. The Soviet people, meanwhile, and fifty years after the victory, are for the most part sure that they entered the Second World War on June 22, 1941. For Soviet military historians-general staff officers, such a position is natural. That it was shared by Georgy Vladimov, a serious writer and consistent dissident, is surprising.

Such claims to Suvorov's theory only superficially look like historical discussions. As a rule, there is a moral conflict behind them. There is a struggle going on not for historical truth, but for the right to historical pride. Vladimov put it clearly:

"Let's leave our veterans in the knowledge that they defended their homeland, and not the extravagant plan of their ruler."

You can leave. One can continue to speak of the soldiers of the Red Army as disinterested liberators. To do this, one will have to forget about the countless aggressions and crimes against humanity committed by the Red Army and the Soviet regime. About the execution of 24,000 Polish officers in the "peaceful" summer of 1940, about wild political terror in the territories liberated from the Germans, about Sachsenhausen turned into a part of the Gulag, about cannibalistic regimes in Eastern European countries. About Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong and the Berlin Wall. Will have to lie further.

The problem is that Vladimov and his like-minded people call for deceiving not only the old front-line soldiers out of compassion, but everyone in general out of patriotism. There is no spiritual nobility in this, unfortunately.  
whom.

Georgy Vladimov published another article against Suvorov in 1999 in the newspaper Russkaya Mysl<sup>1</sup>. Again, Vladimov is more annoyed than Suvorov himself by his like-minded people, in particular Anatoly Kopeikin, Timur Murzaev and the author of these lines, who spoke in the same Russian Thought in support of Suvorov. The writer considers Suvorov and the "Suvorovites" to be professional heretics, out of sheer passion, putting upside down long-established truths - "The Caspian Sea flows into the Volga, oats eat horses - this is the true Suvorov."

In addition, they are also young cynics - "more than once they will soften before the insult of a participant in the Great Patriotic War, when they prove to him that he did not defend his homeland, but a criminal aggressive plan."

The last reproach - to me personally. I answer - soften. It is a pity for the unfortunate deceived people. But even having softened, I can't count the "participant of the Second World War", according to

1 G. Vladimov. "Do horses eat oats?", "RM", No. 4279, 1999.



who crushed the parliamentary movement in occupied Eastern Europe with tanks, an anti-fascist and a liberator. Because the view on such things is determined not by age and sensitivity, but by conscience and common sense. Because I know that very few "participants of the Second World War" would soften before the insult of the prisoners of Sachsenhausen in 1945-1950. Or before the insult of hundreds of thousands of their own compatriots from the displaced persons, with their help sent to the Gulag in 1945. This makes them even more sorry.

Before Vladimov, Naum Korzhavin spoke no less emotionally but no more convincingly against Suvorov. Soviet military patriotism among dissident front-line soldiers sometimes strangely coexists with conscious anti-Sovietism. However, not all.

To Vladimov's rhetorical question "Was that Patriotic War?" back in 1981, Viktor Nekrasov answered: "... For a just cause! That was the name of the book of the great Russian writer Vasily Grossman ... If he dreamed now, Vasily Semenovitch, goosebumps would go through his body from this name alone. He is smart, even wise, who knew a lot that we did not know, extremely truthful, even he believed that we fought then for a just cause. The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours! But our cause turned out to be wrong. This is the tragedy of my generation. And mine, too..."

Bulat Okudzhava, also, as is well known, a front-line soldier, said in an interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta: "I read Suvorov with interest ... It's hard for me to doubt that we were also preparing for an aggressive march, we were just ahead of us, and we compelled to defend their country."

Yuri Nagibin in the novel "Darkness at the End of the Tunnel" wrote: "He (Stalin. - D.Kh.) miscalculated with Hitler not

<sup>1</sup> Naum K o r z h a v i n. "About Stalin the Wise...", "Continent" No. 93, 1998. See also: Anatoly Kopeikin. "Once again about the technical equipment of the Red Army for 1941", "Russian Thought" No. 4208, 1998.

<sup>2</sup> "Literaturnaya gazeta", 11.05.94.

because he sacredly believed him or was head over heels in love - this is suitable for satire, the grotesque (Hitler, of course, impressed him, as he did Hitler), but because the case violated the exact calculation. Everything was done impeccably: he powdered the brains of Adolf with a contract

about friendship, the division of Poland, every possible help to the fighting Reich, at the same time ordered rubber-running tanks for our industry - for smooth European roads and attack aircraft without rear cover - all only for an attack, for an instant crushing blow. To crush Hitler and pass like a heated knife through butter, Europe already gutted by his temporary friend and ally - that was the Stalinist plan. He lacked some kind of pace, Hitler outstripped him to his death.

"The strategy of our military leaders was to stuff German trunks with Russian meat. Zhukov was just a butcher. The German defense industry collapsed under the blows of the Anglo-American bombers, and the Germans surrendered. In the meantime, this did not happen, two disgusting, bloody and vulgar buffoons were grimacing at the forefront of the battle of nations: Hitler and Stalin. They were played on the sidelines by two seasoned politicians: Churchill and Roosevelt. And all the time there was some kind of disgusting bargaining on blood, on the lives of those who still survived, they divided the lands, peoples, conducted new burials.

lines across human hearts, and ever thicker  
poured smoke from gas stoves. And then it turned out that the dispute was not between fascism and the rest of mankind, but between two fascist systems. Fascism was defeated, fascism won.

Yuri Nagibin wrote under the clear influence of Su vorov's books, this can be seen from the mention of rubber-running tanks. But again, the point here is not the persuasiveness of Suvorov's argumentation, but the method of historical thinking. Nagibin's "fascism won" is incompatible with Vladimov's call to leave front-line veterans in

<sup>1</sup> Yuri Nagibin. "Darkness at the End of the Tunnel" - M., 1994, S. 86.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 274.

consciousness of being right. This is not a scientific, not a historical conflict, but an ideological one. Front-line soldier Nagibin is 11 years older than the dissident Vladimov, but he, like Okudzhava, Viktor Nekrasov and others, is a few to free himself from the clichés of Soviet upbringing! - It turned out to be easier for the front-line soldiers.

This conflict cannot be resolved by scientific arguments.

Those who do not want to see them do not see them.

Evidence that the USSR at the end of the thirties in general, and in 1941 in particular, was intensively preparing for an aggressive war, is all around us and without purely scientific military-historical research. After all, this training concerned not only the army, but the whole life of the disenfranchised population up to the border of the militarized country.

Here is one example. When in the early 1990s I first came across Suvorov's "Icebreaker", filled with references to the memoirs of front-line soldiers, my first thought was - where else can you find such evidence? In Soviet times, conscientious memoirs about the prewar period were practically not published, and among the relatively conscientious ones, the most famous (if not the only) book was Ilya Ehrenburg's "People, Years, Life." I open the fourth part, relating to the spring of 1941, and I can't believe my eyes.

On April 24, 1941 Stalin calls Ehrenburg. He praises the first, published part of his novel The Fall of Paris and asks if Ehrenburg is going to show the German fascists in the book. Yes, Ehrenburg answers, he is going to, but he is afraid that the censors will not let him through. Stalin jokes: "And you write, we will try to push through ..."

To the questions of relatives about the conversation, the gloomy Ehrenburg replies: "War is coming soon ..." And he adds: "... I immediately realized that it was not about literature, Stalin knows that such a call will be talked about everywhere," he wanted to warn child."

So, in April 1941, Stalin personally informed Ehrenburg that he was going to attack Germany and he would need propaganda material. And even the deadline was indicated, in three months - so much approximately

I am required to prepare for publication and release of the book. And he personally called for persuasiveness - the cautious Ehrenburg might not have believed the mediator, he might have decided that it was a provocation. The fact that we are talking about an attack is unequivocal. The Soviet military doctrine of those years did not allow any other option.

And the gloominess of Ehrenburg is understandable. Probably, after June 22, despite the catastrophic situation, he breathed a sigh of relief. So he did not have to become a troubadour of aggression. God was merciful. Still expose aggressors are psychologically easier for a decent person.

Most importantly, in the spring of 1941, Ehrenburg knew everything. And knowing he carried his own through his whole life, with no one directly without sharing. Or maybe he hoped that the thoughtful reader and written enough to guess. As it turned out, I hoped in vain.

It must be assumed that there were plenty of people who knew or guessed, like Ehrenburg, about the near planned future. But after the war, which began and ended contrary to these plans, it was very difficult to remember them, and it was very dangerous for life.

One of these well-informed people was undoubtedly the writer Vsevolod Vishnevsky, the author of the famous play Optimistic Tragedy and the script for the film We Are from Kronstadt. He belonged to the very top of the Stalinist intellectual elite. Before the war, he was the editor-in-chief of the Znamya magazine, headed the Defense Commission of the Writers' Union, attended closed meetings at the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, and watched foreign war films. He visited the receptions of the highest Soviet dignitaries and was himself a high dignitary, one of those who were responsible for military propaganda in the USSR. Naturally, Vishnevsky was included in a narrow circle of the most informed people in the state.

In May 1995, the Moscow magazine published extracts from the diaries of Vsevolod Vishnevsky for 1939—1941, prepared for publication by the historian V. Nevezhin.

These diaries are an extremely important historical document. They fully confirm the version that at the end of the thirties Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany and Europe. For Vishnevsky, who is privy to the nuances of Soviet political cuisine, there is no doubt about the real meaning of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact for the Soviet side. This is a way to blow up the peace in Europe, play off the European countries in a long exhausting war and intervene at the right moment - "hit Hitler on the back of the head." Vishnevsky enthusiastically awaits such a development of events. As the main goals of Soviet policy, Vishnevsky writes about a "preemptive strike" on Germany, about the capture of the straits and the Balkans, about the Sovietization of European countries - Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania ... About solving problems in Asia. The fact that after the defeat of Germany, the USSR will be left face to face with England and the USA, with

which will probably have to temporarily divide the world, if the forces to continue the war will not be enough. And about the inevitable continuation of the war for world domination in another 10-15 years, when forces will be accumulated. And also about the fact that the decisive moment will most likely be the summer of 1941 ...

Here are the most interesting excerpts from Vish's diary

Nevsky:

## 1939

*August 28 (afternoon)*

Flurry of responses about the German-Soviet treaty. (Perhaps we reserve the last word. In case of war, we will be the last to act. And - quite possibly - we will strike at the same Germany.) <...>

*August 31 (morning)*

I think about the European situation all the time. On the map, I figure out how the European countries and the USA relate to the German-Soviet treaty.<...>

We will: 1) gain time; let's see the military power of countries in action; 2) check, gain experience - much more useful than in Spain and China; 3) bring ourselves to the maximum mobilization state (the new law on universal military duty); save priority frames; 4) and, if necessary, through the Mongolian People's Republic and China, we will hit Japan in order to untie ourselves in the East; 5) we will be able to improve our positions in the West <...>; 6) we will be able to wait for the growth of the national liberation movement in truncated Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria; 7) to wait for new proposals, already serious, from the same England, France; 8) on occasion, to denounce the treaty with Germany and strike. <...>

### *September 1*

In the afternoon, by telegraph, Comrade Molotov's report on the German-Soviet Pact. The USSR won a free hand, time. <...> Now we are taking the initiative, not retreating, but advancing. Diplomacy with Berlin is clear: they want our neutrality and then reprisals against the USSR; we want them to get bogged down in war and then deal with them. <...> The Second World War is undoubtedly expanding.<...> But with whomever you say: "We will beat Hitler in a year." This is reportedly said in the army. <...>

For the USSR, the time has come for external world actions. For 22 years, we have not only restored, but also multiplied the strength of the country. <...> Here is the question of our exit on Wednesday the Diterranean Sea - which failed in connection with the Spanish defeat, but it may succeed through the Carpathians, the Balkans and, perhaps, Turkey. There is also the question of Poland. It is possible that at the right moment we will announce the slogan of "the restoration of Poland."<...> We will be preferred to the Germans. We will solve both the Baltic problems and the problems of Czechoslovakia and Rumania and Asia Minor. And the great problems of Asia.

It's hard to predict how the game will turn out. But one thing is clear: the world will be redrawn again. In this war, we will try to maintain our winning positions to the end. Attract a number of countries. Gradually, where by affection, where by force. <...>

# 1940

*April, 4*

In anticipation of various options, we conserve strength, strengthen the army and navy. English politicians wanted to come at the end of the war and arrange everything in Europe in their own way. But we have learned something and have intercepted, as if from the British, their sound intentions.

*April 5*

<...> Friendship with Germany, the pact, etc. - all this is a temporary move, these are tactics. Will we win? <...> Or just give the Germans time, respite, supplies. Don't know. <...>

*July 29*

<...> We are stubbornly taking root in the west and southwest. <...> We will achieve control over the straits. We will be in the Balkans. <...>

If we win this winter, if Hitler fails on the campaign against England, things will be good.

*October 22 (afternoon)*

I listened to Manuilsky's report at the core of the Moscow organization.

<...> If you fight, then in the most favorable situation. When there is a breakdown, I would like to say: the breakdown of Hitler.

*31th of December*

The picture of the great war is getting clearer and wider before us. And we are unlikely to be left behind. We need to get ready, quickly. Apparently, we will act, having waited, closer to the denouement. I think: against the "axis".

# 1941

*January 31*

<...> The position of the USSR is expectant, we, if it is expedient, will be able to throw our weight on the scales of war.

<...> Thinking through the possible options - how many times:

<...> The variant is one of the most common in our society: the USSR is waiting, hastily strengthening itself, rearming, pulling up its armed forces to the required level. We are waiting for the US and maybe other countries to speak. <...> Then we come out in order to break the block of aggressors with our common forces. <...>

Our positive opportunities: movement on West, annexation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Carpathian Ukraine, separate parts in the Balkans. The possibility of solving the problem of straits is a problem of thousand years of importance. <...> The possibility of serious changes in the Middle East, Central Asia, etc. Strong pressure from the USSR, in the event of the defeat of Germany - in Europe. Soviet (people's) Germany. We and England (with you scrap USA) face to face. Separation of spheres (the word is not clear: influence?). In the future, however, new wars - people's Europe and Asia against the old capitalist world: England - USA. Imagination can take you far.

<...> Will probably decide next summer...

It is not known what is more desirable: the victory of the "axis" or Anglo-American dominion, with a new chain of powers along our frontiers from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The failure of one of the main sides (Germany or England) leaves the USSR alone with the enemy. <...> The field will be cleared from strangers interfering. Of course, temporary compromises are also possible: after the war, for example, when everyone is tired and exhausted. But reproduction is fast. One generation will change: another 20-25 years, and the question may rise to its full height. This already seems to be decided by our TT. grandchildren.<...>



### *Night of February 10*

Last time I tried to outline possible options. <...> Our action against Germany and the Axis. <...> Movement to the West, the Straits, etc. <...> The prospect of Sovietization of some countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, maybe the Balkans, partially <...>). Compromise with England and the USA. But — in the distance, the inevitability of new clashes with the capitalist world

rum...

The best option. We use the old divide and conquer method. We are out of the war, we pay something for it, we get a lot. <...> We help to wage war on the same Germany, feeding it in "portions", at a minimum. Let's not prevent the imperialists from waging war for another year or two. <...> We are waiting for their weakening. Then - we act as a super-arbitrator, "broker", etc. Intervention, pressure can be both peaceful and armed - "before the curtain." <...>

### *Evening March 3*

<...> It is difficult to predict the course of events. But we will probably wait until Hitler gets seriously bogged down in the big fight in the West. Most likely, in an invasion operation. It will require a huge effort of German forces.<...> Under these conditions, the USSR will be able to hit Hitler "on the back of the head." <...> With the Anglo-American world - enemies of the second order - a compromise is possible, for 10-15 years. This is the period we need to deploy huge economic and defensive power, build the Great Fleet, etc. <...>

### *Happy April 9*

<...> You feel, however, - having waited a little, weighing that the hour of our intervention has not yet come. We need to carry out spring sowing, we need to carry out the program, study, work, press... <...> How will events turn out? <...> Let the matter drag on until winter, then both the defense of England and the powerful pressure of the United States will have an effect. <...> Then our hour will come!

*April 12, 5 p.m.*

Just returned from the Kremlin: I was at Voroshilov's. <...>

I moved on to the topic of Hitler: the man turned out to be much smarter and more serious than we expected. Big mind, si la. <...> Let them reproach him: a maniac, uncultured, expansive, etc., but in his business he is a genius, a force... I repeated it. <...> We listened carefully. A sober assessment of a possible enemy. This is a serious quality of K. E. <...>

*14th of April*

A German strike against us and our response (or preemptive strike) are inevitable. Going to the pact, and we planned: let them start a fight, weaken each other, reveal their strengths and weaknesses, get bogged down if possible; we will skillfully encourage them, push them together, etc., and, if necessary, according to the Leninist formula, we ourselves will go on the attack ... We will have reserves: the peoples of the occupied countries, where there is bitterness against the Germans, a craving for peace, for liberation incredible. <...> The truth comes out. The interim agreement with Hitler is bursting at the seams. <...>

*may 13*

Stalin's military speech in the Kremlin at the graduation of academies. Speech of great importance. We are launching an ideological and practical offensive... We are talking about a world struggle: Hitler is miscalculating here. <...> America enters the business, its readiness for the 42nd year. And we will also say a word: we are closer to Europe, in particular to the Slavs, than anyone else. We have freshness, unused strength, experience... <...> Ahead is our march to the West. Opportunities ahead of which we

dreamed for a long time.

*May 21st*

<...> Something big is underway. Germany, with her 250 divisions, cannot waste time, be "at idle." She chooses direction...

They see and understand abroad that we are winning, we are accumulating strength, <...> - and we can become, if those who are at war, prolong bloodletting, a super-arbiter in Europe and Asia. Hitler understands that we are working towards hitting him in the back of the head, preferably when Germany is exhausted, that way in 1942 ...

<...> Advanced in the "Red Star" - information about the mobilization of a number of classes of spares ("hundreds of thousands"). Published as an article about the study of substitutes. Modestly..

In the next few days there will be a series of articles on the development of the revolutionary policy of France (Napoleon) into an aggressive one. Analogy: Germany in 1939, the struggle against Versailles, the restoration of the country, the escalation of the war into an aggressive one.

## *2 June*

The concentration of troops. Preparation of relevant literature. In parts - anti-fascist films - "Mamlock", "Oppenheim", etc. New features are felt

tiya.

## *21st of June*

I, weighing the information, think: maybe, in view of Germany's refusal to consult, etc., in the spring we began a "quiet" pressure on Germany. <...> Our pressure hinders Germany's ability to act in the West. Here it is, the Russian front - only in potential!

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Vishnevsky's diaries alone would be enough to remove all doubts about the correctness of Viktor Suvorov. But it is unlikely that victory in scientific disputes will help him improve his reputation as a traitor in the eyes of his compatriots in the foreseeable future.

The times when people who in Soviet times openly opposed the Soviet regime will begin to enjoy universal respect in Russia, such as in

Germany is used, for example, by the participants in the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944 - such times will not come soon. Suvorov himself explains this by saying that "the umbilical cord linking today's Russia with the former regime—the communist umbilical cord—has not been cut off... And as long as this blood and spiritual connection persists, decay will continue."

Chekists, who fulfilled their professional duty to the end and did not change their oath, are perceived in Russia even many years after the collapse of the USSR as heroes. Those who helped this collapse, having changed the oath given to the Soviet regime, are still traitors.

It is easy to see the paradoxical nature of this situation by comparing the fate and reputation of Viktor Suvorov with the fate and reputation of his senior colleague in Soviet intelligence, Colonel Arthur Adams.

Before becoming a scout, Arthur Adams was an engineer. Successful and high-ranking. He was born in 1885 in Sweden in the family of a shipbuilding engineer. In 1890, the Adamses moved to Russia. Young Adams studied at the school at the Mining Classes of the Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt, took part in strikes, was exiled, and fled. In 1906 he left Russia. Lived in Germany, Italy, Egypt, Argentina. Studied at the University of Toronto in Canada. In 1913 he moved to the USA and worked as an engineer in various companies. In 1926 he was drafted into the American army and rose to the rank of major.

Then a fracture occurs. After retiring from the army, Adams began working in an unofficial trade mission of the RSFSR, and in 1920 he left for Russia. He quickly makes a career. In 1921, he was the manager of the AMO automobile plant. Then other high posts in industry, frequent business trips abroad. In 1934, Adams was assistant chief of the General Directorate of the Aviation Industry. And a new turning point - he is being transferred to military intelligence. Adams goes illegal in 1935

GRU resident in the United States under the nickname Achilles. He was engaged in military-industrial espionage. He received from the agents he recruited valuable information about the American radio engineering industry, about the development of chemical warfare agents.

In 1938, Adams, like many other intelligence officers, was recalled to Moscow, accused of having links with enemies of the people, fired from intelligence, but for some reason they were not repressed. However, in 1939 he was again returned to intelligence and again sent to the USA, where he continues his former activities. Adams heads the technical laboratory and creates a network of agents from his colleagues, friends and acquaintances who supply him with secret military-technical information. In 1944, he succeeded in obtaining very important data on the development of atomic weapons by the Americans. The section head of the closed research institute handed Adams several thousand pages of documentation and samples of uranium, beryllium, and heavy water. Eventually the FBI began following Adams, but failed to unmask him. In 1946, he was transported to Moscow with difficulty, and upon his return he was promoted to the rank of engineer-colonel. Adams died in 1969.

Approximately this is how the life story of the intelligence officer Arthur Adams is presented in an apologetic article by the writer Vladimir Lot ("Top Secret", No.

11, 2001). Very interesting story. But the concluding phrase of the article is especially interesting: "In 1999, by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Artur Arturovich Adams was awarded the title of Hero of Russia."

Stop! Arthur Adams certainly deserved the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But the Hero of Russia? Here a whole tangle of moral, historical and psychological problems is immediately tied up. Adams began his intelligence career in 1934. This is the peak of the global turning point that occurred in the USSR. Stalin completed the restructuring of the state and party apparatus and the economic system of the state. Destroyed private agriculture, turned the Gulag into the largest

manufacturing concern and began building a military industry on an incredible scale. The goal—preparation for a world war—was obvious both to the West and to those who took a leading part in this construction. Certainly Adams. He worked for a monstrous, inhuman regime in order to supply him with weapons. For what reasons - more on that later. But he couldn't be fooled. In 1939, when Adams came to America for the second time, the USSR started a war together with Germany against the Western world. In 1944, when Adams was mining atomic secrets, it was also quite obvious why Stalin needed an atomic bomb. Adams himself wrote to his leadership in Moscow: "...the complete destruction of Japan is planned, but there is no guarantee that our allies will not try to influence us when they have such weapons at their disposal." Adams knew America and knew the USSR. He understood that "to influence" does not mean to attack, but to resist potential aggression. The information received by Adams served, apparently, as one of the most important impulses that forced Stalin to turn his attention to atomic weapons and begin their development. It is even difficult to imagine what would have happened to the world if the USSR had received the atomic bomb a little earlier than the Americans, or even at the same time. And if Adams had been lucky with an agent not in 1944, but in 1942? From the point of view of Western morality, Adams was engaged in deeply criminal activities. Post-Soviet Russia solemnly announced through the mouths of its presidents that it was breaking with past values and moving into the bosom of Western democratic civilization. The belated awarding of people like Adams with the highest state awards today looks as wild as if the FRG would bestow the highest state order posthumously for services to the fatherland, say, Otto Skorzeny. A hero, of course, is always a hero. And he deserves a reward, even if, from the point of view of his enemies, he is also a criminal. But they should be rewarded. It looks like they are rewarding. Then it turns out that

declarations of reconsideration and new democratic values are a lie, a smoke screen. For those who awarded Adams, the values remained the same.

The other side of this situation is psychological. People like Adams - with a European education, high professional qualifications and knowledge of the world - are a rarity in the Soviet system. What made him? The revolutionary passions of youth are no explanation. They could turn him away from both the Leninist and Stalinist state systems rather than attract him to them. A more serious motive is professional ambition. In 1920, the thirty-five-year-old retired major had a brilliant career in Moscow. Such people were lured by Soviet representatives all over the world to Soviet Russia, which had lost almost all of its intelligentsia. It was difficult then to assume that in 10-12 years no one in Russia would be able to manage his life and even his profession.

It is easy to understand why in 1934 the Deputy Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR (as his position was later called) agreed to become a resident in America, it is easy. I would try to disagree. But why didn't he run away? His agents, American left-wing intellectuals, could have been romantics, disinterestedly supplying the USSR with military secrets and naively believing that by doing so they were fighting for peace. But he knew the system from the inside. The answer can be found in the same article. It turns out that Adams had a wife, an American Dorothea Keene. They married in Berlin in 1930. And all the years of his espionage activities, his wife lived in Moscow. They met again only in 1946. Here is the explanation. The wife was a hostage. Common Soviet practice.

A metamorphosis takes place. You peer into the text of an article filled with on-duty admiration, and through the image of a wonderful patriot, a hero, risking his life to get enemy secrets of great importance for his beloved country, the image of an unfortunate person emerges, out of fear for the life of his loved ones, engaged in dirty work.

business. And the point is not that he was a scout, but for whom and for what he worked.

In general, a change in moral guidelines in society - a much more difficult process than regime change. Even knowing how everything really happened, it is difficult to reconcile this knowledge with the usual stereotype.

All schoolchildren of the 60s and 70s remember who Nikolai Kuznetsov is, he is Lieutenant Paul Silbert. Everyone read the book "It was near Rivne." A Soviet intelligence agent in German uniform acted fearlessly in the territory occupied by the Germans. You committed the attack. Fantastically bold, right on the street he shot several high German officers. He died in battle, making his way to his own through the front line. Undoubted hero.

In the late 1990s, the memoirs of the former chief Kuznetsov, head of the NKVD sabotage department, General Pavel Sudoplatov, were published. Su surcharges also writes about Kuznetsov. It turned out that everything is right. Indeed, a hero. A man of desperate courage. But it turned out that not the whole truth. Kuznetsov was recruited by the NKVD in the mid-1930s. He was, apparently, a man with unconditional acting data. In Moscow, before the war, he worked with the intelligentsia, pretending to be a representative of the golden youth, the then "playboy". He had a car (a rarity then) and moved in artistic, acting, ballet and diplomatic circles. Informed the NKVD about what was happening there. In short, planted artistic intelligence

genius.

Then the war began, and he became a fearless scout. Or maybe it never stopped being. It is not at all easy to combine the image of an anti-fascist hero with the image of a provocateur-informer. But Kuznetsov was, presumably, a whole man. At his age and in his time, the Soviet youth was almost all intact. I can hardly imagine what was going on then in the minds of Nikolai Kuznetsov and Arthur Adams. But just as badly imagine what is going on in th



the authors of articles glorifying Soviet heroes as Heroes of Russia. And those who posthumously award such people with Russian and not Soviet orders. To be able to imagine this is to be able to understand history.

In modern Russia, Arthur Adams and Nikolai Kuznetsov are still national heroes, and Viktor Suvorov is a national traitor.

So much the worse for Russia.

## *Irina Pavlova\**

### SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH ABOUT THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Nobody's word, comrades,  
can't believe...

*Stalin*

In Soviet historiography for many decades there were provisions that the October Revolution became "the great beginning of the world proletarian revolution; it showed all the peoples of the world the path to socialism." However, as the authors of the six-volume "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" convinced readers, the party "saw its mission not in "pushing", not in "exporting the revolution", but in convincing the peoples of the advantages of the socialist system by practical example" 1.

In reality, everything was done exactly the opposite. True, in the first months and even years after the October Revolution, the leaders of the Bolshevik Party did not hide not only their faith in the world revolution, but also their actions aimed at "pushing" it. Not one V.I. Lenin lived in the hope that "as soon as we are strong enough to

defeat all capitalism, we will immediately seize it by the collar." Researcher L.A. Kogan summarized the sayings and suggestions of other famous figures

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parties of that time on this score: L.D. Trotsky in 1919 proposed to form a powerful cavalry corps for a throw to India, since, in his opinion, the path to the West ran through Afghanistan, Bengal and Punjab. N.I. Podvoisky owns the statement that "one must be transformed into another so that it is impossible to say where the war ends and the revolution begins." Proposing to create the General Staff of the III International, M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote in July 1920: "The war can be ended only with the conquest of all

peaceful dictatorship of the proletariat. Other maxims are also known: K.B. Radek: "We have always been for a revolutionary war ... a bayonet is a very essential thing, necessary for the introduction of communism"; F.E. Dzerzhinsky: "We are going to conquer the whole world, despite all the sacrifices that we will still have to bear"; N.I. Bukharin: "While waging war, the workers' state seeks to expand and strengthen the economic basis on which it arose, that is, socialist relations of production (hence, by the way, the fundamental admissibility of even an offensive revolutionary socialist war is clear)"; "Civil war is a minus, but it gives the possibility of restructuring on new principles." In 1919, a book by G. Borisov (the pseudonym of the economist and philosopher I.A. Davydov) was published in Petrograd under the title "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat", in which there was a frank confession: "No, not the world, but the sword does not set the dictatorship of the proletariat in the world »2.

After the defeat near Warsaw in 1920, Lenin became more cautious about his plans for the future Sovietization of the West. At present, a previously unknown fragment of his speech at the IX Party Conference on September 22, 1920, has been published, where he, in particular, said: "I ask you to write down less: this should not get into print ..."3 In this speech, How

already noted in the literature, reflected Leninist plans of the Bolshevik expansion to the West, including the deployment of the Red Army along the German and Czechoslovak

the Vac border, as well as his obsession with secrecy<sup>4</sup>.

Speaking about the plans for the Sovietization of Poland, Lenin lifted the veil on how the decision to "use military forces" was made: "We did not formulate this in an official resolution written down in the minutes of the Central Committee and representing the law for the party until the new congress. **But among ourselves we said** that we should feel with our bayonets whether the social revolution of the proletariat in Poland is ripe? (highlighted by me. - *I.P.*). This was done in secret both from their own party and from the Comintern. "When the Congress of the Comintern was in Moscow in July," Lenin continued, "it was at the time when we were deciding this question in the Central Committee. We could not raise this question at the congress of the Comintern, because this congress had to take place openly.

After the defeat near Warsaw, the intentions of the party leadership remained the same. Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee I.N. Smirnov, at the III Siberian Conference of the RCP(b) in February 1921, spoke about his conversation with Lenin, which he had after it turned out that 40,000 volunteers who had gathered in Siberia for a trip to the Polish front turned out to be unclaimed: "...Tell the countryside that we still have to smash capitalist Europe and that these 40,000 must play a decisive role. And the Russian Soviet rifle will appear in Germany.

As for the principles of conspiracy in foreign politics, they were not only fixed, but also brought to their logical conclusion by Stalin. After the first unsuccessful experiments, the hopes for a world revolution did not disappear and the actions to "push" it did not stop, but were deeply conspiratorial. As a result, the truth about them was literally bricked up. Who could really dare to doubt Stalin's assertion when, in 1936, in response to the question of the American journalist Roy Howard, "Has the Soviet Union abandoned its plans and intentions to make a world revolution?" replied: "We have **no** such plans and intentions

**where** it was not"7 (emphasis mine. — *I.P.*). This answer is extremely characteristic of Stalin's personality. For those who did not know that such plans existed, Stalin's answer meant "did not leave", while those who asked at random received the corresponding answer. There is not even a double, but an excessive negation, equal to self-disclosure and worthy of a common anecdote! At the same time this answer can be seen as refined disorientation of the enemy for internal use and expression of non-participation in the policy in which the West suspected the Soviet Union - for external use. In fact, it contained a gross mockery of everyone to whom this answer is

appointed.

Only with the beginning of radical political changes in the Soviet Union from the end of the 80s. the truth began to gradually come out, but this process turned out to be much more complicated than it seemed then.

The "key" that opens the way to the truth about Stalin's plans to expand the "front of socialism" is the truth about the eve of the war.

Immediately after the war, on the instructions of Stalin, a special body was created, which was called differently in different documents: "government commission for the Nuremberg trials", "government commission for the organization of the Court in Nuremberg", "commission for the leadership of the Nuremberg trials". Stalin placed Vyshinsky at the head of this top-secret commission with special functions. The USSR Prosecutor Gorshenin, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR Golyakov, People's Commissar of Justice of the USSR Rychkov and three closest associates of Beria, his deputies Abakumov, Kobulov, Merkulov were appointed members of the commission. The main goal of the commission was to under no circumstances allow a public discussion of any aspects of Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941, primarily the very fact of the existence, and even more so the content of the so-called secret protocols, until

completing the non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939) and the Friendship Treaty (September 28, 1939). In order to ensure the effectiveness of the instructions of the secret commission during the investigation, a special investigative team was sent to Nuremberg, headed by one of the most ferocious executioners of Beria, Colonel M.T. Likhachev<sup>8</sup>. Stalin was afraid in the public opinion of Europe and America to be in Nuremberg on the same bench with Nazi war criminals. And he had good reason for such fears. Therefore, Stalin did everything to prevent the Nuremberg trials from discussing the role of the USSR in unleashing World War II. He succeeded - the position of the winner allowed him to dictate conditions.

On November 26, 1945, Vyshinsky's commission decided to "approve... a list of issues that are unacceptable for discussion in court"<sup>9</sup>. Separate attempts by the defendants to point out the real role of the USSR in the preparations for the Second World War did not change the general situation. Thus, Ribbentrop stated in his last speech: "When I arrived in Moscow in 1939 to see Marshal Stalin, he discussed with me not the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Briand-Kellogg pact, but made it clear that if he did not will receive half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania, with the port of Libava, then I can immediately fly back. The conduct of war, apparently, was not considered there in 1939 a crime against peace ... "

This paragraph was not included in the Russian edition of the materials of the Nuremberg Trials<sup>10</sup>. The truth about the eve of the war was ordered to be forgotten. Forget in the truest sense of the word - Stalin forbade writing diaries and memoirs about the war. Violation of the ban could cost lives. As for the direct accomplices of Stalin, oblivion was in their own interests. The clearest evidence of this is the conversation between F. Chuev and Molotov: "In the West they persistently write that in 1939 a secret agreement was signed along with the treaty...

- None.
- Did not have?
- Did not have. No, it's absurd.

"Now we can probably talk about it.

Of course, there are no secrets here. In my opinion, rumors are deliberately spread in order to somehow, so to speak, wet it. No, no, I think it's still very

clean and nothing like such an agreement could

be. I stood very close to this, in fact I was engaged in this matter, I can firmly say that this is, without conditional, an invention"11.

Of course, Molotov "was very close to this," which is undeniably confirmed by his signature under the secret protocols and by the photograph that showed him next to Stalin and Ribbentrop during the signing of these documents. It is indicative that even decades later Molotov turned out to be incapable of historical self-assessment, otherwise his deliberate lie would have been verbalized without the intriguing words "spread rumors", "wet" and the assertion that "it's still very clean here", while it was very dirty, very dirty. All this once again convincingly testifies to the moral characterization of Molotov as a political figure who occupied the position of "second person" in the country at a crucial moment in its history.

The lack of necessary documents (those that remained were deeply hidden in secret archives), the general worldview of military historians, most of whom lived under Stalin and went through the war, brought up by official propaganda, naturally led to the fact that they saw the war at the suggestion of Stalin .

It would not be an exaggeration to say that even during the period of Khrushchev's "thaw" historians did not even allow the thought of the existence of the secret of the eve of the war, which was hidden by Stalin. There was nothing like that at that time in A.M. Nekrich, author of the famous book "1941. 22nd of June". He spoke sharply negatively about the "legend of preventive war", which is "artificially supported by the West German neo-Nazis".

hundred and some reactionary West German publicists and historians.

Any criticism of Stalin's actions that went beyond the then permitted limits provoked an immediate disciplinary reaction. The dialogue that took place during the discussion of the book by A.M. Nekrich in the Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 16, 1966 between the presiding Major General E.A. Boltin and L.P. Petrovsky, who called Stalin a criminal: "Comrade Petrovsky, in this hall, from this rostrum, expressions must be chosen. Are you a communist?

- Yes.

"I have not heard that somewhere in the directive decisions of our party, binding on both of us, it was said that Stalin is a criminal."<sup>13</sup>

After the displacement of N.S. Khrushchev, from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, criticism of Stalin's "personality cult" gradually faded away. During the next two decades, the historiography of the Great Patriotic War lost even what it had achieved after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. It is enough to compare at least the 6-volume History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. (M., 1960-1965) with the 12-volume "History of the Second World War 1939-1945" (M., 1973-1982). This was acknowledged by military historians themselves. "It remains only to regret that," wrote N.G. Pavlen

ko - that time is lost, many participants will witness whether they left us, and the most significant problems of the initial period of the war have to be studied, in fact, anew"<sup>14</sup>.

Mountains of books about the war, accumulated by the beginning of perestroika, were united by the general pro-Stalinist concept of the eve of the war, which consisted of a set of unshakable schemes and stereotypes. Let's open any of these books, for example, "The Great Patriotic War. Questions and Answers" (M., 1985): "The situation ... forced the USSR to go to prison



on August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact with Germany, although before the disruption of the Moscow negotiations by Britain and France, this act was in no way included in the plans of Soviet diplomacy.

... On September 17, the Red Army began the liberator ny campaign in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine.

... November 30, 1939, through no fault of the USSR, broke out with Veto-Finnish war ...

... On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany treacherously, violating the non-aggression pact, suddenly, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union.

Moreover, even at the beginning of perestroika, new knowledge about the eve of the war made its way with difficulty. The elders of Soviet military historiography F. Kovalev and O. Rzheshevsky considered it their duty in 1989 to warn those who expressed "points of view, not enough criticism."

graphically reproducing the well-known theses of the anti-socialist propaganda like the stereotypes about the "direct responsibility" of the USSR for unleashing the war..."<sup>15</sup>.

Perestroika in the historiography on the eve of the war began only with the creation of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on issues of international politics, headed by A.N. Yakovlev. Here are some of the statements made at the meeting of this commission on March 28, 1989, statements militant and helpless at the same time.

Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU V.M. Falin: "... In the near future we will come across a whole avalanche of versions that are completely divorced from real facts, imposing — especially on ignorant people, young people — the conclusion that the Soviet Union was an accomplice to the outbreak of World War II or, at least, contributed to it. that it took such a tragic turn, which we know from history and from our own experience.

... Therefore, it is impossible to be detached from what is happening - and something similar is observed in our country - too. Truth is our ally in the current heated debate. But this truth must be complete. Without fakes and overlaps.

Head of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR D.A. Volkogonov: "... All decisions that were made in 1939, including the August and September treaties, were determined by the defensive strategy of the Soviet Union.

History will in the end justify the fact that the pact was signed on August 23, it will justify it as a forced, albeit extremely dull morally step.

While politically supporting the necessity of signing the treaty of 23 August, we must at the same time condemn the conspiracy, which was contrary to the Leninist principles of renunciation of secret agreements.

Director of the Institute of World History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A.O. Chubaryan: "... We have a common concept related to the responsibility for unleashing the Second World War, which is borne by Hitler's fascism. It does not require revision"<sup>16</sup>

The results of the work of the commission A.N. Yakovlev reported to the II Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. According to his report, the congress adopted a special resolution "On the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939", which became a new guide in covering the eve of the war by Soviet historians: "... The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR agrees with the opinion commission that the non-aggression treaty with Germany was concluded in a critical international situation, in the face of the growing danger of fascist aggression in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia, and had one of the goals to avert the threat of impending war from the USSR.

... The Congress considers that the content of this treaty is not was at odds with the norms of international law and the contractual practice of states adopted for such settlements. However, both at the conclusion of the treaty and in the process of its ratification, the fact was hidden that simultaneously with the treaty, a "secret additional protocol" was signed, which demarcated the "spheres of interest" of the contracting parties.

from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from Finland to Bessarabia.

... The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR condemns the fact signing of the "secret additional protocol" from August 23, 1939 and other secret agreements with Germany. The Congress recognizes the secret protocols as legally untenable and invalid from the moment of their signing..."<sup>17</sup>

Commission A.N. Yakovleva did not go beyond the discussion and evaluation of the treaty as an international legal document. The treaty was not placed in a historical context, and no fundamental conclusions about the consequences of this treaty were made at that time. Yakovlev limited himself to remarking that "Stalin and some people from his entourage could already have had imperial plans that were alien to the principles of social

ism", as well as "illusions, which, apparently, Stalin surrendered after the conclusion of the agreements of 1939. Illusions that did not allow proper use of the received peaceful respite..."<sup>18</sup>.

Moreover, the Yakovlev commission by this time was still did not know that the original secret protocols kept in the archives of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Speaking at the congress, Yakovlev said: "There is an official note in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fixing the transfer in April 1946 of the original secret protocols by one of Molotov's assistants to another: Smirnov - Podtserob. Thus, we had the originals, and then they disappeared ..." <sup>19</sup>

Meanwhile, the original secret protocols were not only found, but also known to the General Secretary of the Central Committee. However, speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies, M.S. Gorbachev assured that "all attempts to find the original of the secret treaty were unsuccessful." Some time after his speech, as V.I. Boldin, "M.S. Gorbachev asked me casually whether I had destroyed the protocol."<sup>20</sup> Fortunately, this did not happen, and the publication of the original secret protocols became another

a serious step on the way of comprehension of the truth. But how difficult was this path!

In the discussions of that time on the question of the political and legal evaluation of the Soviet-German treaty on

non-aggression, opinions were expressed that, concluding

By virtue of this treaty, both states bear the same responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War. However, Soviet historiography rejected such opinions automatically, in fact, without argumentation. Here is the point of view of M.I. Semiryaga, author of the book "Secrets of Stalinist Diplomacy": "The statement about the equal responsibility of the USSR and Germany for the outbreak of the Second World War only because they had "the same totalitarian regime" cannot be considered convincing. The main responsibility for this international crime still lies with the ruling elite of Nazi Germany. The Soviet leadership bears its share of responsibility for the fact that by signing the treaty

about non-aggression with Germany, it created certain conditions that contributed to the unleashing of the war against Hitler.

The position of M.I. Semiryagi is more radical than the position of historians represented by A.S. Orlov. Despite the obvious facts, he was still convinced that "the treaty allowed the USSR to stay out of the military fire that had engulfed Europe since September 1, and the secret protocol limited German expansion to the East to the line of the northern border of Lithuania and the rivers Narew, Vistula, San, made it possible to move the western border of the USSR 250-300 km to the west. The treaty created an opportunity in peace to prepare for the inevitable battle with fascism. Further, the Red Army "entered the borders of Poland ...", and the troops "had the limited task of protecting the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus"22.

Relative peace among Russian military historians was destroyed by the publication in Russian of books by V. Suvorov (V. Rezun), who called into question the fact that in the USSR, no one had ever before

was in doubt. (His book *The Icebreaker* is subtitled *Who Started World War II?*) Through his books, he sought to prove that the main culprit and main instigator of World War II was the Soviet Union. Using a metaphorical turn, he called the day the USSR actually entered the war - August 19, 1939. V. Suvorov managed to figure out that on that day a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee took place, which decided to start secret mobilization. "Many historians," he writes, "think that at first Stalin decided to sign peace with Hitler, and then he decided to prepare a surprise attack on Germany. But the facts revealed and confirmed to me that there were no two different solutions. Signing peace with Germany and finally deciding on the inevitable invasion of Germany is one decision, these are two parts of a single plan. And further: "Therefore, I consider August 19 the boundary of the war, after which, in any case, the Second World War should have taken place. And if Hitler had not started it

On September 1, 1939, Stalin would have to look for another opportunity or even another performer who would push Europe and the whole world into war. This is the essence of my little discovery.

IN. Suvorov did not focus on the year 1939 alone, but considered all the main events up to the start of the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941, linking them into a single logical whole: "The secret mobilization was to end with an attack on Germany and Romania on July 6, 1941 ... Secret mobilization was aimed at preparing aggression. **For the defense of the country**

nothing was done. The secret mobilization was so colossal that it was not possible to hide it. Hitler had only one and last chance - to save himself with a preemptive strike. And on June 22, 1941, Hitler—for two weeks—preempted Stalin.

The publication of Suvorov's books divided historians into two unequal groups. The overwhelming majority are historians with experience and names who, in their writings, "sanctified" the pro-Stalinist concept of the war. working

For many years, under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, they could not accept even that half truth about the war, which became the property of official publicity. This is evidenced by the failed attempt to prepare a new, 10-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people." But even those military historians who (for example, A.N. Mertsalov and L.A. Mertsalova) sharply criticize Stalin and Stalinism for the unpreparedness of the Soviet troops for the outbreak of war, for incompetence and arbitrariness, immorality and cruelty<sup>25</sup>, turned out to be unprepared to calmly discuss the concept of V. Suvorov.

This can only be explained by the fact that the Suvorov the concept not only broke the established historiographical tradition, but also dealt a blow to personal feelings and ideas about the war. Moreover, many military historians, like A.N. Mertsalov, were themselves its participants. This is not just rejection, but also unwillingness to understand. The books of V. Suvorov, in their opinion, do not deserve detailed reviews of military historians, because

that "with the help of" icebreakers "conjuncture is carried out revision of the most important moments of national and world history", casts "a shadow on the real historical facts, which have long and from a scientific point of view irreproachably (! - *I.P.*) established by world historiography" <sup>26</sup>.

As the influence of V. Suvorov's books on the public consciousness spread in Russia, their denial also intensified. From silence, these historians moved on to swearing and implausible accusations. They branded him as "not a historian, not a memoirist, a traitor, an agent of foreign intelligence services." It turns out that his books "are written by different people, rather by groups of people", V. Suvorov's participation "is found only in separate literary devices, jargon, interjections"<sup>27</sup>.

Even such a radical historian as D.A. Volkogonov, who was put in a privileged position by the post-communist authorities and

had access to many secret documents, not with adopted this concept. However, the article in which he stated his position on this issue is significant in its own way. Firstly, by the fact that he recognized the fact guessed by V. Suvorov: on August 19, 1939, a meeting of the Politburo really took place. But, as Volkogonov emphasized, "the military question was only this: "On the postponement of the call to the Red Army of workers for the construction of the Akmolinsk-Kartala railway (according to Skvortsov's telegram)." And that's it. No mention of the Gro

for "and **Etc.**".

Secondly, the article is significant in that it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the mechanism of operation of Stalin's power. Volkogonov, who received the right to print the "special folders" of the Politburo of the pre-war and post-war period, did not understand that the absence in the protocol of the Politburo of August 19, 1939 and in the "special folders" of any information about secret Stalinist plans attacks on Germany, as well as the absence of signatures by Stalin and Zhukov on such, according to Volkogonov, "striking" document as "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15 1941 (and not only on this, but also on other important documents) is not yet an argument, much less a decisive one, in a dispute with V. Suvorov.

Unlike his venerable opponents, V. Suvorov understood, although he did not specifically study, the mechanism of power of the Stalinist regime, the basic principle of Stalin's activity in politics - if possible, do not leave lay documents, leave no traces, surround the truth with "battalions" of lies.

Significant evidence of the Soviet military chiefs about how decisions were made on military issues have already been cited above. Even if people like the Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major General A.M. Vasilevsky, who was directly involved in the development of operational

plans on the eve of the war ("Considerations on the plan of strategic deployment..." were written by him)<sup>29</sup>, it is quite natural to assume that the subordinates knew even less about Stalin's strategic plans, moreover, they were sometimes perplexed about the "illogical" actions of their leadership. Historian V.D. Danilov cited in his article a very characteristic testimony of K.K.

Rokossovsky, who was released from prison on the eve of the war and was appointed commander of the 9th mechanized corps in the Kiev Special Military District: "The orders that followed from the headquarters of the district to the troops to send artillery to the firing ranges located in the border zone, and other instructions that were ridiculous in that situation caused complete confusion.

Judging by the concentration of our aviation on advanced airfields and the location of warehouses of central subordination in the front line, it was like preparing a jump forward, and the disposition of troops and the measures taken by the troops did not correspond to it ... In any case, if any either there was a plan, or it clearly did not correspond to the situation that had developed by the beginning of the war.

Thus, to assert that the Soviet Union did not prepare for a war against Germany in 1941 only on the basis of the absence of an official "decision to start a war on the part of the Soviet political leadership and government, in accordance with which the USSR would be the first to start preparing for war, the first would be to mobilize, concentrate and deploy troops on the most advantageous lines," as Yu.A. Gorkov, at least prematurely. Moreover, in the same article, he reports a very remarkable fact that in the prewar period, the operational plan "was developed in a single copy, and was reported for approval only personally to Stalin and Molotov"<sup>31</sup>.

In Soviet times, historians not only did not have access to secret materials of party and state bodies, but were also brought up on strict adherence to the principles of party membership and a class approach.



This presupposed following the interpretation of events, which was laid down in the sources themselves. In re

As a result, the ideolo

gia and logic of the document. The main difficulty in pre-historiography was to Soviet learn how to reveal the true inheritance meaning of the events, which in their own way reflected the remaining documents of the Soviet era - secret and unclassified. We must pay tribute to V. Suvorov, who showed himself in the book "Icebreaker" as an intelligence historian who managed to reveal the main secret of Soviet military policy and history. He did this, relying mainly on published Soviet sources, which he compared, rethought, cleared of ideological masking and marking.

It is noteworthy that the conclusion about the preparation in 1939 - 1941 active entry of the USSR into the world conflict came and other historians. First of all, the names of J. Zamoyski (Poland) and I. Hoffman (Germany) should be mentioned. The article by J. Zamoyski "Black Hole", September 1939 - June 1941 (On the Policy of the USSR in the Initial Period of the Conflict)" was published in 1994, but prepared much earlier, for an international conference of historians in April 1990. in Moscow<sup>32</sup>. Convinced that the actions of the Soviet Union at that time

period "do not fit into any logical whole",

not knowing many more documents, in subsequent years

published in Russia, the author came to the conclusion that the solutions listed below indicate the preparation pushing the USSR to the offensive.

These are: 1. The appointment of G.K. Zhukov to the post of Chief of the General Staff as the winner at Khalkhin Gol, who showed himself excellently (although not without criticism) during the January staff game. 2. Growing replenishment of units in the western districts, but not yet in the order of mobilization. 3. A huge program of military production and rearmament of the Red Army, the results of which were implemented only in 1942 (taking into account the achievements of German aviation). 4. Movement of five armies (16,

19, 21, 22, 25th) from the depths of the country to the west, but not to the border zones, which is important from an operational point of view. 5. Creation in Ukraine of a strong operational fist of 60 divisions with a tendency to further strengthen it. 6. Reorganization of the four rifle divisions of the Kiev district into mountain divisions (Ukraine is mostly flat, and in front of it is a mountainous direction at the junction of Czechoslovakia, Austria with access to the central, vital regions of Germany - a direction known from the First World War). An airborne corps, an instrument of non-defensive use, was also formed in the Kiev district. 7. Disarmament of fortified areas on the old frontier. 8. The extensive construction of airfields near the western border and the mass delivery of air bombs there, which could mean their preparation for an offensive. 9. The movement of military depots to the west by Stalin's personal decision, which later turned out to be a major mistake, but which is quite understandable and correct in the offensive version of the planned operations. 10. Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941 (in the text of the article on January 5, 1941 - *I.P.*) that the war with Germany is inevitable and we must be ready for it in

1942 and that not only a defensive but also a warning strike is possible. 11. May 6, Stalin becomes the head government, which could mean many things, including and a sharp turn towards concessions to Germany, but above all meant that the USSR was entering a period of major and dangerous decisions - decisions calculated

nyh to success.

J. Zamoyiski also made an important remark about "silent sources", which lack any information about Stalin's strategic plans. In particular, attention is focused on the transparency and significance of the ellipses in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov - "Hitler ... was in a hurry, and not without reason ...". As a result, Zamoyiski formed the conviction that "Stalin, back in the period of Munich, undertook a huge, dangerous, "long-range" game, calculated

nuyu that the USSR, i.e. he will say the decisive word in this conflict..."33.

Historian I. Hoffmann, who worked for many years at the Institute of Military History in Freiburg, moved in the same direction in his research, and came to the conclusion that "Stalin concluded a pact on August 23, 1939, in order to unleash a war in Europe. not in which he himself took part as an aggressor from September 17, 1939... The military and political preparations of the Red Army for an attack on Germany reached their climax in the spring of 1941. "34

Hoffman's article, published in the journal *Otechestvennaya Istoriya*, contains additional evidence of the aggressive intentions of the USSR. First, he cites two very important facts: "The conclusion of our agreement with Germany," the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs informed the ambassador in Japan on July 1, 1940, "was dictated by the desire to start a war in Europe." And a telegram to the Soviet ambassadors in Japan and China on June 14, 1940, said: "We would agree to any agreement to ensure a clash between Japan and the United States."

Secondly, in the interrogations of Soviet officers of war kept in the German archives, he found confirmation of the fact that the actions of the Red Army on the border with Germany before June 22, 1941 were indeed shrouded in mystery, the meaning of which is underestimated.

Mali is not all.

Thirdly, there are additional real evidence of offensive plans from the Soviet side, captured by the Germans. Thus, on June 23, 1941, in the headquarters of the Soviet 3rd Army in Grodno, the former head of the Department of Eastern European History at the University of Mainz, Professor Dr. Gotthold Rode, who at one time was a translator and Sonderführer at the headquarters of the German 3rd Infantry Division, found as he noted in his diary, "a pile of maps of East Prussia, excellently printed on a scale of 1:50,000 ... All of East Prussia is at a glance. Why, for

he wondered, "Did the Red Army need hundreds of maps?" Further, in the building of the headquarters of the Soviet 5th Army in Lutsk, on July 4, 1941, documents were found, among which was the "Plan for the political support of military operations during the offensive." In addition, the Germans were aware of leaflets addressed to German soldiers, found, in particular, by the troops of the 16th German Army on the first day of the war, June 22, 1941, near the town of Shakiai in Lithuania. Thus, according to I. Hoffman, although "Hitler did not have a clear idea of what was really being prepared on the Soviet side ... with his attack on June 22, 1941, he anticipated Stalin's attack"<sup>35</sup>.

It must be said that in the West, too, the point of view about Germany's "preventive" attack on the USSR in 1941 is rejected without discussion by the overwhelming majority of historians. The weekly "Die Zeit" (June 7, 1991) directly called the supporters of this version "belated victims of Nazi propaganda"<sup>36</sup>. One gets the impression that Western historians, especially non-German ones, are most afraid of accusations of sympathies for fascism, of neo-Nazi aspirations. These fears

so great that they outweigh the desire for truth, by which the historian should be guided in his work. That is why they are so aggressive in their criticism of the historians of the so-called revisionist school, to which Suvorov and Hoffman belong primarily. Not long ago, another name was added to this list - the German historian W. Maser published the book "The Broken Word. Hitler, Stalin and the Second World War" (in another translation "Treachery..."), which was subjected to devastating criticism from another German historian, G.A. Jacobsen to the point of stating that "Maser has shown himself in this book to be untenable as a historian." The arguments in his criticism are the same

categorical statements, like those of our opponents this concept: "There are no indications, documents that would indicate that Stalin had political intentions to attack in some way

day against Germany", and in general "there is no evidence that Stalin was going to attack Germany in 1941". In addition, according to G.A. Jacobsen, "The Red Army was just about to modernize its tank troops and aviation"<sup>37</sup>.

Unfortunately, in this matter, not only Russian but also Western historians are guided primarily by ideological motives. Thus, the Israeli historian G. Gorodetsky, the author of books published in 1995 and 1999. in Russian - "The Myth of the Icebreaker" and "Fatal Self-Deceit: Stalin and Germany's attack on the Soviet Union", - proclaiming its goal "transferring the discussion from the road of ideology to the rails of science", sees in the concept of V. Suvorov only "grand hoax", which is beneficial "for those who wanted to weaken the warming of the political climate, and in Germany to rehabilitate the Nazi regime"<sup>38</sup>. This statement most frankly reveals the ideologization of the works of G. Gorodetsky himself. It would be more honest to admit that many Western historians are not yet ready for a serious scientific discussion on these issues in the way that, for example, the American historian R.Ch. Raak in a review of the book by I. Hoffman "Stalin's all-destroying war of 1941-1945"<sup>39</sup>.

Attempts to justify the actions of Stalin in 1939-1941. helpless, naive, and most importantly, go against the logic. Perhaps Stalin would not have wished for himself a better defender than, for example, J. Fleischhauer. Citing the fact of Stalin's more than half a meter (58 cm) signature on the map annexed to the Soviet-German friendship and border treaty of 28 September 1939, she seeks to convince the reader that this is not "an imperialist triumph in the signing of the secret protocol to the pact of 23 August, but rather a kind of detente in connection with the fact that the non-aggression pact has borne fruit. Although there would be no triumph, there would also be no psychological relaxation. Moreover, according to I. Fleischhauer, "the map fixes not the division of Poland in half, but rather the Soviet rejection of pain

part of Eastern Poland as compensation for Lithuania. At that time, Stalin clearly preferred military security to territorial expansion in the West. 40

They even tried to prove that the noun "offensive" in Russian means ... "defense"41.

It is noteworthy that the publications that appeared in Russia in those years on this topic were documentary materials or articles by historians, striving to establish the truth - generally confirmed the concept of the "Icebreaker". The Military Historical Journal (1991, No. 12; 1992, No. 1, 2) carried out a partial publication of variants of plans for the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces, which were developed by the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR before the war (the 1940 plan is the basis for the preparation of the plan of September 18, 1940, the plan of March 11, 1941, and in part the plan of May 15, 1941). Anticipating this publication entitled "Did the USSR prepare a preventive strike?", the editors of the journal formulated their point of view: "In general, they (materials. - I.P.) confirm that the Soviet Union, doing, according to Molotov (emphasis added by me) - I.P.), choosing in favor of an "offensive policy", did not set aggressive goals for himself, did not provoke Germany to a "preventive war"42. However, historians B.N. Petrov43

and especially V.N. Kiselev, from whom the editors even preferred to dissociate themselves with a note ("We do not consider the author's point of view indisputable"), came to different conclusions. According to Kiselev, "both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were preparing for the offensive. We did not plan a strategic defense, and this is generally recognized. Only the covering troops were to defend in order to ensure the deployment of the main forces for the offensive. Judging by the timing of the concentration of reserves of the border military districts, the armies of the reserve of the High Command and the deployment of front command posts, the offensive of the Soviet troops to defeat

an aggressor preparing an invasion could not begin until July 1941..."<sup>44</sup>.

Colonel General Yu.A. Gorkov was one of the first in Russia to publish "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941, which dealt another blow to the previous Soviet historiography of the war, which categorically denied the fact possible elaboration by the General Staff of the Red Army of a plan of attack on Germany. But Gorkov himself does not agree with the conclusion that the Red Army is preparing for an offensive. Moreover, he sees in the strengthening of the South-West direction not a strategic plan, but a miscalculation. In his opinion, "the concept of the operational plan for the war did not reflect an offensive, but rather an umbrella doctrine. According to the meaning of the umbrella doctrine, the covering troops should be tasked with covering the deployment of their troops with a strong defense, identifying the composition of the advancing enemy troops, determining the direction of the main and other strikes in order to clarify the tasks for the main forces of their troops.

Meanwhile, it was an unbiased study of the available documents on the eve of the war that led to the appearance of articles by V.D. Danilova and M.I. Meltyukhov<sup>46</sup>. The main conclusion that Danilov came to was the recognition: "They were preparing to start the war with a crushing offensive, but they missed many questions of organizing a reliable defense of the country. It is these "mistakes" and "miscalculations" that explain the major failures of our troops at the beginning of the war.

As for Meltyukhov's article, the decision to publish it was made at a special meeting of the editorial board of the journal *Otechestvennaya Istoriya*, which also showed a sharp rejection of the concept of preparing the USSR for an attack on Germany on the part of historians Yu.A. Polyakova, V.P. Dmitrenko, V.I. Bovykina, V.A. Fedorova and others<sup>47</sup>. Polyakov, despite the avalanche of obvious facts, refused to recognize the actions of the USSR to annex the Baltic states as aggression,

Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Bessarabia and accused Meltyukhov of tendentiousness. Dmitrenko was convinced that "it is simply indecent to discuss Suvorov's book in a scientific journal."

Nevertheless, the article was accepted for publication. Deputy editor-in-chief M.A. Rakhma Tullin rightly assessed it as one of the first attempts at an objective evaluation of V. Suvorov's books. Meltyukhov not only substantiated the fact that the USSR was preparing an attack on Germany, but also pointed out that the plan for the war with Germany was approved on October 14

1940 and its further clarification in the documents dated March 11 and May 15, 1941, in fact, did not change anything. "The most important thing," he emphasized, "both in Germany and in the USSR, these plans did not remain on paper, but began to be implemented. Comparative analysis of the preparation of the parties for war is another direction for further research on the eve of the war. But even based on the well-known

Today materials can be argued that this

The process proceeded in parallel and from the beginning of 1941 entered the final stage both in Germany and in the USSR, which, by the way, once again confirms the inevitability of the outbreak of war precisely in 1941, no matter who initiated it"<sup>48</sup>.

As for the date of a possible Soviet offensive, according to Meltyukhov, "no offensive actions of the Red Army against Germany before July 15, 1941 were impossible"<sup>49</sup>. Danilov, on the contrary, believes that the latest date for readiness was July 2, 1941.<sup>50</sup> Somewhat later, he gave a different date - "approximately after July 10, 1941." <sup>51</sup>

Then Meltyukhov touched on the version of Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR. He cited the definition of preventive action given by the German historian A. Hilgruber. Preventive warfare is "military action taken to preempt the actions of an enemy who is ready to attack or has already begun one, by his own offensive." This requires, first of all, to know about the intentions of the enemy. According to Meltyukhov, neither Germany nor the USSR



counted on the enemy's offensive, which means that the thesis of preventive actions is inapplicable in this case. Moreover, he believes that "the version of a preventive war has nothing to do with historical science at all, but is a purely propaganda thesis to justify one's own actions"<sup>52</sup>.

The issue of preventive actions, in my opinion, is more complicated than Meltyukhov interprets it, and is not just propaganda. Hitler really did not have a clear idea of what was being prepared with the Soviet

parties - we will refer to the authoritative opinion

I. Hoffman. He had no idea of the scope of this preparation and did not know the date of the alleged attack. The Germans knew practically nothing about the systematic creation of tank formations in the USSR for the purpose of conducting offensive operations, so at the beginning of the war it came as a complete surprise to them.

clash with numerous armored divisions

mi, which they suddenly came to. But Hitler had a certain understanding of the offensive military doctrine of the USSR and of Stalin's political intentions. From G. Hilger, adviser to the German embassy in Moscow, he knew about Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, in which it was directly said about the war with Germany in the near future<sup>53</sup>.

From a legal point of view, the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, of course, is aggression. Hitler's actions could be qualified as preventive if he, having defeated the enemy's army on the border, would not rush further into the interior of the country, capturing more and more territories of the USSR. Since that time, military actions on the part of Germany are unambiguously aggression, and on the part of the USSR - a war of liberation, the War of the Patriotic War. However, objectively, Hitler's attack on the USSR was preemptive, because it prevented a much more massive offensive by the Red Army.

At the same time, it was recognized that the official Soviet historians, trying to substantiate the thesis about the military technical superiority of the Wehrmacht at the time of the attack on the USSR, falsified the available facts. They cited, for example, the number of all German tanks and aircraft available on the Eastern Front, and from the USSR side only the number of the latest models. This is not even a falsification, but a direct forgery. As a result, the conviction of the absolute superiority of the Wehrmacht troops was firmly established not only in Soviet historiography, but also in everyday consciousness. Now even the former editor-in-chief of the "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people" V.A. Zolotarev acknowledged that by the beginning of the war, "only in terms of tanks and aircraft, we outnumbered the armed forces of Germany, Japan, Italy, Romania and Finland, taken together, almost twice"<sup>54</sup>.

At the same time, official historiography confirmed that negotiations with England and France in 1939 reached a dead end not only through the fault of these two countries, but also through the fault of the USSR: "No one has proven that the possibilities of negotiations between the USSR and England and France were exhausted, that without the consent of the Polish government to let the troops of the Red Army through the territory of Poland, a military convention with these states was excluded ... although the only way to prevent a war was to conclude a military and political alliance with England and France as soon as possible"<sup>55</sup>. At the same time, it was noted in the Russian literature that "there is still no comprehensive documentary picture that would reflect with exhaustive reliability the position of the Soviet leadership in relation to the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with London and Paris, would highlight the underlying, and not external, causes of the breakdown. these negotiations and the reorientation of Moscow towards an agreement with Berlin"<sup>56</sup>.

And in the December 1994 issue of the *Novy Mir* magazine, a publication of Stalin's speech appeared, with which

he spoke on the day of the meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939. T.S. Bushuyeva, who found the text of this speech in the secret trophy funds of the former Special Archive of the USSR, assessed it as "an unquestionably historical document that so openly exposed the aggressiveness of the policy of the USSR." In her opinion, it was this speech that "formed the basis of the position of the Soviet side when it signed secret protocols with Nazi Germany on the division of Europe"<sup>57</sup>.

A recording of Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on August 19, 1939 was published earlier in the West. Almost immediately, this speech was reported by the French agency Gavass, whose publication Stalin called "a lie" in an interview with the Pravda newspaper on November 30, 1939. Some Western historians also knew about Stalin's speech. The West German historian E. Jeckel even published the recording of Stalin's speech he had found in one of the journals of the FRG in 1958.<sup>58</sup> . The reaction of Soviet military historians to this publication can be found in the second volume of the History of the Second World War: "The falsification is very crude. Suffice it to say that Stalin is credited with such turns of speech and address that he never used. In addition, on this Saturday, August 19, 1939, there was no meeting of the Politburo at all"<sup>59</sup>. Even such a pro-Stalinist Western historian as J. Fleischhauer<sup>60</sup> considers this speech a falsification.

In 1995, Russia solemnly celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany and the end of World War II. This anniversary year was the year of a huge number of publications on the topic, demonstrating not only the level of freedom that Russian historians have achieved, but also the difficulty with which the truth about the eve of the war breaks through<sup>61</sup>.

Soviet history is replete with secret crimes of power, but of all its secrets, the preparations for a military offensive against Europe in 1941 were especially dark and guarded. This truth has so far been accepted by a small part of Russian historians.

As an example of the clash of directly opposite points of view, the published unplanned discussion "Did Stalin prepare for a offensive war against Hitler?" (M.: AIRO - XX, 1995). Along with the articles by A.V. Afanasiev, S. Grigorieva, M.G. Nikolaev, S.P. Isaikin, A.N. and L.A. Mertsalovs, the collection presents an alternative view of the events on the eve of the war - B.N. Petrova, V.N. Kiseleva, V.D. Danilova, M.I. Meltyukhov, V.A. Nevezhina. At the same time, the supporters of the pro-Stalinist concept, faced with a number of obvious facts, were forced to at least admit that "the problem of the relationship between military doctrine and technical policy in the USSR has always been a white spot for society ...", that "compared to In the West, we have published a negligible number of books devoted to this topic"<sup>62</sup>.

The most radical conclusions were contained in the article by M. Nikitin, who, not by chance, hid under a pseudonym (albeit a very transparent one). Based on the ideological documents of May-June 1941, the author came to the conclusion that "the main goal of the USSR was to expand the "front of socialism" to the maximum possible territory, ideally to the whole of Europe. According to Moscow, the situation was conducive to the implementation of this task. The occupation by Germany of most of the continent, a protracted, futile war, the growing discontent of the population of the occupied countries, the dispersal of Wehrmacht forces on different fronts, the close Japanese-American conflict - all this gave the Soviet leadership a unique chance to defeat Germany with a sudden blow and "liberate" Europe from "decaying capitalism". All the activities of the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941 were devoted to this goal.

Thus, the author believes, the intentions of the Soviet leadership in May-June 1941 established based on historical documents, significant but differ from those presented to us by domestic historiography. Therefore, all

so not a very harmonious concept of the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War, since it does not correspond to known facts and documents. Therefore, already now the main task of Russian science is to create a new concept of the history of the Soviet period in general and the events of 1939-1941. in particular"63.

However, the subsequent development of the historiographical situation showed how far Russian historical science is from recognizing this conclusion. In 1995, conferences were held in Russia, including those specially dedicated to the eve of the war. At an international conference in Moscow organized by the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences jointly with the Cummings Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies at Tel Aviv University, "the overwhelming majority—practically all—of the speakers refuted the version of Suvorov and other authors, questioning their very method of approach to the analysis of events. The participants in the scientific seminar in Novosibirsk, organized by the local society "Memorial", on the contrary, spoke in favor of clearing history of ideological camouflage. One of the participants of the seminar — V.L. Doroshenko made an analysis of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, which convincingly proved that the text of this speech, "with all possible distortions, goes back to Stalin and should be accepted as one of the fundamental documents on the history of the Second World War"65.

Of the foreign authors in the anniversary year, Russian historical journals gave preference to those who spoke with a pro-Stalinist concept66.

In this context, two introductory articles deserve special attention: director of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.O. Chubaryan and Director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.N. Sakharov, who, according to the tradition dating back to Soviet times, determined the possible limits of the historical search, but objectively outlined the difficulties that still need to be overcome on the way to the truth. The main conclusion of Chubaryan's article was that "Stalin

in those anxious months he was afraid even to think of a German attack and the outbreak of war. However, the new factual material about the eve of the war, already introduced into scientific circulation, could not but determine the contradictory nature of the article. On the one hand, noting the absence of a discussion of the most important issues of foreign and domestic policy in the Politburo protocols, the author agrees that "many issues were not discussed at the Politburo: decisions on them, apparently, were made at meetings in a narrow format or by Stalin alone. ", and on the other hand, directly referring to the "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941, reiterates that "there is no evidence that this document discussed anywhere, just as there is no definite data on Stalin's reaction to it. In addition, one of the main provisions of Soviet historiography, which has been refuted more than once in recent times, is repeated. In his opinion, "the USSR did not have the forces and capabilities to start a war with Germany"68. However, in the same issue of the journal, G.A. Kumanev admitted that "by the beginning of the war, the defense industry of the USSR as a whole for the first time began to surpass in quantity, and in certain areas of military production and in quality, the indicators of fascist Germany"69.

Article by A.N. Sakharov "War and Soviet Diplomacy: 1939-1945" to a greater extent met the requirements of the time and took into account the results of historiography achieved in recent years. Sakharov officially recognized the still existing desire to "create and strengthen state-ideological myths, anathematize those who are trying to penetrate or at least approximately find out the true meaning of the events that took place in the late 30s and first half of the 40s, to keep over them veil of state secrets, which is completely unacceptable from the point of view of a historian"70. Further, Sakharov admitted the fact of Stalin's speech at the meeting of the Politburo on August 19

1939, quoting an excerpt from it and referring (albeit dully!) to the December 1994 issue of the Novy Mir magazine. The most important fact was also the confirmation of A.N. Sakharov, in contrast to A.O. Chubaryan, the thesis that "according to all objective data, by the middle of 1941, the preponderance of forces in almost all respects was on the side of the Soviet Union"<sup>71</sup>.

However, Sakharov's general objectivist approach to assessing Soviet diplomacy in 1939-1941 raises serious objections: "It was a pragmatic, globalist diplomacy based on the principles of continuity with the policies of old Russia and, moreover, accompanied by certain revolutionary ideological calculations of the Bolshevik leadership. To defend and justify it, as Soviet historiography has done for many years, or to condemn and denounce it, as, say, V. Suvorov does in his books, is completely pointless. Morality has nothing to do with it. In politics there are only results, victories or defeats. Such was the Soviet policy and diplomacy of those years"<sup>72</sup>.

Avoid moral assessment of the actions of the Stalinist power is impossible, and these attempts are always subject to fight the real basis, and, as a rule, such an objectivist approach leads to the justification of the actions of the authorities. For Sakharov, it was determined, firstly, by the fact that Soviet diplomacy in 1939-1941. was considered by him in isolation from the inherently provocative Stalinist diplomacy of the previous period, and secondly, he, like many other modern authors, did not escape the influence of the "charm" of the Stalinist great power. Only in view of these circumstances can one perceive the author's final conclusion without internal protest: "... the Soviet leadership acted quite in the spirit of the times, resolutely, on a large scale, and proactively. And the main miscalculation of Stalin and his guilt before the Fatherland

concluded at this stage and under those conditions not in that the country did not properly prepare for defense (it did not prepare for it), but that the council

The leadership, both political and military, failed to accurately determine the moment when the desire to delay the war until its offensive forces were in full readiness was no longer possible, and it did not take urgent measures to mobilize the country and the army in a state of maximum combat readiness. A preemptive strike would have saved our Fatherland millions of lives and, possibly, would have led much earlier to the same political results that the country, ruined, hungry, cold, having lost the color of the nation, came in 1945, hoisting the banner of Victory over the Reichst

hom.

And the fact that such a blow was not delivered, that the offensive doctrine, carefully worked out at the General Staff of the Red Army and began to be vigorously implemented in May-June 1941, was not implemented.

vana is perhaps one of the main miscalculations of Stalin"73.

A certain result of the historiography of the topic was published in 1996 by the Russian State University for the Humanities, edited by Yu.N. Afanasiev's book "Another War: 1939-1945", which brought together modern authors known for their new approaches to the study of not only the eve, but the entire period of the Great Patriotic War. This book mainly republishes articles by V.D. Danilova, M.I. Melyukhova, V.A. Nevezhina, Yu.A. Gorkova, A.A. Pechenkin and others.

However, in the same year, against the background of the growing wave of apologetic literature about Stalin, a retreat from what had been achieved in covering the eve of the war became noticeable. The illustration for Yu.A. Gorkov and Yu.N. Semin "The end of the global lie. (The operational plans of the western border military districts of 1941 testify that the USSR was not preparing for an attack on Germany)"74. This is a poster from the time of the war called "The broom of the Red Army will sweep the evil spirits to the ground!". Among this "evil spirits" is the book by V. Suvorov "Icebreaker".

Retreat signs are actually negated



review by A.F. Vasilyev on the book "Another War: 1939-1945", published in 1997 in the journal "Questions of History" (No. 7), and new publications by G. Gorodetsky. In response to the reprinting of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 by the German weekly Die Welt (July 12, 1996), Gorodetsky once again called this speech a falsification. In complete contradiction to today's known historical facts, he continues to insist that in the days leading up to the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, Stalin "more than ever adhered to his traditional defensive policy", that he "did not put forward any territorial claims, but only wanted mutual German-Soviet guarantees of inviolability

sky

Baltic

countries"<sup>75</sup>.

The book by V.Ya. Sipols, Diplomatic Secrets. Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 1939-1941 "(M., 1997) and a review of it by A.S. Orlov, in which the high assessment of the fact that "the book is permeated with controversy with opportunistic interpretations of the history of 1939-1941, which, in the wake of unbridled criticism of the history of the USSR in the late 80s and early 90s, prevailed in post-Soviet historiography" is very indicative. . The logic of the objections of both Seapols and the reviewer supporting him is also indicative. It turns out that the idea of secret protocols and the division of "spheres of influence" first appeared not in the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, but in the course of secret Anglo-German negotiations and in the British proposals of the USSR on guarantees for the Baltic countries<sup>76</sup>.

In the same year, a book by V.A. Nevezhin "Syndrome of offensive war. Soviet propaganda on the eve of the "holy battles", 1939-1941", which is a systematic result of his previous research. Based on a large amount of factual material, Nevezhin came to the conclusion that "Stalin **did not separate** the national interests of the country from the ultimate strategic goal - the destruction of" capital

leafy environment. By the end of the 1930s, the Bolshevik leadership no longer considered the "world revolution" in itself as the main instrument for achieving this goal. The mission of crushing the hostile "bourgeois world" was to be taken over, according to Stalin's plan, by the Red Army.

Of particular interest is the special chapter of the book "Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941". This is not only Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies, but also his remarks and toasts at a banquet arranged for this occasion. The original authentic text of Stalin's speech is unknown. Available to researchers

there is only a record, and not only speech, but also a hundred Linsky's statements, made by an employee of the People's Commissariat of Defense K. Semenov and identified in the RGASPI. At present, the most complete publication has been prepared by A.A. Pechenkin<sup>78</sup>. So the accusation made in 1994 by historians A.N. and L.A. Mertsalovs against the German historian I. Hoffmann in that he operated on "Stalin's alleged intentions, his speech on May 5, 1941, the content of which, unfortunately, is unknown to science", is devoid of any grounds<sup>79</sup>. Nevezhin himself, completing the chapter on Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, concludes that "for the closest Stalinist entourage, everything said then by the "leader" at the solemn meeting and at the reception (banquet) was not a "hoax" and not "disinformation", but a direct **guide to action**"<sup>80</sup>.

However, the importance of Nevezhin's study is reduced inconsistency and inconsistency of the author's conclusions. It would not be worth paying special attention to this circumstance if it were not evidence of a retreat in historiography. One gets the impression that Nevezhin is afraid of being put on a par with V. Suvorov, to whom he treats with an obvious prejudice, incomprehensible by the fact that Nevezhin himself and other contemporary researchers of the prewar period were prompted to many conclusions by "Icebreaker". without mentioning the positive

On the other side of this book, Nevezhin immediately proceeds to criticize it in the worst historiographical traditions: "... Russian historians have noticed that V. Suvorov (V. B. Rezun) weakly uses the documentary base, abuses conjectures, literature, which in itself requires

careful source analysis, distorts

facts, arbitrarily interprets events. Western scientists also made great claims against the author of the book "Icebreaker". Thus, B. Bonvech attributed it to a quite definite genre of literature, in which one can see the desire to remove the blame from Germany for the attack on the USSR"<sup>81</sup>. Got it in this context and those Western

researchers who agreed with V. Suvorov in their conclusions - G. Gillessen, V. Mather, E. Topich, I. Hoffman.

With a familiar prejudice, Nevezhin also refers to The Other War: 1939-1945. In his opinion, Yu.N. Afanasiev unreasonably tried to put Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 "on a par with Stalin's speeches allegedly delivered at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on August 19, 1939 and at the main Military Council on May 14, 1941." The source on the basis of which the publication of Stalin's speech to the Politburo on August 19, 1939, was made, Nevezhin further adds, "requires critical analysis." Having made this addition, he considered it unnecessary to mention, firstly, that V. Suvorov attracted attention to Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, and secondly, that a recording of the text of this speech was found in the Special Archive (now the Storage Center historical and documentary collections) T.S. Bushueva and published by her in the journal Novy Mir in 1994 (No. 12), thirdly, that the analysis of this speech had already been made by V.L. Doroshenko and published in the materials of a scientific seminar dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, held in Novosibirsk on April 16, 1995, and then republished in the book "Another War: 1939-1945". There is no indication of all this, not only in the main text

book, but also in the attached "List of used materials sources and literature.

As for the phrase used by Nevezhin, "supposedly spoken," the same can be said about Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941. The original text of the speech in both cases has not been found. In addition, the whole structure of Nevezhin falls apart if we take as a basis another recording of Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, which was told by N.G. Lyashchenko. Decades later, he was able to read a transcript of the text of Stalin's speech sent from the Institute of Military History. According to Nevezhin, **there was not a word about the war in the received record.** As an eyewitness, N.G. Lyashchenko concluded that "someone did a fair amount of work on it"<sup>82</sup>. All this was quite in the spirit of Stalin. Not by chance, but he forbade the inclusion of a recording of his speech on May 5, 1941, made by K. Semenov, in the 14th volume of his works that was supposed to be published.

Such a position of Nevezhin could not but cause the inconsistency and vagueness of the conclusions of his book. In the chapter devoted to Stalin's speeches on May 5

1941, he joins the conclusion that "Stalin's calls for the need to restructure Soviet propaganda, sounded at a banquet in the Kremlin on the occasion of the graduation of the military academies of the Red Army, did not yet mean that the USSR was preparing in the summer of 1941 to attack **Ger mania**" (**emphasis mine.** — I.P.)<sup>83</sup>.

The book ends with an afterword by professor of the Ruhr University (Germany) B. Bonwetsch, in which he "explains" Nevezhin's position to the reader. It turns out that the emphasis on the "offensive" does not make the "attack" necessary. The author of the book, according to Bonwetsch, "is sometimes prone to some dramatization, but on the whole he is positively characterized by the fact that, based on the obvious changes in Soviet military propaganda after Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, he does not conclude that the Soviet Union definitely intended to attack Germany..."<sup>84</sup>. Bonwetsch, despite the study of He

Vezhin and other authors, is still convinced that "Stalin scrupulously, and not only for reasons of defense, took into account state interests, taking into account the possibility of a war with Germany. By what time he attributed the beginning of the war, it is impossible to establish, but many data point to 1942.

A section written by M.I. also testifies to a certain "surrender of positions". Meltyukhov, in the book "Soviet society: emergence, development, historical finale. T. 1. From the armed uprising in Petrograd to the second superpower of the world" (Moscow: RGGU, 1997). The section has an eloquent title - "Cries for defense - this is a veil", which is a phrase of Stalin, said by him on October 1, 1938 at a meeting of propagandists from Moscow and Leningrad, then written down by the secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Zhdanov in his block note. Characteristically, Zhdanov singled out this phrase as the key one, revealing Stalin's true ideas about the foreign policy mission of the Soviet state<sup>86</sup>. But, on the other hand, analyzing the articles of the authors, which are collected in the book "Another War: 1939-1945" and actually represent a discussion on the topic "Did Stalin Prepare an Offensive War?" Meltyukhov incorrectly reduced it to the following conclusion: "...the authors dispute not so much the likelihood (or necessity) of a preemptive offensive by the USSR, **but the possibility of its implementation**

**precisely in 1941** (emphasis mine. - *I.P.*). In any case, a comparison of the mentioned articles published in the same book and reflecting at first glance opposing points of view is useful. This helps to better understand the causes and nature of the catastrophe that occurred in 1941 and which was ultimately organically linked to the nature of the Stalinist regime"<sup>87</sup>.

The emphasis on the question of **the possibility** of carrying out an offensive by the USSR in 1941 is nothing more than an attempt to divert the discussion from clarifying Stalin's real actions in preparation for war. The same trend was clearly manifested at the meeting of the Association of Historians

kov of the Second World War in December 1997, at which a special report by M.I. Meltyukhov<sup>88</sup>. On the same flank were the speaker and the historian V.A. Nevezhin, and on the other - the elders of our military historical science V.A. Anfilov, M.A. Gareev, Yu.A. Gorkov, A.S. Orlov, O.A. Rzheshhevsky and others, for whom "history is a political science", and the historian, in their opinion, "should always remember the interests of his state and take care of the sanity of generations entering life"<sup>89</sup>. The discussion that took place demonstrated that the historians of the democratic trend did not succeed in pushing back or in any noticeable way ousting the historians of the pro-communist trend. The latter, having retained their positions in the institutional system of post-Soviet science, have moved to revenge, which has no actual scientific significance. However, it has a serious impact on the process of further degradation of historical science in Russia and will affect the training of a new generation of historians. The processes that are taking place in post-Soviet historical science are connected with the general political processes in the country. Democracy has not succeeded even in history, and it could not succeed in the personal balance of power. If the pro-communist revenge had received at least a rebuff from the world of historical science, a paradoxical situation would have arisen here too: Western historians not only formally contact pro-communist historians, but also support them conceptually<sup>90</sup>. Russian historians of the democratic trend will have to show not only patience, but also courage.

The publication in 1998 by the international foundation "Democracy" of the collection of documents "1941" (in 2 books) does not put an end to the historiography of this topic, as L.A. Bezymensky, whose interview under the significant title "The Truth about June 22" appeared on June 18, 1998 in the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda". The collection contains documents that, until very recently, were not available in such

archives, such as the Archive of the President, the Archive of Foreign Policy, the Archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, etc. For all their undeniable importance, these documents by themselves cannot provide direct answers to the questions posed. This was precisely what was in the interests of Stalin, who personally controlled the cultivating its own archive, which today forms the basis of the Archive of the President. That is why "the documentation that is contained in the personal archives of Stalin and Molotov is an exceptionally important, but **not exhaustive source**" (emphasis mine. - *I.P.*)<sup>91</sup>. Quite indicative is the fundamental fact that emerged during the preparation of the collection that, "in contrast to the meager information about a possible political rapprochement, the materials on the resumption of economic ties between the USSR and Germany are very extensive..."<sup>92</sup>. It was no coincidence that Stalin left in his archives mainly materials on economic cooperation with Germany, as if he knew the psychology of historians educated in the country he created. And indeed, the conclusion followed: "Our assumption about the proactive role of the economic factor still requires additional research, but even now it should

taken into account when evaluating the argument about the "forced" nature of the 1939 agreements ." <sup>93</sup>

Documents on the pre-war policy of the Stalinist regime sti, preserved to our time, represent This is precisely the example of sources that force "to abandon the illusion that the sources are "windows" through which one can look at the historical life of people of other eras in its "primordial" authenticity, one has only to wipe these windows well"<sup>94</sup>. Only then will it be possible to extract a grain of truth from this array of sources left to us when they are compared with others, analyzed, built into the general context of events. Only under this condition will these sources "tell" us what Stalin wanted to hide. Therefore, it is premature

the conclusion of the compilers of the collection of documents "1941" that "the published documents completely refute the speculation about the supposedly preventive (to repel the impending Soviet aggression) attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union"<sup>95</sup>. Moreover, the situation in the pre-war period cannot be interpreted so unambiguously in the categories: "preventive" - "non-preventive (perfidious)" attack.

Whatever the digressions in coverage of the eve of the war, the truth about him has already come out. It made more understandable not only the external but also the internal policy of the Stalinist government, aimed at realizing the main goal. This goal is clearly formulated in the article by Z.S. Belousova and D.G. Najafov, who

can be considered as a stage in the process of withdrawal modern Russian historians from the lies of Soviet historiography: "The proletarian call for a "last and decisive battle" with capitalism became the guiding principle of the policy of the communist rulers of the Soviet state, was the basis of their global strategy. So the idea of destroying the "old world" became an end in itself for the newborn social

leafy system, the meaning and justification of its existence of the vast Eurasian country with aspiration for the "new world"... The belief that the dialectics of historical development would lead to the triumph of communism (and in the first post-October years such a course of world events seemed to the creators of the Russian revolution a near future), rested on the dogmas of class irreconcilability and the inevitability of wars under capitalism, supposedly leading the proletariat right up to the social revolution. Elevated to the rank of official policy, the bet on the victory of world communism determined the global framework of Soviet activity in creating conditions for the widespread establishment of a new social order"<sup>96</sup>.

However, the need for a historical assessment of this "bet on the victory of world communism" marked a new divergence between historians on the eve of the war,



which can be considered significant. On the one hand, this is a democratic position, its essence is stated by D.G. Over zhafovym. "Most likely," he writes, "the Soviet leaders really believed in their revolutionary mission, putting an equal sign between the interests of the socialist Soviet Union and the "fundamental" (in Marxist terminology) interests of the peoples of other countries, intending at the right moment to act as liberator of these peoples from the yoke of capitalism. In practice, the so-called proletarian internationalism of the USSR was reduced to open nationalism (in its Soviet, national-Bolshevik version), while the basic component of the Second World War from the very beginning was the defense of freedom and democracy against the onslaught of the forces of totalitarianism.

On the other hand, this is a great power, anti-Western position, manifested in the book by M.I. Meltyukhov "Stalin's Missed Chance". This position deserves special attention, because its supporter turned out to be the author, who achieved very significant results in the study of existing and in the search for new materials on this topic. Meltyukhov managed to generalize practically all the facts that have become known in recent years.

years, and create a comprehensive study, after which

A return to the old version about the unpreparedness of the Soviet Union for war is no longer possible. The book convincingly proves that by the summer of 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world, armed with a number of unique systems of military equipment, and this army was preparing for the offensive. In 1940-1941. The General Staff of the Red Army developed at least four variants of the operational plan, the content of which indicates the preparation of only offensive operations by the Soviet troops ... This idea is especially clearly expressed in a document dated May 15, 1941. The Red Army was assigned 303 divisions to 247, which, after mobilization, would have numbered over 6 million men, 62,000 guns and mortars, 14,200 tanks and 9,900 aircraft. Germany

and its allies, according to the data given in the book, did not have forces capable of inflicting a guaranteed defeat on the Red Army. The superiority of the latter in the number of divisions was 2.3 times, in personnel 2.1 times, in guns and mortars 2.4 times, in tanks 8.7 times, and in aircraft 4.4 times<sup>98</sup>.

After Meltyukhov's book, it is impossible to talk more about the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, not only on the eve of the war, but also in the preceding years. The book examines in detail the actions of the USSR in Poland in September 1939, its "fight for the Scandinavian bridgehead", "the buildup of the Soviet military presence in the Baltic states", the struggle for the Balkans, the policy aimed at weakening the positions of England and France in Europe.

At the same time, the discussion about the eve of the war cannot be considered completed. Firstly, as Meltyukhov himself rightly notes, many documents on the state of the Red Army, plans for combat operations against Finland, Romania, Turkey, most of the documents on the operational training of troops, in particular, plans for districts, cover plans, are still classified. for the entire interwar period, etc. But first of all, there are no documents that allow "to fully reconstruct the process of making key decisions by the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941." I have

available sources do not yet allow not only to answer

to the question about the reasons for the rejection of June 12 as the initial date for the attack on Germany, but also to substantiate the thesis that "the Red Army should have completed preparations for the offensive no earlier than July 15, 1941" **99** .

Secondly, Meltyukhov's general approach to considering the policy of the USSR in 1939-1941 raises serious objections. Claiming to objectively recreate historical reality, to consider Soviet foreign policy "without any propaganda blinkers, but from the point of view of the real interests, goals and capabilities of the Soviet Union", speaking out against the moralizing traditions in the national historical

literature and stating that in his study

we are not talking about justifying or accusing the Soviet leadership, Meltyukhov turns out to be the spokesman for the great-power and anti-Western position, which is typical today for many representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, including historians. This position determined his research approach - he is completely on the side of Stalin, moreover, he regrets the missed chance "to defeat the most powerful European

Atlantic Ocean, eliminate the age-old western threat

for our country." If Stalin had succeeded in realizing the planned plan, then, according to Meltyukhov, "the Red Army could be in Berlin no later than

1942, which would have allowed Moscow to control a much larger area in Europe than happened in 1945. The defeat of Germany and the Sovietization of Europe allowed Moscow to use its scientific and technical potential, opened the way to a "just social reorganization" of European colonies in Asia and Africa..."<sup>100</sup>.

No one would dispute the right of M.I. Meltyukhov to talk about the possible prospects for the Sovietization of Europe more than half a century ago, just as the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party V.V. Zhirinovskiy and his follower, State Duma deputy A.V. Mitrofanov about the position of modern Russia in relation to the West, if not for one important circumstance. Such an approach is in complete contradiction with the author's claim for an objective study of the problem. This contradiction can be illustrated by the example of his consideration of the most important question of the role of the USSR in unleashing the Second World War. Meltyukhov actually lubricates the initiatory role of the USSR in the preparation of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, misrepresents the position of the USSR on the eve of Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, bypasses the question of evaluating Stalin's speech on August 19, frankly hushing up those who appeared on this publication topic. Thanks to the agreement

On August 23, according to Meltyukhov, "the USSR for the first time in its history received recognition of its interests in Eastern Europe by a great European power", therefore "the Soviet-German non-aggression pact

nii can be regarded as significant luck advice

British diplomacy, which was able to outmaneuver British diplomacy and achieve its main goal of staying out of the European war, while gaining a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, more room for maneuver between the warring factions in their own interests, and in doing so, to shift the blame for disruption of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on London and Paris. It was not in the interests of the Soviet leadership to prevent a war in Europe between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany, since only a war gave it a real chance to significantly increase its influence on the continent... The non-aggression pact, he concludes, ensured not only the interests of the Soviet Union, **but also the rear of Germany, making it easier for her**

**war in Europe.**" In fact, the key role of the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War lies in the words I have highlighted. However, this role is camouflaged by Meltyukhov's geopolitical reasoning.

Thus, despite the obvious progress in the search for the truth about the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the creation of its objective history requires clarification of many more fundamental points. following

concepts of post-communist great power,

defending the aggressive aspirations of Stalin, leads not only to a distortion of the coverage of the key turns of his policy, but also cannot answer such an important question as to why the Red Army, despite

its multiple superiority, suffered such a crushing defeat in 1941. Arguments about the fatal miscalculation of the Soviet leadership and the unpreparedness of the troops to create a continuous front of defense are not enough here. Questions of this kind do not fit into this concept at all, because these questions are not about geo

Stalin's political plans, but about the attitude of millions of Red Army soldiers to the regime he created.

The truth about the eve of the war will have to win its proper place not only in historiography, but also in the public consciousness. Russian society is not yet ready to accept such truth about the war, as evidenced by its negative reaction to V. Sinelnikov's documentary film "The Last Myth" about Viktor Suvorov and his book "Icebreaker". And yet, there is still hope that May 9 in Russia will someday become not only the Day of the long-awaited peace that came after the bloody war, the Day of Remembrance of the 27 million who died in this war, but also a reminder of our

pote, about how relations between the authorities and society **should not** be built.

## Notes

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<sup>2</sup> Kogan L.A. War communism: utopia and reality // Vopr. is torii. 1998. No. 2. S. 128.

<sup>3</sup> "I ask you to write less: this should not get into print." Speeches by V.I. Lenin at the IX Conference of the RCP(b) September 22, 1920 // Historical archive. 1992. No. 1. S. 12, 13.

<sup>4</sup> Raak R.Ch. A source from the highest circles of the Comintern about Stalin's plans related to the Second World War // Patriotic History. 1996. No. 3. S. 45.

<sup>5</sup> Historical archive. 1992. No. 1. S. 16.

<sup>6</sup> GANO, f. P-1, op. 3, d. 11, l. 51.

<sup>7</sup> Stalin I.V. Op. T. 14 / Comp. and general ed. R. Kosolapova. M., 1997. P. 106. B. Solonevich cites this episode in more detail: "Recently, he (Stalin. - *I.P.*) gave an interview to the American journalist Howard (so in the text. - *I.P.*), and when he unexpectedly asked Stalin about his intention to start a world revolution, the latter made a "genuinely naive" face.

- What kind of world revolution?

The American was even embarrassed by such impudence.

- Excuse me, Mr. Stalin. Why, the whole world thinks that your task is to establish world communism through revolution in all countries.

Where did such a strange opinion come from? There is an obvious misunderstanding here. Our Soviet Union thinks only of arranging its own life and never thinks of interfering in the affairs of other countries. All fables about

the fact that we are striving for some kind of world revolution is nothing but the fantasy of our enemies ... " // *Solonevich B.* Conspiracy of the Red Bon part. Marshal Tukhachevsky: A documented novel. Buenos-Ayres, 1958. S. 125.

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<sup>10</sup> Semiryaga M.I. Secrets of Stalinist diplomacy. 1939-1941. M., 1992, pp. 48-49.

<sup>11</sup> One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov: From the diary of F. Chuev. M., 1991. S. 20.

<sup>12</sup> *Nekrich A.M.* 1941. June 22. M., 1965. S. 8-9. In 1995 the book A.M. Nekrich has been reissued. His modern point of view on this issue is as follows: "I have no doubt that Stalin planned the participation of the USSR in a large-scale European war, but at the same time he was afraid of colliding with an alliance of leading capitalist powers and, above all, he was afraid of changing the front by England and its collusion with Germany against the USSR... Stalin was afraid of finding himself in political isolation... This, it seems to me, is the vulnerable point of the assumption that Stalin was counting on delivering an unexpected, preventive strike to Hitler in the summer of 1941 [...] Soviet military-industrial plans were mainly focused on their implementation in 1942. Perhaps this time would be, in Stalin's opinion, the most suitable time to throw the pound weights of Soviet military power onto the scales. - *Nekrich A.* 1941.

June 22: Ed. 2nd, add. and reworked. M., 1995. S. 216-217.

<sup>13</sup> Archive of Dr. ist. sciences, prof. A.S. Moscow. The transcript of the meeting of the Party Control Committee (CPC) under the Central Committee of the CPSU was published under the title "A.M. Nekrich: From the history of the persecution of the Soviet intelligentsia. Publication of documents about the book. A. Without shouting "1941. June 22" and the circumstances related to its discussion. Foreword L.P. Petrovsky // *Centaur*. 1994. No. 4 - 5. By the decision of the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU L.P. Petrovsky was severely reprimanded and put on a record card "for his irresponsible, politically erroneous speech during the discussion of A.M. Nekrich and for violating party discipline. — *Centaur*. 1994. No. 5. P. 96. As for E.A. Boltin, then by a resolution of the Politburo of May 5, 1940, he was appointed editor of the Red Star - RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1021, p. 177. From that time on, he was an active conductor of Stalin's policy and knew a lot about the impending attack on Germany.

B.A. Nevezhin cited a number of statements from E.A. Boltin at a meeting with writers on June 25, 1940. In particular, he said:

"We must be ready, if necessary, to be the first to strike ... It is absolutely clear that the nature of the Red Army's combat operations will be active." E.A. Boltin also formulated the main principles of the Soviet military ideology, which had to be put into practice. First, the Red Army is an instrument of war. Secondly, the war of the USSR against any capitalist state will have a fair character, regardless of who starts it. — *Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome. Soviet propaganda on the eve of the "holy battles", 1939-1941. M., 1997. S. 134.*

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<sup>65</sup> Doroshenko V.L. Stalin's provocation of the Second World War // 1939-1945. September 1 - May 9. Fiftieth Anniversary of the Defeat of Nazi Germany in the Context of the Beginning of World War II. Proceedings of a scientific seminar (April 16, 1995, Novosibirsk). Novosibirsk, 1995. S. 17.

<sup>66</sup> Pietrov-Ennker B. Germany in June 1941 a victim of the Soviet aggression? (On the thesis of "preventive war") // *Centaur*. 1995. No. 2; *Gorodetsky G.* Answers to the questions of the journal // *New and latest history*

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67 Chubaryan A. War and the fate of the world...// Free Thought. 1995. no. 2. S. 52.

68 Ibid. pp. 48, 52.

<sup>69</sup> Kumanev G., Shklyar E. Before and after the pact. Soviet-German wearing on the eve of the war // Svobodnaya thought. 1995. No. 2. S. 9-10.

<sup>70</sup> Sakharov A.N. War and Soviet diplomacy: 1939-1945// Vopr. stories. 1995. No. 7. S. 26.

71 Ibid. S. 29, 37.

72 Ibid. pp. 36-37.

73 Ibid. S. 38.

<sup>74</sup> Military history magazine. 1996. No. 2. S. 3.

<sup>75</sup> Gorodetsky G. In the ice of history // Jewish newspaper. 1996. No. 17-18 (September).

76 New and recent history. 1998. No. 2. S. 182.

77 Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome... S. 67.

<sup>78</sup> Historical archive. 1995. No. 2. S. 23-31.

79 Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome. S. 154.

80 Ibid. S. 185.

81 Ibid. P. 12. It is characteristic that in the abstract of the doctoral dissertation by V.A. Nevezhin "Soviet propaganda and ideological preparation for war (the second half of the 30s - early 40s)". (M., 1999)

B. Suvorov is not mentioned at all. The same trend can be traced in the vast majority of modern publications. See, for example: *Bobylev P.N.* It's too early to put an end to the discussion. To the question of planning in the General Staff of the Red Army a possible war with Germany in

1940-1941 // Patriotic history. 2000. No. 1. S. 41-43.

82 Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome... P. 176. Based on this recording of Stalin's speech, O.V. Vishlev built his objections to V.A. Nevezhin and M.I. Meltyukhov in a special article "Speech by I.V. Stalin on May 5, 1941. Russian documents" // New and recent history. 1998. No. 4.

83 Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome... S. 156.

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88 New and recent history. 1998. No. 6. S. 201-208. Report by M.I. Meltyukhov "The Eve of the Great Patriotic War: the discussion continues" in 1999 was published by "AIRO - XX" in the series "AIRO - scientific reports and discussions. Themes for the 21st century.

89 Myagkov M.Yu. Pre-war operational plans of the USSR (session Association of Historians of World War II) // War and Politics... C. 493.

<sup>90</sup> A vivid confirmation of this circumstance was the discussion at a theoretical seminar at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences on June 24, 1997 of the book by S.G. Wheatcroft and R.W. Davis "Crisis (! - *I.P.*) in Soviet agriculture (1931-1933)". According to L. Viola, a participant in this discussion, "Wheatcroft and Davis presented today for discussion an excellent example of revisionism in considering the problem of hunger" // Domestic History. 1998. No. 6. S. 122.

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<sup>94</sup> Gurevich A.Ya. Historian and History. To the 70th anniversary of Yu.L. Immortal // Odysseus. Man in history. 1993. M., 1994. S. 213.

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98 Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. Soviet Union and struggle for Europe: 1939-1941. (Documents, facts, judgments). M., 2000. pp. 497-498, 501-503.

99 Ibid. pp. 16, 393, 405, 411-413, 415, etc.

100 Ibid. S. 506.

101 Ibid. pp. 79, 86, 93-94, 492.

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*Yuri Tsurganov*

## HOW TO READ POST-SOVIET HISTORIANS?

### Dots over "I"

With the statement that the history of the Second World War is slandered, many will agree. Moreover, they will agree that the history of the participation of the USSR in it has been slandered. But at the same time, each agreeing will have in mind his own: one - that they lied before perestroika, the other - that they are lying now. Therefore, I will immediately reveal my cards: I belong to the category of people about which Prokhanov said: "... they strive to spit the red icons of Victory with poisonous saliva of nihilism"<sup>1</sup>.

### Great start

In the early 1990s, scientific works on the history of the Second World War were characterized by sharp criticism of the historiography of the Soviet period and the desire to dissociate itself from it: "... Adherents of totalitarianism are still trying to impose historical myths in order to eradicate scientific knowledge. Such an example is the notorious ten-volume book "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. 1941-1945", work on which was launched in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of August 13, 1987 ... The ten-volume official opus is a purposeful

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sabotage of ideologues from the CPSU against the people who see clearly from lies. This is an attempt to revive the idea of the strength and inviolability of the "socialist" system by familiar means ... The public expects from historians a fundamentally new work created on the basis of a deep reassessment of the past, and not a corrected model of what has already been written"<sup>2</sup>. This trend was stable for several years, but then the situation began

change.

### Katyn - sanity test

Among the previously unexplored problems, one of the first to attract the attention of modern Russian historians was the fate of Polish prisoners of war in the USSR.

Collection of articles "Katyn Drama"<sup>3</sup> with the participation of domestic researchers, the author of the foreword, prof. A.O. Chubaryan called the first scientific publication in our country dedicated to the Katyn case. The publications are based on archival documents. "... The cases of Polish officers and policemen who were in the Kozelsky, Starobelsky and Ostashkovsky camps in December 1939 - March 1940, - concludes N. Lebedeva, - were being prepared for consideration by the Special Meeting of the NKVD in April - May 1940. More than 15,000 Polish prisoners of war—officers and policemen—were taken from the Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov camps and handed over to the UNKVD of the Smolensk, Kharkov, and Kalinin regions. This was their last route, the final points of which were Katyn, Mednoe and the 6th quarter of the forested area of Kharkov"<sup>4</sup>.

The conclusion about the "Soviet trace" was also made by V.K. Abarinov, author of the monograph "Katyn labyrinth"<sup>5</sup>. From a legal point of view, Abarinov assesses the events in Katyn as a war crime. At the same time, he refers to Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which speaks of violations of the laws and customs of war, in particular, the killing of prisoners of war. The author also points out that the Soviet Union

was a party to the Convention on the non-applicability of the statute of limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity of November 26, 1968. In December 1983, the USSR voted for resolution 38/99 of the UN General Assembly, according to which it is the obligation of all members of the international community to bring to justice the perpetrators of these crimes.

In principle, the question of who exactly shot the Poles in Katyn has already lost its historical relevance, the subject of research today can only be the details of the event. After in April 1990 the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev admitted the guilt of the NKVD in the Katyn case, and this issue lost its political relevance. Today, the question of responsibility for what has been done has turned into a sanity test, which not everyone in our country passes.

There are three counterarguments. The first is the denial to the last, in spite of obvious circumstances, of the fact execution of Polish prisoners of war by Soviet special services, shifting responsibility to the Wehrmacht, SS, on Gestapo. The arguments, as a rule, are dressed in a characteristic linguistic form: "It's not us, it's the Germans." Indeed, the instinct of self-preservation alone should make everyone come out in defense of everyone whom a person unites with himself into a single "we". The problem rests on the fact that there are still people for whom Stalin and the NKVD are "we".

(Foreign social and political thought sometimes itself pushes the place of estates to such use. In the West, and in Eastern Europe, they often do not breed, but synonymize the concepts of "Russians" and "Bolsheviks". For example, Vojtech Mastny gave his book the title: "Russia's Path to the Cold War. Although during the Cold War there was no state with the name "Russia" on the political map of the world.)

The second "counterargument": yes, were the Chekists carrying out executions, but "are our Polish friends not in a position to assess what happened from a clear class

positions? After all, we are talking about the commanding cadres of the old Polish army, which was in the service of the bourgeoisie. So why are the Polish comrades beginning to lose their class sense and fall into nationalistic ambitions?

The third "counterargument": the leadership of the NKVD misinterpreted the order to liquidate the camps, Stalin everyone did not mean the execution of the Poles, these are subordinates overdone.

And yet the most popular is the first "counterargument". An example is the book of the editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Duel" Yuri Mukhin "Anti-Russian meanness". In it, as in several other works, the author tries to cross out the conclusions of modern historical science about the initial period of World War II and return to the canons of Soviet historiography, flavoring them with the pathos of national Bolshevism.

"Anti-Russian meanness" - a book about Katyn. It is not even necessary to pick it up in order to understand what the author wants to convince his readers of. The cover depicts a German soldier shooting a man in a Polish uniform in the back of the head. (The quality of the drawing is very low, but the characteristic German helmet and the Polish "confederate" can be guessed.) Within the framework of the article, it is not possible to give a complete analysis of Mukhin's theses. We will only say that the first document that he cites (and already in the introduction to the book) is "the testimony of the peasant Kiselev" to the NKVD officers. In them, Kiselev claims that under the Germans he was forced to say that the Poles were killed by the Chekists, since the Germans used physical methods of coercion against him. Apparently, it should be understood that the representatives of the Soviet authorities did not use such methods, and therefore the person was truly frank with them.

The level of Mukhin's controversy is characterized by statements of the following kind: "After the war, for the Polish gentry freaks, hanging around abroad and ready for anything for small handouts, the Katyn affair became

the only justification for why they didn't fight against the Germans in World War II and why they crap Poland even after the war... The coming to power of the brainless Gorbachev and his team in the USSR left the Soviet Union without control. This spotted cretin sawed off the branch on which he was sitting, and falling from the top into the garbage he pretends that this is exactly what he wanted because of his commitment to "universal values" and his new "thinking"<sup>6</sup>. Mukhin evaluates his scientific opponents as follows: "... the archives were admitted mainly to extremely vile, but sometimes simply stupid" scientists "..."

Mukhin likes to bring the events of 1940 (or, as he believes, 1941) to the present: "How many people in Russia understand that ... an almost 40-year-old military ally of the USSR has now become a potential enemy of Russia? .." But he understands Did he himself say that Poland was never an ally of the USSR, that it was its satellite? Does he understand that in 1944 it was not the "liberation" of Poland that took place, but the change of the occupation regime - Hitler's to Stalin's? The Red Army was inactive instead of coming to the aid of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944. This uprising against the Nazis was led by the Home Army ("gentry freaks" who "did not fight against the Germans in World War II"). The Home Army is a force that sought to restore the rule of law that existed in Poland in the pre-war years. Of course, it was to Stalin's advantage that the Nazis drown this uprising in blood, which is why the Red Army was inactive. After all, Stalin's main goal was to impose on Poland, as well as on other European states that he could reach, the same barbaric system that existed in the USSR. It succeeded, and during the forty years mentioned by Mukhin, the USSR kept Poland on a leash. In 1982, Jaruzelski was even forced to introduce martial law himself in order to prevent the development of events according to the Hungarian scenario of 1956 or the Czechoslovak scenario of 1968. Even without Katyn, this is enough to recognize the hatred of the Poles for Bolshevism



quite justified. So far only towards Bolshevism as a system, but what about Russians as a nation?

Mukhin's general conclusion: "The Katyn case was used by the "fifth column" of the USSR and Russia in exactly the same way. the same way as it was used by the Nazis with their Polish lackeys starting from 1943, i.e. to cause hatred among Europeans for the USSR and Russia ... "

The tragedy of Mukhin and his associates concluded  
The problem lies in the fact that for them the USSR is a Russian state.

— And what else? - the question will follow.

- Bolshevik, communist, Soviet (in this case, we will consider these terms as synonyms). And that means anti-Russian in the narrow sense and anti-human in the broad sense. How does a nation-state differ from a totalitarian one? The fact that the national government in its activities proceeds from the fact that to improve the lives of citizens. On

in this field, national governments can make mistakes, may turn out to be insufficiently competent, but the vector of their policy is set, nevertheless, in the named direction. The totalitarian government, in principle, does not set itself the task of improving the lives of citizens. Its task is to strengthen the regime inside the country and expand the geography of its influence. And everything that is in the country, including citizens, is only raw material for the implementation of the main task. Moreover, its implementation is an endless process. Of course, totalitarian rulers also do something for the citizens, but just as the slave owner does something for the slaves, and the farmer does something for the

domestic animals.

Why tragedy? Because Mukhin really loves Russia. But in an effort to express his feelings, he tries to defend the USSR - a state that was the main enemy for the peoples living on its territory. Any accusation directed against the USSR is perceived by Mukhin and his like-minded people as "anti-Russian meanness", that is, a priori taken. How true is this accusation?

it doesn't matter to them: they blame "ours", which means they need to defend themselves. In reality, Russia is the first victim of Bolshevism, which subsequently began to act on behalf of its victim, incurring the hatred of neighboring peoples for its crimes. To renounce Lenin and Stalin as the destroyers of Russia is the main task of national policy. To speak of them as national leaders is indeed anti-Russian meanness, in this case without

quotes.

The really bad thing is that Mukhin is unscrupulous in his means. In order to ensure support for his version on the part of the Russian inhabitants, he plays on very unpretentious feelings: "How many people understand that as soon as the desired

naya by the Poles and domestic scoundrels, we will foreign citizens of Russia pay the current citizens of hostile Poland monetary "compensation"?.." Mukhin repeatedly addresses the topic of a possible "lawsuit by Polish citizens against Russian citizens". Researchers whose goal is to reconstruct an adequate picture of the past do not resort to such arguments.

Mukhin not only jumps from 1940 to 1991, but also jumps back to 1937: "The Katyn affair perfectly explains why emergency troikas were required on the eve of World War II and why the "fifth column" was so mercilessly destroyed.

The scale of his super-task is really impressive: not only to blame the architects of perestroika for all sorts of sins, but also to justify the Stalinist repressions.

But Mukhin offended Alexander Filippovich Katusev in vain ("... in the autumn of 1990, the chief military prosecutor of the USSR Katusev, from the notorious scoundrels of the GVP, assembled an "investigative team" to legally falsify this case"). A more zealous fighter against the "fifth column" than Katusev, perhaps, cannot be found. In 1990, together with V. Oppokov, he wrote the article "Judas. (Vlasovites

in the service of fascism). The name speaks for itself and brings us to another topic, no less burning.

## In whose service were the Vlasovites?

In the 1990s, several serious books were published about the anti-Stalinist protest of Soviet citizens in 1941-1945. They are usually written by young historians and published by private publishers. But here is a book written by Mikhail Ivanovich Semiryaga, a coryphaeus of Soviet historical science, a veteran (not least), published by the ROSSPEN publishing house, The Russian Political Encyclopedia. In this monograph, entitled "Collaborationism. Nature, typology and manifestations during the Second World War"<sup>8</sup> read: "The vast majority of citizens of the states of the former Soviet Union strongly condemn the inhuman Stalinist regime. But when it comes to the political assessment of those who waged an active struggle against him, a seemingly paradoxical situation arises: people are ready to sympathize with those prisoners of the Stalinist regime who were imprisoned in numerous Gulag camps and, in essence, could not actively fight against it. But these same people are psychologically still not ready to understand and accept those opponents of Stalin who fought against the same regime with weapons in their hands ... Life is always richer, more complex, more multifaceted than any, even the most established schemes and stereotypes. Therefore, it seems that over time, the attitude towards collaborators - except, of course, genuine war criminals, punishers for whom there is no and cannot be forgiveness - will certainly change. The new generations of our compatriots will obviously be able to more widely and impartially assess the nature and motives of the behavior of many collaborators, to see and understand the tragedy of their destinies"<sup>9</sup>.

Such a view, presented in fact at the official level, was a great event for the fatherland.

venous science. But then there was a rollback. Boris Filippov in his article "Resistance to the Soviet Regime (1920-1941)"<sup>10</sup> begins "for health": "The thesis about the absence of resistance, about the passive behavior of the civilian population bled white by the world war, the either died or emigrated." He cites numerous facts of resistance to Bolshevism in the 1920s-1930s and classifies them. But he ends "for peace": "... until the beginning of the Patriotic War, resistance to the Stalinist regime did not stop." And what, after the start of the "Patriotic War" it stopped? It is after June 22 that I will deploy it

moose for real.

S. Chuev, author of the book *Cursed Soldiers*,<sup>11</sup> acknowledges both the existence of resistance and its scope. But, wondering why this became possible, he answers: "First of all, this is the readiness of German commanders to recruit local residents and prisoners of war, although such an initiative was sometimes hampered by the Nazi encirclement"<sup>12</sup>.

This readiness of the German commanders did not manifest itself immediately. Cooperation initiative with a German  
mi came from the local population and from the military  
prisoners. The idea of political registration of the movement also came from the locals - specifically from the residents of Smolensk in the fall of 1941. The question of what came first - the anti-Stalinist protest of the citizens of the USSR, which passed from a latent phase to an open one under war conditions, or the desire of the Germans to replenish their thinning regiments with someone - is fundamentally important. Nor can one agree with the fact that the initiative "sometimes was hindered by the Hitlerite encirclement." It met with the most active opposition from the Nazi party elite, primarily from Hitler himself, since it contradicted the ideological principles developed even before the war.

"... We serve the Germans," Chuev continues, "still perceived, including in the popular consciousness, as a betrayal, and even if the burgomaster

became a former Soviet or party official, and a former policeman became a policeman, then such an act was regarded as especially cynical and unforgivable..."<sup>13</sup>

There was no unified attitude towards the cooperation of fellow citizens with the Germans, since the cooperation itself was massive. In addition, many looked at it from a pragmatic standpoint. The criminal police (militia in the USSR) must exist in any country under any regime. And she must be local, speak the same language with the population, have experience working in con

specific cities and towns, know the special  
fic of the criminal world. The Bolsheviks retreated, so there is no need to catch crooks? Do not need to service the life support system? Plow, sow, harvest? That's what Stalin wanted: either with me, or not at all. Hence the orders to destroy the infrastructure during the retreat of the Red Army. (Hitler would do the same from the end of 1944, a scorched-earth tactic.) Dictators want life to end.

went along with them, but should the nation share this  
sight?

Chuev's book is a compilation, he relies on a lot of documentary data introduced into scientific circulation by other authors, but the conclusions and assessments he offers are directly opposite. Thanks that he expresses To Alexandrov, S. Drobyazko, G. Kokunko

and others, therefore it looks rather strange.

B. Kovalev's book "Nazi Occupation and Collaborationism in Russia, 1941-1944"<sup>14</sup> is based on  
in the dissertation, as can be seen already from the introduction: the enumeration of the object, subject, purpose, research tasks, characteristic of this genre, classification of sources, analysis of the historiography of the problem. This already obliges us to pay special attention to this work.

"Planting in the occupied territories its  
"new order", the Nazis sought to erase the very word "Russia" from the map of the so-called "New Europe"<sup>15</sup>.

Russia was not on the world map in 1941, it was already destroyed by the Bolsheviks.

The author evaluates the works of his predecessors: "Since the mid-1990s, articles and books have appeared in Russia telling about various forms of Russian collaborationism in apologetic tones. These include, first of all, articles by K. Alexandrov in the magazines "Posev" and "New Watch". Since 1997 in Moscow under the editorship of A.V. Okorokov published "Materials on the history of the Russian Liberation Movement (1941-1945)" ... The Vlasov movement in them is called the "Russian Liberation Movement" (it is in this spelling, all words with a capital letter. - B.K.) . Soviet resistance is written in pejorative tones..."<sup>16</sup>

Kovalev's preferences are obvious: "Of the most fundamental works of a general nature on the events of the Second World War, one should note the six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union" published in 1960-1965 by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense. 1941-1945". Its authors introduced into scientific circulation a huge amount of material reflecting all the main aspects of the history of the war, including the events in the territory of our country occupied by the Nazis"<sup>17</sup>. No less flattering was the 12-volume History of World War II, published in 1973-1982. "Separate chapters of this work were devoted to the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines"<sup>18</sup>. Let us compare this statement with the assessment given to Soviet multivolume books in 1992 (quoted at the beginning of this article). Rollback again. The trend is depressing

schaya.

"... So far there is no comprehensive study on this problem," Kovalev continues. "The lack of work in this area has now been taken advantage of by those who are directly or indirectly trying to rehabilitate people who collaborated with the Germans during the Great Patriotic War. Actively using the media, they promote the idea of the independence of the collaborative

rationalist movement. One of the most important tasks now facing Russian historians is the objective study of this problem, the exposure of such statements”<sup>19</sup>.

The author concludes: “The country had one enemy—foreign invaders...”<sup>20</sup> Well, if so, is it not necessary to fight against Stalin? (According to the data presented in 1991 to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by the prosecution and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the total number of victims of Stalinist repressions was 50,114,267 people.) This means that those who did this were “in the service of fascism,” and not more moreover? Leading the reader to this conclusion, the author returns to the most straightforward Soviet interpretations, discarding a whole layer of studies and conclusions made in the 1990s.

## Passion for the "Icebreaker" continues

In 2002, the publishing house "Veche" in Moscow published a book by Alexander Pomogaibo "Pseudo-historian Suvorov and the mysteries of the Second World War." This is another attempt to refute the concept of Stalin's preparations for an attack on Europe in 1941. Previous attempts have been futile. The main argument of the critics was ideological: “With the book Icebreaker, Suvorov offended the feelings of veterans of the Great Patriotic War.” The text of the book was not analyzed by anyone, including the main critic, Gabriel Gorodetsky. His monograph *The Myth of the Icebreaker* should have had a different title - *Some Information on Soviet-German Relations at the Turn of the 1930s-1940s*. It contains a lot of new and interesting things, but there is no refutation of Suvorov's concept in it.

Help me first who set himself the task of refuting Suvorov point by point, but, again, to no avail. The first thing that attracts attention is the author's attempt to reproduce the style of his opponent. Suvorov's language is lively, aphoristic, almost colloquial. This is both the strength and the weakness of his books about the war. strength in

the fact that the author has gained a mass readership, weakness - gave his ill-wishers a reason to classify "Icebreaker" as journalism, although in essence this is a scientific study. Suvorov loves to joke, but he does it with talent, while Pomogaibo is mediocre: "I can really see: the bearded Marx conjures over retorts, cultivates pure Marxism. But it doesn't work clean. Everything comes out dirty, with sediment. "Oh, something is missing," Marx mournfully whispers. "Suvorov-Rezun would add here to me one hundred and fifty grams of the world revolution ..." A nightmare scene. Brrr."

Such arrogance is found on almost every page. Indeed "brrrr". Reading is difficult and not pleasant.

The second is the pettiness of nit-picking. Suvorov writes: "And the shells of the Tiger (weight 56 tons) and Tigr-B (weight 67 tons) could not penetrate the IS-2 from such a distance ..." Pomogaybo retorts: "It cannot be such that the tank had shells of 67 tons! Yes, Suvorov's phrase

not very well built, but nevertheless it is quite clear that tons refer to tanks, and not to shells.

There is a letter on the forum: "Mr. Help! Let's be honest... You wrote a bad book. Superficial in the presentation of facts, in constructing counterarguments to the theory of Vladimir Bogdanovich, and simply unprofessional. I have been writing a similar work since June 2001 (more than 3 MB of Word text have already been written, more than 1.2 million printed characters with spaces), so as a colleague I see advantages and disadvantages.

When I wrote

each of the chapters, then dug into various sources, both ours and foreign, and sought out the essence of the matter. I even made my way to the RGVA (Russian State Military Archive. - Yu.Ts.) and read documents in Finnish. Well, how can you jump in one chapter with those we are on a topic without finishing the thought and without building a clear proof with the conclusion "listened-post updated" at the end? The way you do it, books are not written. Chaotic presentation of facts, lack of own



whole theory about the development of events ... V. Suvorov your grind the book to powder...

Let's see, of course, what the author of the letter himself will present in the end, but the attempt to "expose" Suvorov, undertaken by Pomogaibo, should be recognized as unsuccessful.

In addition, these attempts have already tired readers. Anti-Suvorov books ceased to be in demand. This is eloquently evidenced by the fact that one of the works was smuggled into the reader. "Icebreaker-2". The cover design is similar to that of the entire Suvorov series, the author's name is "Viktor Surovov". The order of the letters has been changed, but a cursory glance does not immediately catch it. As a marketing technique - an abomination, in terms of content - an even greater abomination. This is not even a personal criticism, but just a collection of dirty conjectures.

## All Quiet on the Western Front

A. Orlov in his book "Behind the Scenes of the Second Front"<sup>21</sup> asks the question: "What allowed Hitler for almost five years (September 1939 - June 1944) to successfully avoid a war on two fronts? Why was the second front opened only in the fifth year of the war? and about the fact that England and France declared war on Hitler on September 3, 1939, two days after he attacked Poland. But for him, these are insignificant episodes: "... The concept of the "second front" implied the military operations of the armed forces of the USA and England in Western Europe (and in 1944. - Yu.Ts.), yes, precisely in Western, *because* only the crushing simultaneous onslaught on Germany from the east and west, from the territories directly leading the armies of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition to the borders of Germany itself and to the capital of the Third Reich, allowed the allies to take the citadel of the fascist bloc into powerful

wise. Only such conditions ensured victory over the Nazi Reich in the entire Second World War.

First, the territory leading directly to the borders of the Reich was not only France, but also Italy. Secondly, the presence of several fronts, without

relative to where they are located, forced

the Germans to disperse their forces did not allow them to gather into a single fist in the eastern direction. As for Japan, for it the Soviet Far East was an alternative to Pearl Harbor, but the Japanese blow fell on the United States. Otherwise, not Hitler, but Stalin would have fought on two fronts.

All this is quite obvious, but Orlov's overriding task is to once again confirm the Soviet thesis that the USSR took upon itself not only the largest part of the task of defeating Hitler, but that the participation of the allies was extremely small, and they shied away from decisive decisions until the very end. actions.

But in general, which front is the second, and which is the first? At the time Britain and France declared war on Hitler, the USSR and Germany were bound by a non-aggression pact. After 25 days, they signed a treaty of friendship, that is, they became allies. The USSR supplied Germany with strategic raw materials - the Messerschmitts ironing the British Isles ran on fuel made from Baku oil. The two dictators agreed on spheres of influence in Europe, set about

section and, of course, gnawed.

Here we come to another super-task of Orlov - to convince the reader that the USSR supposedly had no aggressive intentions: the resources of the Soviet state. The leading role was acquired by geopolitics, not ideology. There was, one might say, the farewell of "Slavyanka" with "Varshavyanka". The Soviet Union needed peace."24

The pun about the songs is spectacular, but the declaration as a whole is not supported by any facts. From which it follows that Stalin abandoned the world revolution

tions - from the slogan "Socialism in a single country"? So there is no contradiction here - first in one country, then everywhere. As for the "national real interests of the Soviet state", then this is in a generally incorrect formulation of the question, the USSR simply did not have such, this state did not set itself the task of serving the interests of the nation.

The tone of Robert Ivanov's book "Stalin and the Allies: 1941-1945"<sup>25</sup> is set by the epigraph - a quote from Stalin: "I know that after my death a pile of rubbish is not brought to my grave, but the wind of history will dispel it!" The book is openly revanchist - the author sets the task of canceling the conclusions made by the historical science of the 1990s. He justifies this aspiration as follows: "On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the West, the falsification of history and the results of the war has sharply intensified. Unfortunately, individual domestic historians are also actively participating in this campaign"<sup>26</sup>. "Many historians, writers, publicists now specialize in the endless slandering of everything that happened in the history of our country after 1917 "<sup>27</sup>.

Ivanov strives to appear objective, repeatedly repeating that Stalin made "serious mistakes." However, the author is so "objective" that he is ready to equate the devil with a baby: "Stalin, on the one hand, Roosevelt and Churchill, on the other, represented different systems, opposite in their socio-economic and socio-political content ... each of them had its pluses and minuses... The Emperor of Russia Alexander I was by no means an exemplary democrat, nor did he shine with any other virtues. Nevertheless, his name is inscribed in history as the liberator of Europe from the yoke of Napoleon. This is an attempt to draw an analogy with the "liberator of Europe" Stalin, who was also not a "model democrat."

The author is interested in the moral side of the issue: "... From the very beginning of the Second World War, the states that fought against the bloc of fascist countries waged justice

vicious, liberation war for its existence. This liberating character of the Second World War was further intensified after the entry of the Soviet Union into it. The liberation character of the war really intensified after June 22, 1941, as the number of people in the world fighting against tyranny increased, both external and internal (the latter, however, Ivanov does not mean). But June 22, 1941 is not the date the USSR entered World War II; by that time, it had been fighting for almost two years. Given this, the author's statement is false. The USSR entered World War II on September 17, 1939, stabbing Poland in the back. And there is nothing liberating in this - the regiment of aggressors has arrived. With this in mind, Ivanov's statement is also false.

Some of the author's statements are generally bewildering: "The popular character of the Second World War required the search for new ways of cooperation between the broadest masses of the people of the Soviet Union and the public of allied and friendly countries"<sup>30</sup>. First, if we are talking about new ways, then what are the old ways of cooperation? The number of citizens of the USSR who had contacts with foreigners in the prewar years was limited to an extremely narrow circle of responsible workers, and they were the first candidates for "landing". Secondly, if we proceed from the expediency of preserving the socio-political structure of the USSR, and Ivanov proceeds precisely from this, then it was necessary, as in the pre-war years, not to allow the citizens of the USSR to come into contact with the "other world", so that they would not get smart reason and did not show the foreign community evidence of the Soviet order. Stalin understood this very well, hence his attitude towards those who during the war years came into contact with the allies, for example, through work in the Lend-Lease field, not to mention prisoners of war and Ostarbeiters. Contact by

the last with the allies only aggravated their fate: mastering those liberated from the German camps by the Red Army are candidates for the "chervonets", and the liberated Anglo-Ame

Ricans - on the "quarter". Ivanov mentions several anti-fascist committees set up in the USSR, whose members actually traveled throughout the allied countries, but these are not "broad masses of the people." In addition, the exception confirms the rule: most of the participants in these tours were then planted and shot, and Mikhoels had a fatal accident.

house.

Ivanov complains: "... in the huge historical and publicist literature devoted to the history of the Second World War, there is still a big blank spot - showing the role of the broad masses in the defeat of fascist Germany, its allies and satellites"<sup>31</sup>. Taking into account the fact that Soviet literature about the war was aimed at this in the first place, and all the same - a "blank spot", perhaps the rumors about this role should be recognized as exaggerated? The regular army, yes, the partisan movement, directed and strictly controlled by Moscow, yes, but the "broad masses of the people"?..

Like other red revanchists, Robert Ivanov likes to bring the topic to the present: "... there is a direct connection between the topic "Stalin and the Allies: 1941-1945" and the most acute problems of modern Russia, its internal and external political situation." [<sup>32</sup>] The author's personal political preferences are most clearly revealed by his phrase: "Stalin remained one of the Big Three when it was time to sum up the results of the war. And it was a great blessing for our country."<sup>32</sup>

## Push and don't let go

Textbook by Igor Dolutsky "History of the USSR. XX century" is deprived of the stamp "recommended". In an interview with Novoye Vremya magazine (December 21, 2003), the author said that the publisher was able to redraw their notes from the official copy of the textbook. The anger of officials is caused by the mention of the victims of repression: "For the years 1941-1942

150 thousand people were shot for cowardice and alarmism, this equals 16 divisions. They are also horrified by language such as "half a century of occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union." They are indignant about the following paragraph: "The Bobruisk group of Germans tried 15 times to break out of the encirclement. In full growth during the day, the Germans rushed to break through. Our artillery and machine guns opened fire on them from seven hundred meters away. And they continued to walk, stepping over the corpses. One indignant reviewer, Dolutsky testifies, asked: is this how history should be taught?!

History as a science generally does not set educational tasks for itself, just as physics or chemistry does not set them for itself. It would be simply absurd to talk about their educational significance, but for some reason it is customary to talk about the educational significance of history. The only task of historical science is to reconstruct the events of the past as accurately as possible. This task can be accomplished only if the scale of a historical phenomenon and the degree of attention paid to it by researchers are adequate to each other. Any bias—increased attention to selected subjects, withdrawal from other subjects—immediately creates the effect of a distorted mirror. And what is education, especially patriotic education? This is the desire to convey to the educated a system of views and judgments. And if historical science is placed at the service of this, then this will inevitably mean a biased selection of facts - we write and talk about

what does honor to the fatherland, and what does not - about that we write and we don't speak. Moreover, we are not talking about what does honor to the enemy of the fatherland. And then science degenerates into propaganda, researcher and teacher the body turns into a political instructor.

The episode with the Bobruisk grouping of Germans, continues Dolutsky, is an almost verbatim retelling of the memoirs of Marshal Rokossovsky. "For 40 years there were no complaints against Rokossovsky that he incorrectly covers our history. But we have such a publishing technology that

she doesn't give footnotes." Indeed, there is practically no source study and historiography in the educational literature. No one is taught the methodology of checking sources for authenticity, they are not taught to analyze facts, compare concepts and draw independent conclusions. Instead, they are taught to take on faith and memorize some clichéd judgments.

"Now the rollback from the previous liberal interpretations and the offensive of the sovereign ideology has begun," writes Dolutsky. "During the years of perestroika, in the era of Yeltsin, the communist core was removed from it, but the state remained ... Just do not confuse the state and the people, the state and the country. They do not match, they are not synonyms. I tried to portray ... how the state actually behaved, the rulers behaved and how people resisted them ... You can love your homeland, but hate the state ... The Bolsheviks committed a crime in 1917, a continuing crime, and it cannot contain some bright moments that I am advised to find. The only bright moment is the resistance of the people to this onslaught."

A stereotype is being formed: the Great Patriotic War is (after Pushkin) "our everything". Under the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, a "public organization" was created - the Council of Veterans. The goal is obvious - to carry out the introduction of Soviet patriotism. Vete wounds for the most part are the most conservative part of creatures.

Dolutsky: "There is a Constitution that guarantees the absence of an official ideology. If our ideology is not nationalistic, not chauvinistic, my textbook has the right to exist... There is an attempt to change the ideology, and this is state policy, and every academic year it takes a step forward... The ministry is only an executor of the state order, which is from people standing at the very top, and it is, of course, beneficial for them that everyone has one opinion.

The fate of Dolutsky's textbook is not the only assignor. A few years ago, the persecution of the textbook began

A.A. Kreder, The Recent History of Foreign Countries. They also removed the neck, the author suffered two heart attacks and died. Officials were not satisfied with about the same as in Dolutsky's book. Kreder was persecuted mercilessly because he did not show in the proper, in their opinion, volume the feat of the Soviet people. Although he has a different topic - world history. Here is a review by Y. Mukhin posted on the website of the Zavtra newspaper: "After reading this textbook, I came to the conclusion that this book is an example of anti-Slavic Zionist racism, on the cover of which there is only an inscription: "For the 9th grade native schools of the Rush colony (Russia).

Dolutsky is criticized, in particular, for undermining "the collectivist primordial values of the Russian people and instilling individualistic values that are not characteristic of our people." To determine what is characteristic and what is not characteristic of the people as a whole is a pernicious desire in itself. Moreover, the

Riya proved: progress is based on individual creative work in conditions of intellectual freedom (although many people do feel more comfortable in the herd). If we talk about the war, it is difficult to disagree with the authors of the article posted by May 9, 2005 on the website of the Russian Information Agency: that the value of the life of an individual was not only negligible, but was absent altogether, sacrificed to the collective "rallying of the masses" 33.

So, the trends are sad: the intellectual breakthrough that began at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s is opposed by a growing wave of lies. This is especially noticeable when it comes to the history of the Second World War. Is there a way out? "I believe," says the author of the "unrecommended" textbook, "in the possibility of resisting each individual in his area to the onslaught of the state."